

# **Evaluation of the Christchurch city one-way door intervention**

## **Final report**

## **Acknowledgements**

**The authors of the report wish to acknowledge all who contributed to this evaluation, in particular the agency and licensee representatives who participated in multiple interviews and provided much-needed information for this report.**

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**This report was commissioned by the Alcohol Advisory Council of New Zealand and the Accident Compensation Corporation**

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**ISBN 978 – 1 – 877373 – 40 – 4**

**AL451 / JAN 08**

# TABLE OF CONTENTS

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<b>DESCRIPTION OF TERMS</b> .....	<b>6</b>
<b>EXECUTIVE SUMMARY</b> .....	<b>7</b>
<b>INTRODUCTION</b> .....	<b>11</b>
EXPECTED OUTCOMES OF THE EVALUATION .....	11
<b>BACKGROUND</b> .....	<b>12</b>
ALCOHOL ACCORD AND THE CVRP .....	13
<b>EVALUATION METHODOLOGY</b> .....	<b>15</b>
PROJECT DOCUMENTATION REVIEW .....	15
WEEKLY/MONTHLY FEEDBACK SURVEY OF LICENSED PREMISES .....	15
INTERVIEWS WITH KEY STAKEHOLDER REPRESENTATIVES .....	15
COMMUNITY PANEL SURVEY .....	16
TELEPHONE SURVEYS OF LICENSEES/REPRESENTATIVES .....	16
OFFENCE DATA.....	17
LITERATURE SUMMARY .....	19
<b>DATA OBTAINED</b> .....	<b>21</b>
PROJECT DOCUMENTATION .....	21
WEEKLY/MONTHLY FEEDBACK SURVEY OF LICENSED PREMISES .....	22
TELEPHONE SURVEYS OF LICENSEES/REPRESENTATIVES .....	22
INTERVIEWS WITH KEY STAKEHOLDER REPRESENTATIVES .....	22
COMMUNITY PANEL SURVEY .....	23
<b>RESULTS: INTERVENTION PROCESS</b> .....	<b>24</b>
THE PLANNED INTERVENTION .....	24
DESCRIPTION OF THE INTERVENTION PROCESS .....	26
<i>Summary overview of the intervention</i> .....	26
<i>Conceptual phase (circa March 2005 – March 2006)</i> .....	26
<i>Engagement phase (March – September 2006)</i> .....	29
<i>Implementation phase (October 2006 – March 2007)</i> .....	44
<i>Costs</i> .....	51
<i>Policing activity</i> .....	51
<b>RESULTS: OUTCOMES OF INTERVENTION</b> .....	<b>55</b>
PERCEPTIONS OF SAFETY AND INCIDENTS .....	55
<i>Safety</i> .....	55
<i>Incidents</i> .....	57
PERCEPTIONS REGARDING PROBLEMS WITH YOUNG PEOPLE .....	60
PERCEPTIONS OF POLICE ACTIVITY AND PERFORMANCE .....	61
ANALYSIS OF OFFENCE DATA.....	63

<i>Whole-weekend data 2005/6 versus 2006/7</i> .....	63
<i>Saturday-Sunday night data 2005/6 versus 2006/7</i> .....	64
<i>Violence offences</i> .....	64
<i>Sexual offences</i> .....	64
<i>Times of offences</i> .....	65
<i>Comparison with Alcolink data</i> .....	68
PERCEPTIONS OF CRIME LEVELS .....	69
PERCEPTIONS OF PUBLIC AWARENESS OF THE ONE-WAY DOOR.....	70
IMPACT ON LICENSED PREMISES' TURNOVER .....	71
INTEREST IN CONTINUATION .....	73
<b>RESULTS: LITERATURE FINDINGS</b> .....	<b>76</b>
<b>DISCUSSION</b> .....	<b>78</b>
WHAT WAS PLANNED COMPARED WITH WHAT TOOK PLACE .....	78
WERE THE OBJECTIVES OF THE ALCOHOL ACCORD MET? .....	78
THE "ACTIVE INGREDIENTS" OF THE INTERVENTION .....	81
MOVING ON .....	84
LESSONS FROM THE CHRISTCHURCH CBD ALCOHOL ACCORD AND ONE-WAY DOOR.....	85
<b>APPENDIX 1: ALCOHOL ACCORD ONE WAY DOOR: LICENSED PREMISES DAILY FEEDBACK SHEET</b> .....	<b>88</b>
<b>APPENDIX 2: KEY STAKEHOLDER INTERVIEW PROMPT SHEET EXAMPLE</b> .....	<b>89</b>
<b>APPENDIX 3: TEMPLATES FOR TELEPHONE SURVEYS OF LICENSEES / REPRESENTATIVES</b> .....	<b>93</b>
<b>APPENDIX 4: LIST OF PREMISES SIGNED UP TO THE ACCORD (SUPPLIED BY CHRISTCHURCH CITY COUNCIL)</b> .....	<b>97</b>
<b>APPENDIX 5: ALCOHOL ACCORD DOCUMENT</b> .....	<b>99</b>
<b>APPENDIX 6: CHRISTCHURCH CITY ALCOHOL ACCORD COMMUNICATIONS AND PROMOTIONS PLAN AUGUST 2006</b> .....	<b>100</b>
INTRODUCTION .....	100
BACKGROUND .....	100
THE STRATEGY .....	101
COMMUNICATION OBJECTIVES .....	101
STAKEHOLDERS .....	102
KEY MESSAGES .....	102
TACTICS & ACTION PLAN .....	103
<b>APPENDIX 7: SUMMARY OF MID POINT EVALUATION OF THE CHRISTCHURCH CITY ONE- WAY DOOR INTERVENTION</b> .....	<b>107</b>
<b>APPENDIX 8: CRIME DATA ANALYSIS: FULL REPORT</b> .....	<b>110</b>
METHODOLOGY .....	111
RESULTS.....	113

<i>Offence numbers</i> .....	113
<i>Offence types</i> .....	114
CONTRIBUTION OF MINOR OFFENCES TO OFFENCE NUMBERS .....	116
TIMES OF OFFENCES .....	117
DAYS ON WHICH OFFENCES OCCURRED .....	121
VIOLENCE OFFENCES.....	121
OFFENCES OF A SEXUAL NATURE.....	121
COMPARABILITY OF NIA AND ALCOLINK DATA .....	122
<b>APPENDIX: SELECTION OF NIA VERSUS CARD DATA.....</b>	<b>124</b>
<b>APPENDIX 9: COMMUNITY PANEL SURVEY ANALYSIS: FULL REPORT.....</b>	<b>125</b>
INTRODUCTION .....	126
METHODOLOGY .....	126
RESULTS.....	126
<i>Survey completion</i> .....	126
<i>Survey respondents' experience of the CBD:</i> .....	127
<i>Perceptions of safety in the CBD</i> .....	128
<i>Perceptions of young people (under 18) and alcohol</i> .....	132
<i>Perceptions of licensed premises/intoxication and violence</i> .....	134
<i>Perceptions of safety in the CBD</i> .....	142
<i>Perceptions of Christchurch CBD</i> .....	146
PERCEPTIONS OF POLICING.....	148
PERCEPTIONS OF ONE-WAY DOOR AND THE ACCORD.....	149
<b>APPENDIX 10: SUMMARY OF LITERATURE .....</b>	<b>152</b>
INTRODUCTION .....	153
METHODOLOGY .....	153
RESULTS.....	154
<i>Scope of the review</i> .....	154
<i>What is an Alcohol Accord?</i> .....	155
<i>Components of Accords</i> .....	156
<i>International examples of liquor industry Accords</i> .....	157
<i>Legal and policy context for one-way door in New Zealand</i> .....	158
<i>"Responsive regulation"</i> .....	160
EVIDENTIAL BASE FOR SUCCESS FACTORS IN IMPLEMENTATION OF A ONE-WAY DOOR INTERVENTION.....	163
CONTRIBUTORS TO VOLUNTARY ACCORD PROJECT SUCCESS .....	166
<i>Engagement and set-up</i> .....	166
<i>Framework for the Accord</i> .....	168
<i>Implementation</i> .....	168
<i>Accord sustainability</i> .....	171
<i>Complementing the Accord</i> .....	173
COMPARING SUCCESS FACTORS WITH AN EXISTING NEW ZEALAND SUMMARY .....	175
<b>REFERENCES .....</b>	<b>176</b>

## DESCRIPTION OF TERMS

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### **Licensee/ licensed premises:**

The terms “licensee” and “licensed premises” are used in this report to refer to holders of on-licences and on-licensed premises respectively. As such, they are exclusive of off-licence holders and off-licensed premises.

### **Alcohol Accord**

An Alcohol Accord is a voluntary, industry-based partnership in a local community used as a framework to introduce practical solutions to alcohol-related problems.

### **One-way door**

The term “one-way door” is used to refer to an intervention where, after an agreed time, patrons in licensed premises are able to remain in the premises, but cannot re-enter the premises or enter another licensed premises after leaving.

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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The Christchurch Central Business District (CBD) Alcohol Accord (Alcohol Accord) was implemented from October 2006 to March 2007 to reduce alcohol-related violence and crime in the Christchurch CBD. The initiative arose out of a collaboration between representatives of the Police District Licensing Unit, Christchurch City Council and Canterbury District Health Board Community and Public Health (the agencies).

The overall aims of the intervention were to:

- Reduce the incidence of violence where the perpetrator and/or victim are affected by alcohol
- Improve local-level responses to alcohol-related violence
- Increase the safety of environments where alcohol consumption occurs/licensed premises
- Produce a measured reduction of crime and violence in the CBD of 10%.

The Alcohol Advisory Council of New Zealand and the Accident Compensation Corporation jointly commissioned an evaluation of the one-way door component of the Alcohol Accord.

The evaluation findings are based on a range of data including a review of literature and documentation, surveys and interviews of key stakeholders and analysis of offence data.

The essential components of the planned intervention were:

- An Alcohol Accord aimed at reducing alcohol-related harm in the Christchurch CBD
- A 3am one-way door on Thursday, Friday and Saturday nights
- The aim of reducing crime and violence in the inner city by 10%
- An Alcohol Accord based on a willing compliance model and a partnership approach between the agencies, licensees and other stakeholders.

A high level of engagement in the initiative was achieved, with 42 licensed premises located in the Christchurch CBD signing the Alcohol Accord.

In the main, the intervention was implemented as planned, with the exception that the one-way door was delayed from the planned 3am to 4am and diluted somewhat by allowing licensed premises the option of operating a cover charge as an alternative to the one-way door. These changes represented a significant compromise to the planned intervention.

The goal of a 10% reduction in alcohol-related crime and violence in the inner city was not met. Findings based on an analysis of offence data<sup>1</sup> showed a 75% increase in offences in 2006/7 compared with 2005/6, with most of that increase (93%) reflecting increases in liquor ban breach and disorder offences. With the exclusion of both liquor ban breaches and disorder offences, the increase was more contained at 8%.<sup>2</sup>

However, there were reductions in some subsets of crime. For example, offences on Saturday-Sunday night decreased by 4% (after the exclusion of liquor ban breach and disorder data) in 2006/7 compared with 2005/6. Serious violence offences on Saturday-Sunday night decreased by 22% between 2005/6 and 2006/7.

There was some impact on perceptions of safety and crime levels. Key findings were as follows:

- A consistent shift toward improved perceptions of safety in the CBD at night
- Some indications that reduced incidents in the CBD although perceived problems remained
- Indications of an increased Police presence and Police acting on an increased number of low-level offences, and fewer high-level issues.

Approximately 70% of the survey respondents reported that licensed premises' turnover had not been adversely affected by the Alcohol Accord throughout the pilot timeframe. However, 10% reported a decrease in turnover. Comments suggested that for some licensed premises, trade had decreased between 3am and 5am.

There was a unanimous view that relationships between stakeholders have been significantly improved by the intervention and this was widely noted as a key achievement of the project.

The following critical success factors were identified by stakeholders:

- Effective working relationships and shared vision of the agency representatives, especially important in the early stages of the initiative
- Early formation of an Accord Management Team with strong licensee representation to manage the overall project. This was identified by licensees as critical to licensee engagement in the project and a turning point, enabling licensees to trust that their various interests would be fully accounted for and allowing a united approach
- The significant hands-on involvement of frontline Police and a commitment to increase Police numbers in the CBD as part of the Accord
- The involvement of a communications expert to advise on and assist with implementing a planned approach to communications
- Infrastructure provided by Christchurch City Council, in particular a dedicated project management resource

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<sup>1</sup> Eleven offences identified as those most typically involving alcohol.

<sup>2</sup> The omission of liquor ban breach and disorder data aims to reduce the confounder caused by an increased number of these offences, regarded to be largely generated by an increased Police presence.

- Input and leadership provided by a group of licensees
- Involvement of further stakeholders representing eg, taxi companies, security organisations, bus companies, city design department, and a focus on addressing other issues of concern eg, transport, security, rubbish collection
- Allowance of adequate time for the various phases of the intervention to take place.

Stakeholders suggested the following areas for improvement in the Alcohol Accord process:

- Improved collaboration with licensees at the outset
- An increased number of committed licensees on the Accord Management Team
- Earlier involvement of frontline Police
- Broadening of the scope of the Alcohol Accord eg, to include a greater range of stakeholders, such as rugby clubs and off-licences, and to consider other issues, such as supermarket sales of cheap alcohol.

The Christchurch CBD Alcohol Accord intervention reflects a number of key success factors for such an intervention as identified in the literature. The intervention was built on a collaborative approach with a threat of sanction; a dedicated project management resource was secured; data were used to identify and refine a description of the problems; a voluntary Accord was developed involving a partnership approach with all key stakeholders; and the Accord Management Team was developed as a key structure to sustain the intervention through the pilot.

It was noted in feedback that bringing in the licensees earlier would have benefited the intervention. This view is supported in international literature. A related point, highlighted in the literature, is that licensees should be actively involved in the process of generating solutions to address issues. In Christchurch, a key preferred solution (the one-way door) had been substantially decided before the licensees became involved in the project. It appears that one result of this was that licensees were not fully persuaded about the one-way door as a solution and hence did not support the proposed 3am one-way door.

The literature supports the importance of active leadership provided by licensees. This was a significant achievement of the Christchurch project. The literature also favours the development of a licensee-only monitoring group (in addition to the Management Team) to maintain compliance with the Accord. This could be considered to strengthen the Christchurch Accord.

The literature highlights the need to develop and maintain a sense of the benefits of the Alcohol Accord for the licensees. The Christchurch CBD Alcohol Accord is vulnerable in this area; particularly as the crime data are inconclusive.

The Christchurch CBD Alcohol Accord would also benefit from better ways to keep licensees who are not part of the Accord Management Team informed and engaged in the intervention.

The following are identified as requirements for successfully implementing this type of intervention to reduce alcohol-related harm, based on the Christchurch experience and literature findings:

- A strong vision for the project
- Effective working relationships between relevant agencies
- The active recruitment and involvement of licensees in formulating a description of the problems and designing an effective solution(s)
- An intervention(s) that attends to **multiple** related issues identified as contributing to the problem being addressed
- The involvement of **all** relevant stakeholders from the earliest stages
- Strong project leadership, typically from a steering group made up of relevant stakeholders
- A dedicated full-time project management resource
- Planned and regular communication with **all** relevant licensees and other stakeholders involved in the intervention(s)
- Self-regulation of compliance with the planned intervention by a licensee-only monitoring committee
- Planned communications to advise the public on the planned intervention(s) and to educate them in relation to minimising alcohol-related harm
- A suitable infrastructure for the project to ensure that adequate resources are applied
- Adequate time to both set up and run the intervention and to achieve project targets
- Formal planning for the key transition of the project from dependence on personnel to dependence on a process, ultimately with the aim of the intervention becoming part of the routine procedures of the relevant government agencies and other stakeholders ie, “normalising” the processes of desired community change.

## INTRODUCTION

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The Christchurch Central Business District (CBD) Alcohol Accord (Alcohol Accord) was implemented from October 2006 to March 2007 to reduce alcohol-related violence and crime in the Christchurch CBD.

The Alcohol Accord was initiated by representatives from the Police, Christchurch City Council and the Canterbury District Health Board (DHB) as part of the Community Violence Reduction Project (CVRP), under the umbrella of the Safer Christchurch Interagency Group in response to the Crime Reduction Strategy and the Safer Communities Action Plan.<sup>3</sup> Funding from the Ministry of Justice Crime Prevention Unit supported the project.

An evaluation of the one-way door strategy, a key component of the Alcohol Accord, was commissioned jointly by the Alcohol Advisory Council of New Zealand (ALAC) and the Accident Compensation Corporation (ACC) to determine the efficacy of the one-way door intervention to reduce alcohol-related crime and associated harms within Christchurch city.

The evaluation was completed by Louise Kirkwood and Paula Parsonage in collaboration with key stakeholder groups.

## EXPECTED OUTCOMES OF THE EVALUATION

The outcomes expected from the evaluation were:

- A verified account of the way in which the range of interventions<sup>4</sup> is being implemented, in comparison with the planned range of interventions, and a clear understanding of the resources, support and processes needed for effective and efficient implementation of this range of interventions
- A summary of evidence of the outcomes of the range of interventions in terms of the impact on crime and safety and perceptions of the impact on crime and safety
- An overview of the perceptions of licensees and representatives of the statutory agencies on the economic and social costs and benefits of the intervention(s) applied
- The requirements for effective delivery of this range of interventions to reduce alcohol-related harm in other settings, including the identification of core and optional components.

This report provides an outline of the methodology and results of the evaluation and concludes with a discussion of the outcome relative to intervention objectives and a consideration of the one-way door initiative alongside best practice for such interventions as set out in the literature.

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<sup>3</sup> CPU Funding – Project Schedule: Christchurch Community Violence Project 1 Sept 2005 – 30 Aug 2007.

<sup>4</sup> One-way door and the alternative cover charge that was added as an option during project set-up.

## BACKGROUND

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The management of alcohol-related incidents in and around licensed premises is recognised as an ongoing challenge. Evidence suggests that attendance and excessive drinking by young men in their late teens and 20s at certain types of licensed venue increase the likelihood of their being involved in assaults and other alcohol-related harms, particularly late at night and in the early morning on weekends.<sup>5</sup>

Critical findings in relation to alcohol-related incidents in and around licensed premises are that:

- A small number of licensed premises account for most acts of violence<sup>6</sup>
- The majority of assaults in and around licensed premises increase after midnight and near closing times in a small number of venues with extended trading hours<sup>7</sup>
- The level of violence seems to increase as alcohol consumption increases because of extended trading hours.<sup>8</sup>

In Christchurch, representatives from the Police, Christchurch City Council and Canterbury DHB Public Health identified a “crime spike” occurring in the Christchurch CBD between 2am and 4am. Assaults and other injuries appeared to be linked to intoxicated people migrating between various locations in the inner city.

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5 ALAC One-way door intervention Request for Proposals (RFP), 2006 citing Briscoe and Donnelly, 2001a; Campbell and Green, 1997; Devery, 1992; Casswell, Zhang, and Wyllie, 1993; Homel and Clarke, 1994; Homel, Hauritz, Wortley, McIlwain, and Carvolth, 1997; Ireland and Thommey, 1993; Graham, Laroque, Yetman, Ross, and Guistra, 1980; Lang, Stockwell, Rydon, and Lockwood, 1995; Stockwell, Somerford, and Lang, 1992, 1997; Stockwell, Lang, and Rydon, 1993; Teece and Williams, 2000.

6 ALAC One-way door intervention RFP, 2006 citing Considine, Walker, Wiggers, Daly, Hazel, and Fairhill, 1998; Homel and Clarke, 1994; Jochelson, 1997.

7 ALAC One-way door intervention RFP, 2006 citing Briscoe and Donnelly2001a; Chikritzhs, 1997; Cohen and Felson, 1979; Homel, Tomsen, and Tommeny, 1991; Stockwell, 1997; Robb, 1988.

8 ALAC One-way door intervention RFP, 2006 citing Chikritzhs, Stockwell, and Masters, 1997; Graham and Wells, 2001.

## ALCOHOL ACCORD AND THE CVRP

In response to the above issue, the Police, Christchurch City Council and Canterbury DHB Community and Public Health collaborated to initiate the Alcohol Accord as part of the CVRP.

The project schedule for the CVRP outlines the following overall goal and objectives:<sup>9</sup>

### Goal:

- To reduce alcohol-related community violence in the central city.

### Objectives:

- Identify high-risk and problem licensed premises, through data analysis, to assist and enhance capacity to police the compliance with the Sale of Liquor Act within the target area
- Identify areas where people are likely to be victimised and identify and develop appropriate solutions
- Enhance/increase training of licensed premises staff, security staff and Police staff in the target area
- Enhance/increase monitoring of licensed premises in the target area
- Enhance communication between security staff and licensed premises staff.

The CVRP includes the Alcohol Accord incorporating a one-way door as one intervention that would assist in achieving objective 2 (above) and lists the following as goals for this approach:<sup>10</sup>

- Reduce the incidence of violence where the perpetrator and/or victim are affected by alcohol
- Improve local-level responses to alcohol-related violence
- Increase the safety of environments where alcohol consumption occurs/licensed premises.

The following aim and objectives of the Alcohol Accord are recorded:

### Aim:

- To target alcohol-affected groups or individuals congregating or migrating in the Christchurch CBD resulting in disproportionately high rates of offending such as common or sexual assaults, wilful damage, property offences and other criminal or antisocial activity.

### Objectives:

- To create a safe and prosperous night-time economy within the Christchurch CBD

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<sup>9</sup> CPU Funding – Project Schedule: Christchurch Community Violence Project 1 Sept 2005 – 30 Aug 2007, p 1.

<sup>10</sup> Christchurch City Council. CBD Alcohol Accord and One-Way Door Process [Report], November 2006.

- To reduce alcohol-related harm and crime-related costs
- To contribute to the reduction in liquor abuse
- To reduce intoxication, underage drinking and antisocial behaviour
- To build better relationships between stakeholders and the public.

The Accord document also notes the following agreement: "It is agreed that this trial is for a period of 6 months with a measured reduction of crime and violence in the CBD of 10% as the goal".<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>11</sup> This was proposed by the three agencies as a more appropriate target than an original 17% target based on experience in Australia.

# EVALUATION METHODOLOGY

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## PROJECT DOCUMENTATION REVIEW

Key documents were reviewed to determine goals, objectives, and planning and implementation processes relevant to the intervention. These documents were supplied to the evaluators at the outset of the evaluation or as they were generated during the pilot.

## WEEKLY/MONTHLY FEEDBACK SURVEY OF LICENSED PREMISES

From October to December 2006, licensed premises' representatives were offered an option to provide weekly feedback via a simple sheet (provided and returned by e-mail, fax or post) rating the following items as below average, average or above average:

- Rates of patronage within specified timeframes 12am – 2am, 2am – 4am, 4am – 6am, past 6am
- Turnover rates
- Rates of door-based incidents with patrons
- Cleaning requirement rates
- Perceptions of safety
- Observations of Police presence.

The survey also reviewed whether the premises had been visited by agency personnel regarding enforcement of the Sale of Liquor Act.

The use of weekly feedback was suggested by the licensee representatives on the Accord Management Team prior to the implementation of the Alcohol Accord. At the December 2006 meeting where mid-point evaluation findings were presented, it was decided to reduce the frequency of the survey from weekly to monthly.

An example of the weekly feedback sheet template is provided in Appendix 1.

## INTERVIEWS WITH KEY STAKEHOLDER REPRESENTATIVES

Key stakeholder representatives were interviewed via telephone at the mid-point of the evaluation<sup>12</sup> (November 2006) and at the conclusion of the pilot (March 2007). Interview

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<sup>12</sup> The “mid-point” was agreed to be mid-November 2006 (after six weeks of operation), which actually fell short of a three-month mid-point. Stakeholders wanted early indications about whether or not the intervention was effective and whether there were any negative consequences arising from the intervention. Ideally, this would have been conducted after three months or close to this. The six-week period was agreed as a pragmatic option to avoid the December period, which is one of the busiest times of year in the hospitality industry, and to allow for data to be collected and analysed in time for an early December report back.

participants were selected to represent the licensees and key roles in Christchurch City Council, Police and Canterbury DHB Community and Public Health.

The interview focused on the experiences and perceptions of the interview participants in relation to their roles in the Accord process, the anticipated costs and benefits of the Accord, in particular the one-way door, incentives and barriers to engagement and the implementation of the Accord and the one-way door and views on the implementation processes.

Each interview was tailored to the role of the interview participant. An example of the interview prompt sheet is provided in Appendix 2.

## **COMMUNITY PANEL SURVEY**

A panel survey was developed by the CVRP Project Manager. The base survey contained 60 questions. Some survey questions were slightly amended or omitted<sup>13</sup> for different recipients, but the majority of questions remained the same across all surveys.

Panel members were selected to ensure that all key stakeholders in the community were represented. Hard copy surveys were provided to panel members for completion and reply-paid return to the Project Manager. Completed surveys were supplied to the evaluation team.

## **TELEPHONE SURVEYS OF LICENSEES/REPRESENTATIVES**

Licensees or their representative managers were surveyed via telephone three times during the pilot intervention as follows:

- An initial survey undertaken at the outset of the one-way door implementation (4-7 October 2006), which aimed to determine whether licensed premises were signed up to the Accord, whether the 4am one-way door applied, and whether the licensees or managers would be completing weekly feedback sheets
- A mid-point survey to determine whether premises were operating a one-way door or cover charge, perceptions regarding the overall implementation of the Accord, perceptions relating to crime and Police presence, information re changes in profitability related to the one-way door and whether licensees supported a continuation of the Accord
- An end-point survey conducted in April – May 2007 to determine the same information as the mid-point survey.

Note: a telephone survey of licence holders was not included in the data-collection methods at the outset of the evaluation. The method was added initially to establish a comprehensive contact list for all licensees/licensed premises in order to enable other agreed data collection (ie, weekly surveys of licensed premises) to occur in a timely manner. A comprehensive list was not able to

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<sup>13</sup> Four surveys with 60 questions, two with 57 questions, one each with 52 and 54 questions.

be supplied by the Accord Management Team or the agencies. Once contact had been established, the surveys were repeated to supplement the weekly/monthly feedback sheets, to ensure that the views and experiences of licensees were adequately reflected in the evaluation.

Copies of the telephone survey templates are provided in Appendix 3.


### OFFENCE DATA

Data were sourced through the Police Mapping System (MAPS) using National Intelligence Application (NIA) data.

The predominant function of MAPS is to assist in analysing spatial patterns of offending as opposed to providing quantitative data. However, MAPS is the only way that quantitative data can be obtained regarding a specific area (eg, one street or block), which is why it was used.

The physical boundary for the data is the four avenues bounding the central city: Bealey, Deans, Moorhouse and Fitzgerald (refer figure 1).

Figure 1: Physical boundary for offence data



Violence in this analysis refers to Commissioner’s Risk Indicator (CRI) violence, which includes violence (category code 1000) and **excludes** intimidations/threats (class code 1700).

CRI violence also excludes the following family violence-related type and offence codes:

- Crimes Act 1961 Section 194(b) assault on child under 14 years and assault by male on female (type codes 1530 and 1540) and common assault domestic firearm, common assault domestic other weapon, common assault domestic manually and common assault domestic stabbing/cutting weapon (offence codes 1581-1583, 1587)

- Summary Offences Act 1981 Section 9 common assault domestic firearm, common assault domestic other weapon, common assault domestic manually and common assault domestic stabbing/cutting weapon (offence codes 1641-1643 and 1647).

These family violence-related codes are excluded from violence on the basis that they form their own subset of crime type, which requires separate monitoring from CRI violence.

As there is no method to restrict offence data to crimes enacted under the influence of alcohol, the analysis was restricted to data for the following 11 offences identified as those offences most typically involving alcohol in the Christchurch metropolitan setting:<sup>14</sup>

- Robbery
- Sexual affronts
- Grievous assaults
- Sexual attacks
- Serious assaults
- Rape
- Minor assaults
- Disorder
- Intimidation/threats
- Liquor offences
- Wilful damage.

Note: offence data for “drunk custody” were omitted from the above list although it was recognised as being in the offences most typically involving alcohol in the Christchurch metropolitan setting. This was because there were serious concerns regarding the validity of data on “drunk custody” occurrences in NIA because of operator workloads. Entries for charges/arrests that need to be ready before Court each morning take priority and often the “drunk custody” records are not included in the system at all.<sup>15</sup>

Offences within the above criteria within the following times were plotted over a six-month period from 1 October to 31 March for both 2005/6 and 2006/7. Only those offences that resulted in a K6 (an offence report has been submitted) or a K9 (an arrest) were considered.

- Thursday 10pm – Friday 7am
- Friday 10pm – Saturday 7am
- Saturday 10pm – Sunday 7am.

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<sup>14</sup> Offences identified as those most typically involving alcohol in the Christchurch metropolitan area by the Alcohol Intelligence Analyst, Policing Development Group, Canterbury District Headquarters.

<sup>15</sup> A low number of drunk custody offences in the 2006/7 period of the one-way door supports this rationale; there were 18 drunk custody offences out of 423 offences overall (including drunk custody with the other identified 11 offences representing most typically involving alcohol), ie only 4% of offences under consideration.

A further set of data was obtained through the data-querying application Business Objects using Alcolink<sup>16</sup> data. This data set comprised occurrences within the same physical boundary and dates and times as used for NIA data.

Note: Alcolink data were not suitable to use alone for the crime data analysis in this evaluation because the Alcolink database only records data for crimes where the offender is known and an arrest has taken place (K9). Thus, Alcolink omits any offence where there is no arrest (eg, a K6 where an offence report has been submitted or the offender has not been identified). As such, Alcolink records do not reflect the full extent of offence activity that is relevant for this evaluation.

## LITERATURE SUMMARY

An overview of selected literature was undertaken to establish current knowledge regarding best practice for the implementation of a one-way door intervention. The review was predominantly based on papers selected and provided by ALAC.

English language literature published up to August 2006 was searched.

A literature search was completed using the following:

1. In-depth search on ALAC bibliographic databases
2. Ebsco search, which contains newspaper items on "Lockouts".

Search terms used were combinations of:

- Lockout\*, lock out\*, lockdown\*, lock down\* or one-way door policy
- Or Accord\*
- With alcohol or liquor.

Other search terms used were:

- Licens\*
- Premise\*
- Violence\*
- Bar, bars, clubs, club, pub, pubs
- Entry, entering or movement\* or hopping.

Because of limited findings from the above, an extended search was completed to cover the following:

- Harm reduction and licensed premises, generally

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<sup>16</sup> Alcohol information pertaining to offender levels of intoxication and last place of drinks collected from Custody Charge Sheets and Traffic Offence Notices.

- Interventions making up liquor or alcohol accords, particularly in Australia and New Zealand, and cover charge as a specific such intervention
- Migratory drinking patterns and efforts to reduce these.

Search terms used were:

- Licensed/bars/bar/pub/pubs/club/clubs
- With combinations of:
  - Police/policing
  - Violen\*
  - Crime
  - Driving
- Local authorities and accord

Articles were selected on the basis of date and relevance.

The above material was supplemented by further general Internet searches using the keyword "Accord" and specific searches by site or researcher to supplement identified material.

# DATA OBTAINED

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## PROJECT DOCUMENTATION

The following documents were reviewed:

- Christchurch Community Violence Project (CVRP) Crime Prevention Unit Funding: Project Schedule
- Community Alcohol Violence Reduction Project Report 1 September 2005 – 31 January 2006
- Meeting notes: evaluation team and stakeholders June 2006, August 2006
- Alcohol Accord Forum Presentation Slides, July 06 ex Christchurch City Council, Canterbury DHB Community and Public Health, Police
- Letter of invitation to licensees Central City Liquor Accord 31 August 2006 ex Christchurch City Council, Canterbury DHB Community and Public Health, Police
- CVRP Christchurch CBD Alcohol Accord and One-Way Door Process [draft progress report] 28 August 2006, prepared by the Project Manager
- Christchurch Central Business District Alcohol Accord Communications & Promotions Plan August 2006
- Community Violence Reduction Project Meeting Minutes: 02/03/06, 13/04/06, 11/05/06, 08/06/06, 06/07/06, 10/08/06
- CBD Liquor Accord Management Meeting Minutes: 21/09/06, 09/10/06, 17/10/06, 21/10/06, 31/10/06, 12/12/06, 23/01/07, 19/02/07, 29/03/07
- Christchurch Central Business District (CBD) Alcohol Accord (V2. supplied August 2006)
- Launch notes. Christchurch City Council. October 2006
- CVRP Christchurch CBD Alcohol Accord and One-Way Door Process [progress report] November 2006, prepared by the Project Manager
- The Press newspaper report 13 November 2006
- Christchurch Central Business District (CBD) Alcohol Accord (V4 supplied November 2006)
- Correspondence from Accord Management Team to licensees and others
- Christchurch Central Police. Canterbury District Headquarters: Area Weekly Report. Central Area. 20 November 2006
- Correspondence Gary Knowles to independent evaluation team re policing, 8 May 2007
- Correspondence Gary Knowles to Accord Management Team re planned policing, 20 September 2006
- Summary on Police view of crime levels prepared by the Area Commander, Christchurch Central for inclusion in the March Accord newsletter, 15 February 2007
- Christchurch Central Business District (CBD) Alcohol Accord newsletter. November 2006.

## WEEKLY/MONTHLY FEEDBACK SURVEY OF LICENSED PREMISES

A small percentage of bars regularly returned daily feedback sheets, although the number returned diminished markedly over the first months of the pilot. Nine bars regularly provided feedback in the initial weekends, whereas only three bars provided responses in the last weeks.

Three bars returned monthly feedback sheets in 2007, two returning sheets for 2/4 months and one for 1/4 months.<sup>17</sup>

## TELEPHONE SURVEYS OF LICENSEES/REPRESENTATIVES

An initial survey was undertaken during the period 3-7 October 2006. Attempts were made to establish contact by telephone with a total of 48 bars, working from a list of premises signed up to the Accord supplied by Christchurch City Council (see Appendix 4).<sup>18</sup> Contact was established mainly via telephone with some e-mail only, with 47 premises (the one remaining premises had closed down).

A mid-point telephone survey was conducted in late November 2006 and an end-point survey was conducted in April 2007. Response rates of circa 80% were achieved in each survey (33 of 42 signatories in November 2006 and 33 of 42 signatories in April 2007).

## INTERVIEWS WITH KEY STAKEHOLDER REPRESENTATIVES

Key stakeholder representatives were interviewed via telephone three times over the course of the intervention: at the outset (September to October 2006), at the mid-point (November 2006) and at the conclusion of the pilot (March 2007). Total interviews for each stage are shown in table 1:

*Table 1: Type and number of stakeholder interviews at each stage of evaluation*

	<i>Outset</i>	<i>Mid-point</i>	<i>End-point</i>
Licensee representative	5	5	5
Agency representative	4	6	5

<sup>17</sup> As noted above, given the low response rate these data were supplemented by telephone surveys of all licensed premises' representatives.

<sup>18</sup> The list provided premises' names only. No telephone numbers, e-mail addresses or contact names were able to be supplied at this point.

## **COMMUNITY PANEL SURVEY**

The following eight respondents working in the CBD completed forms on two occasions during the one-way door pilot:

- Security
- Store security
- Oxford Terrace (resident)
- Street cleaners
- Youth worker
- Midnight Express driver
- KFC worker
- Taxi driver.

The first surveys were completed between 11 October and 1 November 2006 and referred to perceptions of the previous three or six months – effectively pre-Accord surveys.

The second surveys were completed between 17 January and 12 February 2007 and referred to the previous three or six months – effectively a mid-intervention survey.

On most occasions the recipients completed all parts of the survey. For questions where recipients omitted to provide responses, the results presented reflected the feedback that was provided (in each case this is indicated by the total number of responses referred to).

## RESULTS: INTERVENTION PROCESS

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### THE PLANNED INTERVENTION

The intervention was planned over an extensive period beginning in early 2005. A key aspect of the plan was to engage licensees to both participate and take a leading role in the project. Hence the intervention evolved over time and flexibility to change the plan was an intentional feature of the intervention plan. Given that planning processes were, of necessity, fluid in nature, key aspects of the **initial** plan only are outlined below.

The CVRP project schedule describes the intervention target as being high-risk and problem licensed premises within the specified area with a focus on increasing the safety of environments where alcohol consumption occurs/licensed premises.

Project targets included the geographical zone in which the project activity would be focused and the selection of offences that the project would seek to reduce. Both were selected following a review of crime data and scans conducted by Police with input from licensing sectors within Canterbury DHB and Christchurch City Council.

*The target area encompassed central Christchurch within the 4 avenues, including: Bealey Ave, Fitzgerald Ave, Moorhouse Ave and Hagley Park. The hot spot areas within the 4 avenues were defined as Colombo St, Cashel St, Hereford St, Worcester St, Manchester St, Oxford Terrace and Cathedral Square. Due to the changing dynamics of the liquor industry there will be an increase around the Manchester St end of Cashel, Lichfield St and Bedford Row. Inside this area bounded by and including Oxford Terrace (The Strip), Lichfield Street, Manchester and Armagh is where 66% of reported crime is occurring within the 4 avenues.*

Refer figure 1 (page 15), which shows the intervention target area.

It was noted in the Christchurch CBD Alcohol Accord and One-Way Door Process [Report], November 2006<sup>19</sup> that there are two distinct focus areas of bars in the CBD: Oxford Terrace (also referred to as The Strip) and the Manchester/Cashel Street corner. A large number of bars are concentrated within these areas.

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<sup>19</sup> Christchurch City Council. CBD Alcohol Accord and One-Way Door Process [Report], November 2006.

The intervention sought specifically to reduce the incidence of the following offences:

- Sexual offences
- Robberies
- Assaults (aggravated, serious, minor and threats and harassment)
- Disorder and property damage
- Burglary
- Car crime.

The following stakeholders were identified: licensees (and duty managers), Canterbury DHB (Community and Public Health), Christchurch City Council, New Zealand Police, the Hospitality Association of New Zealand (HANZ), liquor companies, security companies, the Taxi Federation, After Midnight Express<sup>20</sup>, ACC and ALAC.

The agencies involved in the intervention sought a proven approach to reduce alcohol-related violence and increase safety. The intervention was focused on reducing the number of bar patrons who “migrate” from bar to bar after 2am, specifically during the identified “crime spike” period occurring between 2am and 4am.<sup>21</sup> Early documentation indicates that an Alcohol Accord featuring a 3am one-way door based on a willing compliance model was planned, with a target of reducing crime by 10%.<sup>22</sup>

The Alcohol Accord document outlines the target, method and principles of the Accord along with the commitments made by venue operators and agencies in implementing the Accord. Details are provided in the Alcohol Accord document in Appendix 5. Key among the planned commitments was the commitment by Police to provide an increased Police presence in support of the intervention.

An evaluation of the project was part of the plan. This included a mid-point evaluation to determine interim outcomes and inform the remainder of the pilot, and a final evaluation to determine the process and outcomes of the intervention, in particular the one-way door.

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<sup>20</sup> Operates a late-night bus service.

<sup>21</sup> Based on information in the RFP and meeting minutes.

<sup>22</sup> This was revised from an original 17% target during the conceptual phase.

## DESCRIPTION OF THE INTERVENTION PROCESS

Key summary points are provided for easy reference at the beginning of each sub-section of this section of the report.

### Summary overview of the intervention

*Forty-two licensed premises signed up to the Alcohol Accord implemented as a pilot from 5 October 2006 to 30 March 2007*

An Alcohol Accord signed by 42 licensed premises was implemented as a pilot project from 5 October 2006 to 30 March 2007. The Alcohol Accord aimed to reduce alcohol-related harm in the Christchurch CBD by employing a 4am to 6am one-way door on “Thursday, Friday and Saturday nights”.<sup>23</sup> A cover charge was also agreed as a method, providing licensees with an alternative to the one-way door, however this was not formally written into the Alcohol Accord. The Alcohol Accord was aimed at reducing crime and violence in the inner city by 10%.

The Alcohol Accord was managed by an Accord Management Team made up of representatives of licensees, HANZ, Christchurch City Council, Canterbury DHB, New Zealand Police and other stakeholders.

The intervention process is outlined in detail below. It is helpful to describe the intervention in three phases: conceptual, engagement and implementation.

### Conceptual phase (circa March 2005 – March 2006)

*The Accord initiative arose out of a collaboration between representatives of a “triad” of agencies: the Police District Licensing Unit, Christchurch City Council and Canterbury DHB Public Health, and was framed within the broader context of the CVRP*

Project documents and data from key stakeholder interviews indicate that the initiative arose out of a collaboration between representatives of the “triad” of agencies, being the Police District Licensing Unit, Christchurch City Council and Canterbury DHB Public Health within the broader context of the CVRP. These agencies working together, along with the structure, funding and leadership provided by the CVRP, appear to have been critical in getting the project up and running. The following comments illustrate this:

*[The project] evolved over a year with good interagency collaboration (District Licensing Agency, Canterbury DHB Public Health, Police District Licensing Unit). Willing compliance*

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<sup>23</sup> In fact the one-way door was operated on Friday, Saturday and Sunday mornings.

*is key and can only be achieved with agencies working together. You cannot achieve compliance if agencies work in silos.*

*[It arose out of] passion from the team based on Australian experience. We had identified a goal of reducing alcohol-related crime by 10% and saw a one-way door as an opportunity to achieve this goal.*

*CVRP started from Safer Communities... The “triad” became part of that. The Crime Prevention Unit wanted to reduce alcohol in sexual related violence. CVRP added greater dimension and other components to the strategy.*

### *Key agencies and roles*

Details regarding the key agencies and roles of representatives are provided in table 2.

*Table 2: Key agencies and roles in the conceptual phase*

<i>Organisation</i>	<i>Role</i>
Christchurch City Council	Metropolitan Community Advisor – Safety
Christchurch City Council	Liquor Licensing Inspector
Christchurch City Council	Community Violence Reduction Project
New Zealand Police	Officer in Charge Liquor Licensing
Canterbury DHB Community and Public Health	Health Promoter and Liquor Licensing Officer
Canterbury DHB Community and Public Health	Liquor Licensing Training

### *Formulating the problem and designing the intervention*

*A one-way door was considered a feasible option within the existing policy context and in relation to the target area comprising a high number of licensed premises in a small geographical area within the CBD*

*The agencies’ agreement was to attempt to pilot a one-way door within the framework of a voluntary Alcohol Accord*

During the conceptual phase, agency representatives worked together to formulate the problem and determine interventions to address it.

Crime statistics, other Police data, the Christchurch Community Safety Survey and the knowledge of agency representatives were drawn on to formulate the problem. Those involved drew on available literature and first-hand experience to consider options for intervention. Initially a 3am closing time (ie, no 24-hour licensing) for all licensed premises was the preferred option, but this was eventually rejected as it would have required a significant change in Christchurch City Council policy (Christchurch City Council had issued a number of 24-hour trading licences under existing policy).

A one-way door was considered to be a feasible option within the existing policy context and in relation to the target ie, Christchurch is unique in that there are a high number of licensed premises in a relatively small geographical area within the CBD. The agencies agreed to attempt to pilot a one-way door within the framework of a voluntary Alcohol Accord. Importantly, the voluntary nature of the Alcohol Accord was recognised as fitting with existing theories regarding effective approaches to industry self-regulation and models of willing compliance. The agencies favoured a 3am one-way door and initially aimed for a 12-17% reduction in crime.<sup>24</sup>

Police and Christchurch City Council liquor licensing representatives tested out the idea of the one-way door via one-to-one discussions with a sample of licensees and were initially given a positive response. Most licensees were then contacted individually to discuss the one-way door option in the context of an Alcohol Accord. Again the response was generally positive.

#### *Success factors in the conceptual phase as identified by stakeholders*

*The conceptual phase was supported by a multi-agency approach, collaboration and teamwork*

*Potential improvements to the conceptual phase identified an earlier involvement of frontline Police and earlier licensee involvement to ensure a full consideration of the issues from their perspective and to reassure licensees that their interests were being considered*

From the perspective of the agency representatives, this phase of the project worked well, with evaluation participants noting the multi-agency approach, collaboration and teamwork as the most positive and effective components.

Additionally, good awareness of the problem was cited.

For example, the following comment was made:

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<sup>24</sup> Ex notes from meeting ALAC, ACC, Police, Canterbury DHB, evaluation team 21/06/06.

*The key to success is that the three agencies genuinely have knowledge of the 3-5am setting and are not basing action on what other people tell them.*

The following suggestions for improvement were noted:

- Frontline Police could have been involved earlier in the project and this would have strengthened the approach
- Licence holders could have been involved earlier to ensure full consideration of the issues from the licensee perspective and to reassure licensees that their interests were being looked after.

The latter suggestion is supported in data from licensee interviews and is discussed further below.

### **Engagement phase (March – September 2006)**

*The engagement phase focused on involving all key stakeholders in the project and developing a partnership approach to managing the intervention*

The engagement phase of the project was focused on involving all key stakeholders in the project and developing a partnership approach to managing the intervention. Key milestones in this phase are outlined in table 3 and discussed below.

Table 3: Key milestones in the engagement phase

<i>Milestone</i>	<i>Date</i>
First licensee forum	March 2006
Accord drafted	May – August 2006
Buses and taxi companies engaged	May 2006
Evaluators engaged	June 2006
October date agreed for implementation	June 2006
Second licensee forum; Accord Management Team established; Police Area Commander, Christchurch Central involved	July 2006
Communications plan developed	August 2006
Final Accord document completed	September 2006
Accord signing	September 2006
Security firms engaged in process	September 2006
Second Accord signing	2 October 2006
Launch of Alcohol Accord	3 October 2006

#### *Stakeholder forums and development of the Alcohol Accord agreement*

*Key steps in progress at this stage were:*

- *Licensees recognised and engaged as a key stakeholder group*
- *Official introduction of the one-way door*
- *Licensee support for making the streets safer, despite some reservations about the project, and agreement to proceed*
- *Alcohol Accord agreement development underway*
- *Active involvement of frontline Police*
- *Formation of Accord Management Team*

The engagement of a wider group of stakeholders, with licensees being viewed as the key group, began as a formalised process on 6 March 2006 when agency representatives convened a public forum for licensees and HANZ.<sup>25</sup> The concept of a one-way door was officially introduced at this meeting.<sup>26</sup> Feedback from the first forum was generally positive.<sup>27</sup> While licensees expressed some reservations, all expressed support for making the streets safer and there was an agreement to proceed.

<sup>25</sup> Community Violence Reduction Project Minutes 02/03/06.

<sup>26</sup> Christchurch City Council. CBD Alcohol Accord and One-Way Door Process [Report], November 2006.

<sup>27</sup> Community Violence Reduction Project Minutes.

The process of developing the Alcohol Accord agreement commenced at this time and was refined through a review process involving stakeholders until a final version was produced in November 2006. The CVRP meeting minutes show that the Alcohol Accord was viewed as a partnership between the regulatory agencies and the central city liquor industry as well as being a platform for the industry to enhance business. Industry support was acknowledged as vital for achieving the objectives of the Alcohol Accord. It was agreed that the Alcohol Accord needed to be driven by the industry.

The second forum for licensees and HANZ was convened on 6 July 2006 and was attended by 20 licensees, agency representatives and members of HANZ.<sup>28</sup> The Police Area Commander, Christchurch Central was included at this stage. A management team (the Accord Management Team) was appointed at this forum, comprising licensee representatives, HANZ members and agency representatives. Details of team members are shown in table 4. The Accord Management Team was then charged with negotiating and finalising the content of the draft Accord.<sup>29</sup>

*Table 4: Accord Management Team members*

<i>Organisation</i>	<i>Representative</i>
HANZ Regional Manager	Susan Biss
HANZ Branch President	Peter Morrison (Chair)
General Manager NZ Hospitality (representing five licensed premises)	Paul Webster
Licensee representatives	Guy Randall Anne-Maree Nadeau John McCarthy Simon Rennie Phil Stanley Bob Pelham Karl Varley
Security representative	Hal October
Christchurch City Council CVRP	Rachel Palmer
Christchurch City Council Liquor Licensing Inspector	Martin Ferguson
New Zealand Police Officer in Charge Liquor Licensing	Al Lawn
Canterbury DHB Public Health; Health Promoter and Liquor Licensing Officer	Barry MacDonald

### *Barriers identified*

<sup>28</sup> Christchurch City Council. CBD Alcohol Accord and One-Way Door Process [Report], November 2006.

<sup>29</sup> CVRP Meeting Minutes August 2006.

*Licensees' concerns came to the fore at the second forum*

*Steps taken to address barriers to the existing proposal included:*

- *Delaying the start date*
- *Planning to provide promotions material*
- *Confirming a planned increase in Police numbers*
- *Involving entertainment venues in the Accord activities*

Issues were raised by licensees at both forums, with the second forum highlighting that there was less support for a one-way door than previously indicated. A number of concerns were raised by licensees that were effectively barriers to the Accord being agreed and implemented. Licensees indicated that it would be necessary to address these prior to an Accord being formed.

Table 5 shows key barriers to the existing proposal that were identified and the steps taken to address these, where applicable.<sup>30</sup>

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<sup>30</sup> Christchurch City Council. CBD Alcohol Accord and One-Way Door Process [Report], November 2006.

Table 5: Barriers identified and the steps taken to address barriers

<i>Barrier</i>	<i>Response to address barrier</i>
A winter start was unacceptable as market is flat at this time	October start date proposed
Publicity and promotion of the Accord are needed	Agencies agreed to draft material for media and promotional material (posters, cards) for use in bars and radio advertising
Requirement for increased Police presence	Already changed rosters and had other plans in place to achieve this in part Police gave assurance of support for one-way door by increasing the number of Police
Drink promotions that may be offered to attract customers at 2.30am	Clause added to Accord draft outlining that no drink specials were to be provided after 11.30pm <sup>31</sup>
100% buy-in would be needed from licensed premises	Agencies stated that resource issues forced them to focus on areas of greatest risk, therefore any late-night venue operating outside the Accord would run the risk of greater scrutiny from regulatory agencies
Entertainment venues must be included in Accord	Some of the larger entertainment venues agreed to support the principles of the Accord eg, pre-sell tickets or charge a substantial cover charge
Hospitality employees leaving work late at night need to have the option of going to a late-night venue after 3am	Hospitality employees leaving work late at night could be admitted between 4am and 6am on presentation of a wage slip that verified their employment

The following issues were also raised:

- Potential loss of business
- Need for enforcement of the liquor ban
- Need for party buses to be involved or accounted for in the terms of the Accord
- Requirement to manage major sporting events
- Smokers who leave the premises need to be able to re-enter
- Public transport issues need to be addressed
- A one-way door **at 3am** is not acceptable.

HANZ advised that licensees felt they were unfairly being held responsible for problems in the inner city. It stated that the Sale of Liquor Act allowed trading past 3am and bars trading unlawfully should be dealt with by the agencies on an individual basis.

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<sup>31</sup> Note: this was eventually removed from the Accord to comply with Commerce Commission requirements.

Agency representatives were concerned that HANZ represented only 20% of licensees and was therefore not representing a number of bar owners. Agency representatives proceeded to meet individually with approximately 10 premises to determine the level of support for the one-way door.

The issues outlined above were again identified by licensee representatives interviewed as part of the evaluation during the engagement phase.

Interview participants most frequently identified concerns about potential loss of business.

The following concerns were also identified:

- The need to educate the public
- The smaller, more exclusive venues being unfairly associated with the inner city violence and crime
- The inadequate availability of public transport and taxis
- The difficulty of managing patrons on nights when there are special events either in the city or in the bars
- Potentially unfairly detrimental to club-type late-night bars.

The following examples of comments from interview participants illustrate the identified issues:

*The key barrier is financial risk – some outlets are not busy until 3am, they are worried that this lock-in will hurt their business. There are still one or two not wanting to sign because of this.*

*Tars us with the same brush as “dirty old bars”.*

*Main error has been too limited education for patrons – needed better advertising earlier including TV, radio and billboards with set date that all become aware of (noted the equivalent done in relation to smoking changes).*

*In the smaller, “cooler” venues which cater for the 30+ age group, they only come out maybe six times a year. They will be very confused and it will take a very long time to educate them.*

## *Changes to the Alcohol Accord*

*Changes to the Accord in response to issues raised by licensees; eventually agreement reached on a 4am one-way door with a cover charge option (\$5 minimum) and the target of a 10% reduction in crime*

*Removal of measures in Accord deemed to be “price fixing” and thus in breach of the Commerce Act (agreement for a cover charge and the agreement to cease liquor promotions after 11.30pm)*

In order to address some of their concerns, licensees proposed an option of a cover charge” that some bars could use as an alternative to the one-way door. This would involve premises imposing a cover charge after 4am, with the aim of reducing migration.

In response to this, the agencies set the following as the non-negotiable conditions to be included within the Alcohol Accord:

- A specified start date – the first week in September was suggested
- A six-month trial, with a review at three months assessing the trends and statistics of progress
- A target of a 10% crime reduction.<sup>32</sup>

The agencies also discussed a back-up option of imposing the one-way door as a condition on licensees should the alternative be unsuccessful in achieving the project objectives. It was noted that this would be a lengthy process, however it was thought to be good to have as an option to start exploring.

A 4am one-way door with a cover charge option (\$5 minimum) and the target of a 10% reduction in crime were eventually agreed.<sup>33</sup>

In late August the liquor licensing office received a letter from a legal adviser for New Zealand Police stating that the agreement on a cover charge and the agreement to cease liquor promotions after 11.30pm would breach the Commerce Act in that they were deemed to be “price fixing”. The recommendation was to remove from the Alcohol Accord all measures that involved price fixing. Therefore the Accord Management Team decided to revert to a simple one-way door and the Accord document was adjusted accordingly. The following key changes were made to the Accord:<sup>34</sup>

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<sup>32</sup> Community Violence Reduction Project Minutes 07/06.

<sup>33</sup> Confirmed at the CPRU[means?] meeting August 2006.

<sup>34</sup> Both of these items were removed because they breached the requirements of the Commerce Commission and an exemption was not able to be negotiated.

- The removal of a minimum cover charge as a “method” for achieving the objectives of the Accord. This method also limited “add-ons” such as complementary drinks provided as part of the cover charge price
- The removal of a commitment by licensees to refrain from providing drink promotions after 11.30pm.

### *Communications planning*

*Formal communications plan developed to support Accord Management Team activities*

*Support items developed and provided: posters, cards, chocolates, newspaper and radio advertising, media protocol, HANZ incident register*

*Intervention slogan “In B4 4” coined*

In August 2006, the Christchurch City Council Communications Advisor was brought in to assist the Accord Management Team. The Communications Advisor attended several of the Accord Management Team meetings for this purpose. A communications plan was developed with the following key messages:

- The Christchurch City Council is working towards making Christchurch the Safest City in New Zealand
- The Council, Police, Canterbury District Health Board and licensees have formed a partnership to work together to reduce alcohol-related crime and violence in Christchurch’s CBD area
- An Alcohol Accord is the first initiative to help create a night-time environment in the inner city that is safe and enjoyable
- Licensees, the Police, Council and CDHB are committed to finding solutions that reduce inner-city crime and violence, thereby creating a safe and prosperous night-time economy.<sup>35</sup>

A pack was developed for those who signed the Accord, consisting of promotional items including posters, cards, chocolates, copies of newspaper and radio advertising, a media protocol and an incident register.<sup>36</sup> The slogan “In B4 4” was developed around this time, however the origins of the slogan are not detailed in project documentation and the slogan was not referred to in the surveys or interviews undertaken as part of the evaluation.

A copy of the Christchurch City Alcohol Accord Communications and Promotions Plan August 2006 is provided in Appendix 6.

<sup>35</sup> Christchurch City Council Alcohol Accord Communications and Promotions Plan, August 2006.

<sup>36</sup> Note: the incident register was never implemented.

### *Licensed premises signed up to Alcohol Accord*

*Two events were held to promote the signing of the Alcohol Accord*

*Considerable issues raised and limited signatures gained at the first signing*

*Most of balance of signatures gained via one-on-one meetings between licensees and Police and City Council licensing personnel*

*Eventually, a very high level of engagement of licensees was achieved*

Two events were arranged to promote the signing of the Alcohol Accord in an effort to ensure that all relevant licensed premises were signed up.

Seventeen licensees attended the first signing event. It was noted that the turnout to the first “Accord Signing” was disappointing partly because invitations to the signing event were not received in time.<sup>37</sup> It was further noted that:

*The Police liquor licensing team were keen to keep a low profile so did not attend, although with hindsight it may have been better if they had as many questions and concerns raised by licensees were directed at them.*<sup>38</sup>

The following issues were raised at the signing event:

- A 4am one-way door may be “missing the boat” in terms of making any impact on the crime spike
- Several licensees (one a member of the Accord Management Team) stated that they were disappointed with the changes to the Alcohol Accord
- Concerns about losing the cover charge from the Alcohol Accord document were raised. The comment was made that this change had not been agreed. This comment came from licensees who had not been involved in the Accord Management Team discussions on this subject and project documentation suggests that this highlighted a lack of communication between the Accord Management Team and other licensees
- Clarification was requested as to the actual level of policing that would accompany the Alcohol Accord
- The issue of drink specials was raised again and concerns were expressed about how this would be handled given that it was no longer explicit in the Accord.<sup>39</sup>

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<sup>37</sup> Accord Management Team Minutes 21/09/06.

<sup>38</sup> Christchurch City Council. CBD Alcohol Accord and One-Way Door Process [Report], November 2006.

It appears from documentation that there was considerable discussion about the issues above and that the option to “not sign” was explicitly stated by the Accord Management Team. At the conclusion of the meeting, 14 licensees had signed the Alcohol Accord and another signing meeting was arranged for 2 October 2006.<sup>40</sup>

In the weeks before the planned second signing event and the intervention launch, Police and City Council liquor licensing personnel met individually with 80% of the remaining licensees to obtain their signatures. A total of 42 of a potential 47 licensed premises were signed up to the Accord by the time of the launch in early October.<sup>41</sup>

Effectively, results show that a very high level of engagement of licensees was achieved.

### *Other activity*

*Other pre-implementation activity focused on “support activities” for the Accord eg, work with transport operators and security, hospitality industry training*

Other activity prior to the implementation phase included:

- A meeting with Christchurch Mayor Garry Moore to discuss his support for the Alcohol Accord and one-way door
- Ongoing discussions with taxi and bus transport operators to inform them of the Alcohol Accord and its implications and to ensure that transport services were able to meet customer demand at peak times
- Meetings with security personnel to ensure a smooth start to the one-way door
- Hospitality industry training and education.

### *Stakeholder perceptions of the engagement phase*

Stakeholder perceptions of the engagement phase were also ascertained in interviews conducted at the end of this phase.

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<sup>39</sup> Christchurch City Council. CBD Alcohol Accord and One-Way Door Process [Report], November 2006.

<sup>40</sup> This event was cancelled as it was no longer needed given that most premises had signed the Accord prior to that date.

<sup>41</sup> According to a list supplied to the evaluators by the Accord Management Team.

## Critical success factors

*Critical success factors for engagement from a stakeholder perspective were identified as:*

- *Ensuring that all licensee interests were taken into account, enabling a united approach*
- *The formation of the Accord Management Team, which helped to reassure licensees that their interests would be considered*
- *Increased licensee involvement*
- *Strong agency collaboration*

*At this stage, there was a unanimous view of improved relationships between stakeholders*

In general, licensees were positive about the processes and outcome during the engagement phase. The following processes were most frequently cited by licensees as being critical to engaging licensees in the project:

- Bringing the licensees together to enable different interests to be identified, thus ensuring that all interests were taken into account and consequently enabling the development of a united approach. The importance of a united approach was emphasised by licensee representatives
- The formation of the Accord Management Team, which provided some reassurance for licensees that their interests would be looked after.

The following comment summarises these points:

*Once the agencies stepped back and licensees got more involved things started to progress. What happened then was that we started looking at what the licensees wanted. Eg, we would have been happy to sign to a 3am lock in because most of our bars are shutting around that time, others are in a different position and it was necessary to take all the issues into consideration. It has been essential to have all the licensees working together.*

Agency representatives noted the collaboration of the agencies as critical, along with the strong vision and the provision of a structure and framework for the intervention.

All stakeholders strongly endorsed the fact that the project had enhanced relationships between the regulatory agencies, the licensees and others in the liquor industry and other stakeholders such as security services and transport services. This was highlighted at the conclusion of the engagement phase as both a critical success factor and a significant positive outcome of the project. For example, the following comment is typical:

*[We are] now discussing things other than problems, ie how we can solve issues.*

### *Motivating factors cited by licensees*

*Mixed reasons given for involvement, including a desire to be involved and to stay close to licensing authorities and the potential safety benefits*

Most licensees became involved via invitation from the agency representatives. Comments indicated that licensees initially became involved for a range of reasons including:

- Wanting to know what was happening
- Wanting to stay on the right side of the DLA
- Opportunity to know more about the agencies
- Opportunity to get to know other licensees
- Wanting to ensure that the licensees' issues were considered ie, ensure a balanced approach
- Wanting to make sure people were safe on the streets
- Perceiving the project was happening anyway regardless of licensee point of view.

For example, the following comments were made:

*I think bar owners didn't want the City Council dictating how we operate – so people got involved to have a say. It is good to have input.*

*We wanted to ensure there was a balance – ie, bar owners' issues were included.*

*The opportunity to work together to get people into the CBD (rather than drinking at home or out in the suburbs) – this is good for business.*

### *Benefits for licensed premises identified by licensees*

*Mixed views were held by licensees regarding the potential gains from the project. Some licensees held the view that business gains were unlikely; some saw the potential benefit of getting patrons into the city earlier*

*Feedback typically indicated that there had been no negative impact on licensee turnover*

Licensees were asked to comment on aspects of the project that might be good for business or might be beneficial in other ways.

There were mixed views regarding the potential business gains that could ensue from the Accord. Some noted that there were unlikely to be business gains ensuing from the Accord. Others noted that if patrons came into the city earlier, this would be beneficial, for example:

*It could be good for the late-openers because people will stay in the bars, rather than moving to another bar. But it could be detrimental for earlier closers because people might move on earlier to a late-opening bar, knowing they can't get in later. It is hard to say what the effects will be.*

*Supposed to get people to come out earlier but don't believe it will – might have worked with an earlier one-way door. If it gets people out earlier it has the potential to be good for business but at this stage more concern about losing business.*

One licensee representative noted an intention to market their premises on the concept of a safer inner-city environment, for example:

*We intend to market ourselves as operating safe places to have a night out. Not sure if others are going to do this but we really want to leverage it as much as possible.*

One licensee representative noted that their premises had in fact been successfully operating a one-way door for some months and this had resulted in no negative impact on turnover.

*[There has been] no negative impact on turnover although marketing the one-way door for a single venue was a big task.*

Some licensees noted their hope that the Accord would address issues related to drink promotions, for example:

*The discounts and promotions are more relevant to us – our licence finishes at 4am anyway. Our main interest was getting the discounts stopped earlier.*

Most noted the benefit of coming together and working together, for example:

*The teamwork has been really good – getting everyone working together has been a good achievement.*

#### *Perceptions of the potential effectiveness of the Alcohol Accord*

*Most stakeholders were not confident that Accord-based activities would meet the objective of a 10% reduction in inner-city crime, mainly because of the 4am timing*

*The viewpoint was raised regularly that licensed premises were not the appropriate target for reducing inner-city crime and the strategy chosen was not the most effective option*

Most stakeholders were not confident that the activities undertaken within the terms of the Accord would meet the objective of a 10% reduction in inner-city crime, with most citing the timing of the one-way door as being too late to make a substantial difference.

Examples of comments are:

*Because of the timing, I can't see it being very effective.*

*This is laughable. The problem hours are not touched. We hardly see any traffic at 4am unless it is a big rugby night.*

*It will be a start – hard to say whether it will achieve a 10% reduction. There are a lot of other factors that are not within the control of licensees. eg people drinking at home, in cars, in car parks and then creating trouble in the CBD.*

A view espoused by some licensees was that licensed premises were not the appropriate target for reducing inner-city crime and therefore the strategy was not the most effective one to select to achieve this target. Those arguing this point appeared to hold the view that the problems occurred in the streets, not in the bars and that the solution was to provide more policing on the streets. The following is an example of this kind of comment:

*Bars are an easy target; the main problem is not enough Police out on the streets from 2 to 4am. They are shifting the burden onto bar owners. We are heavily regulated and can't help any more than we are already. The Police have already done a really good job on the industry.*

There was also concern from licensees that the intervention would shift the problem, that it would be detrimental to the image of the inner city, and that it could have other unintended consequences such as creating pressure for bar staff to serve intoxicated people in order to maintain business at a profitable level. For example:

*It will push the problem out to the suburbs where it will be harder to police. It will turn Christchurch into an old aged pensioner city. City is already suffering.  
They are barking up the wrong tree. We need more policing.*

However, other likely gains from the intervention were identified by all stakeholders, namely the benefits of working together to create a safer inner-city environment.

### *Less good aspects noted during engagement phase*

*There was recognition by agencies of issues in the management of the signing of the Accord and the reversal of agreed approaches because of Commerce Commission requirements*

*Despite the above, the ethos is in place and licensees are operating within the spirit of the Accord*

There were some differences in perception regarding the project process used during the engagement phase.

While licensees cited the formation of the Accord Management Team as a critical success factor, agency representatives noted some concerns with the management provided,<sup>42</sup> namely:

- The signing process was not well managed ie, the responsibility for getting premises signed up was not formally allocated to anyone. The first signing was not well attended, necessitating a second signing, and agency staff spent considerable time subsequently visiting premises individually to ensure all were signed
- The Accord Management Team was too fragmented and business demands frequently took priority. The agency presence was vital to keep the project on track.

All stakeholders expressed disappointment regarding the loss of the drink promotions clause from the Accord. This aspect of the Accord was of keen interest to many licensees and was strongly supported by the agencies. Because of the terms of the Commerce Commission, it was not possible to retain the clause and all parties expressed this as a weakening of the Accord.

Examples of comments include:

*Biggest loss was Commerce Commission and loss of restrictions on drink specials, 4am less of a loss, but ethos is there and licensees are operating in spirit of Alcohol Accord (and under Section 154A not allowed to promote excess consumption).*

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<sup>42</sup> Note: later results indicated that this view changed markedly over the course of the implementation phase. By March, agency representatives were very positive about the leadership provided by the Accord Management Team.

## **Implementation phase (October 2006 – March 2007)**

*Majority of licensees signed up at implementation*

*A well attended publicised launch took place with positive media involvement*

*The Accord Management Team closely monitored issues during the early implementation phase and on an ongoing basis, making a significant contribution to addressing issues as they arose*

*The project was perceived to have begun successfully*

As outlined above, 42 of 47 licensees or their representatives had signed the Accord as at 7 October 2006. Those who had not signed cited the following reasons:

- Two held entertainment licences and routinely applied a cover charge for entry
- One was a restaurant that closed at 1am
- One closed early and thought that the Accord did not apply to their operation
- One was intending to sign.

Results of the mid-point telephone survey (late November 2006) and the end-point survey (March 2007) indicated that at least half of the signatories to the Accord were closing by 4am during the pilot. Of the remaining half, most operated a one-way door or a mix of one-way door and cover charge and a small number operated a cover charge only. Results are shown in table 6.

Table 6: Percentage of licensed premises by type of operation

Type of operation	% Nov 06	% March 07
Close by 4am	52% (n=17)	49% (n=16)
One-way door	30% (n=10)	39% (n=13)
Cover charge	12% (n=4)	6% (n=2)
Mix of one-way door/cover charge	6% (n=2)	6% (n=2)

The implementation phase began with a publicised launch attended by approximately 60-70 people, including representatives of Christchurch City Council, Community and Public Health and Police and representatives of the national youth workers' collective, security, ACC, bus companies, taxi companies, HANZ, New Zealand Hospitality and the Ministry of Pacific Island Affairs.

Launch "boxes" were distributed to licensees that contained "Get in B4 4" branded chocolates and cards, posters, Alcohol Accord documentation and incident registers. The launch was well attended by the media and an article appeared in The Press the following day entitled "Alarm at rise in 'street pirates'".

Project documentation indicates that the Accord Management Team closely monitored issues during the early implementation phase. The Accord Management Team meeting minutes of 9 October 2007 state that the implementation phase began successfully.

A number of observations were identified during the first weekend of operation, including:

- Licensees perceptions of increased Police presence were positive
- A number of people did not know about the one-way door or did not understand it
- DLA and Police representatives reported observations that people disappeared earlier from Oxford Terrace once they knew they couldn't get into bars
- Hospitality staff had difficulty getting into bars after work due to not being aware of the procedure for admittance (ie showing a pay slip). It was discussed that it will be left up to individual premises to decide how they police this
- Transport appeared to be good – lots of cabs around, better flow of traffic
- Road sweeper started at 2.30 which is unusual
- There was concern that there are two bars still advertising drink specials after 11.30pm and the Chairperson of the Accord Management Team was nominated to discuss this with the premises concerned
- Progress in relation to the Commerce Commission concerns regarding the Alcohol Accord and drink specials.<sup>43</sup>

<sup>43</sup> Accord Management Team minutes, 9 October 2007.

Meeting notes from August 2006 to March 2007 indicate that the Accord Management Team monitored the implementation of the Alcohol Accord and managed a number of related issues during the implementation phase. Processes for managing the Alcohol Accord implementation included:

- Initial weekly review of implementation, moving to monthly from November 2006 to March 2007
- Information-sharing and collaborative problem-solving between Police, City Council, Canterbury DHB, licensees and other stakeholders (security, taxis, street cleaners, rubbish collectors, bus companies etc)
- Ongoing liaison with taxi and bus transport operators
- Ongoing liaison with security companies
- Producing a newsletter for signatories to the Accord.

The Accord Management Team contributed to the management of a number of issues including:

- Alcohol Accord implementation issues, such as breaches of the spirit of the Accord
- The requirement for host responsibility training
- Transport issues, including the provision of public transport, party buses, traffic flow and speeding
- Inner-city design issues relevant to safety
- Communication requirements
- Issues pertaining to litter and rubbish removal
- Special events in the city
- Gang-related issues.

The following initiatives of the CVRP also supported the Alcohol Accord:

- Focused dialogue between the Police and member of the licensed trade
- Training and monitoring of licensed premises
- Measures aimed at improving the quality and behaviour of door staff
- Targeted policing operations directed at crime and disorder “hot-spots”
- Training programme for bar staff
- Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design initiatives including site analysis
- Co-location of the three agencies.<sup>44</sup>

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<sup>44</sup> Christchurch City Council. CBD Alcohol Accord and One-Way Door Process [Report], November 2006.

## *Mid-point evaluation feedback*

### *Planned mid-point evaluation undertaken*

*Conclusion that project on right track process-wise (stakeholders engaged, constructive relationships in place and innovative problem-solving occurring) but that it was too early to be conclusive regarding impact on crime and safety*

At the outset of the project the agencies and licensee representatives planned for mid-point evaluation feedback to determine whether or not there were early indications of the effectiveness of the intervention. As noted, this “mid-point” was determined as being mid-November and a presentation of mid-point results was made in December 2006 to the Accord Management Team and other invited stakeholders.

Key results included:

- 42 licensed premises signed and 48% implementing one-way door/cover charge (balance closed by 4am)
- Patron awareness of one-way door is improving
- Mixed expectation of outcome in terms of alcohol-related crime
- General interest in Alcohol Accord continuation
- Recognition of value of collaboration and role for all stakeholders
- Crime statistics at similar levels to 2005/6 with exception of marked rise in liquor offences/drunks in custody
- Perception of increased policing (borne out in crime data)
- Perception that there has been no obvious negative effect on business at this stage
- No reported change on perceptions of safety, incidents, litter, etc.

Process-wise, the mid-point evaluation showed that the project was overwhelmingly on the right track given the level of engagement of stakeholders, the constructive relationships in place and the innovative approaches to problem solving. However, it was regarded to be too early to be conclusive regarding the impact on crime and safety.

A summary of mid-point evaluation results is provided in Appendix 7.

## *Stakeholder perceptions of the intervention phase*

*Agency representatives' perceptions of the intervention phase were that the Accord had exceeded expectations but most expressed doubt that the project would achieve a 10% reduction in crime*

*There was a more mixed response from licensees, with both positive and negative aspects raised, the latter more often from those with less involvement*

*Areas for improvement in the Alcohol Accord process included improved collaboration at the outset, an increased number of committed licensees and earlier frontline Police involvement*

*There was a desire to see the scope of the Alcohol Accord broadened eg, to include rugby clubs and off-licences, and to consider other issues eg, supermarket sales of cheap alcohol*

Agency representatives noted that the Alcohol Accord had exceeded expectations, although most expressed doubt that the project would achieve a 10% reduction in crime.

Comments indicate that the improvement in stakeholder relationships was viewed as a key positive outcome and that this was linked to creating a safer inner-city environment. For example, increased communication between the licensees, the public and Police assisted Police to pick up trends and crime issues earlier.

The following comments illustrate these points:

*Been brilliant – better than original expectations – feels better in city at night.  
Relationship between the industry and agencies is great.*

*Had anticipated improved relationships between agencies and licensees but was much greater than anticipated. The Accord Management Team was very functional – continued to get reasonable turnout.*

*Picking up a lot more low-level offences (drunk and disorderly, breach of liquor ban) and fewer high-level issues – believes that the arrests for low-level offences are stopping escalation – as arrestees would have been offenders or victims of higher-level offences.*

Comments from licensee representatives are more mixed, with two of five interview participants expressing positive views on the intervention and what it had achieved and the remaining three identifying some negative aspects of the intervention process and outcomes. Those more involved in the Accord Management team tended to be more positive about the intervention. The following comments illustrate the range of views:

*We run a late night music bar and prior to the Alcohol Accord we were in a growth phase. Now we only really have four hours of trading. Patrons leave earlier than they used to, there is a mass exodus between 3.30 and 4am. They move on to the established "late, late" venues. It will have been good for their business.*

*Has not attracted people into the city earlier.*

*Working together is positive even though I don't support the one-way door.*

*It is a successful initiative. It has been good for our style of bar.*

*Very happy with process, brilliant, everyone around the table talking about issues and concerns.*

### *Key incentives for licensees continuing*

The following incentives were identified by stakeholders:

- Free host responsibility training provided by Canterbury DHB Community and Public Health
- Positive relationships with the agencies
- Threat of sanctions by the agencies
- Perception that revenues are not reduced by the one-way door intervention
- Acceptance that once people accept the one-way door, they will be in town earlier
- Licensed premises will get less Police attention if part of the Alcohol Accord
- See themselves as part of solution versus problem
- The Alcohol Accord/one-way door is killing the perception of lack of safety in the CBD
- The united approach. Without this, the intervention will be threatened.

### *Barriers/risks to continuation of the Alcohol Accord*

The following barriers/risks to the continuation of the Alcohol Accord were identified by stakeholders:

- Crime statistics may be a barrier to changing to a 3am one-way door but are not likely to be a barrier to a continuation of the current 4am arrangement. There may be too much focus on crime statistics and insufficient focus on other positive aspects of the Alcohol Accord
- Mismanagement of evaluation feedback. It will be important for the Accord Management Team to have a clear process and a media strategy for managing the feedback
- There may be difficulty in keeping the momentum going
- Very resource intensive for Police, may be difficult to sustain
- The Alcohol Accord may have promoted a more intensive media focus on inner-city crime.

### *Key success factors*

The following key success factors were identified by stakeholders:

- Police involvement, especially in relation to zero tolerance of liquor ban breaches
- Buy-in from transport providers, including taxis and buses
- The creation of a perception of risk with licensees; without this licensees would never have become involved
- Agency collaboration prior to the initiation of the pilot and a high level of commitment to the intervention concept. Police could not have achieved this on their own
- Communication and media planning. This continues to be vital to the success of the project
- Functional and committed Accord Management Team.

### *Less good things about the Alcohol Accord process*

The following less good things about the Alcohol Accord process were identified by stakeholders:

- The inability to work around the Commerce Act requirements. Drink specials in particular were an issue of interest and concern to many licensees and a key reason for initial involvement. It was disappointing that this issue was not able to be formally addressed and there was concern that the issue will “slide” over time
- The perceived “stand-over” tactics used by the agencies to implement the intervention. Some expressed a view that the intervention had been going to happen whatever transpired and that the involvement of the licensees was a token gesture masking the real strategy.

### *Areas for improvement*

The following areas for improvement were identified by stakeholders:

- A better communication strategy for the public was required
- There is a need to broaden the scope of the Alcohol Accord ie, include rugby clubs, suburban pubs, off-licences. There should also be consideration of other issues eg, supermarket sales of cheap alcohol
- The intervention would have been strengthened if a more collaborative approach had been taken from the start. Specifically it would have been better to bring licensees in early
- There is a need to increase the number of committed licensees involved in the Accord Management Team
- The project needs a full-time project manager to attend to the coordination issues and keep momentum going
- The Police hierarchy was slow to see that this project was important to perceptions of a safer city. They could have been included earlier and there could have been more lobbying on this issue. City Council management could also have been more involved at an earlier point in the project

- It would have been useful to have more clarity about the legal parameters for the intervention eg, a regulatory path as a threat or reality
- There is a need for a better way to keep licensees informed – not just those on the Accord Management Team
- There has been a lack of communication to licensees from the Accord Management Team on some issues, such as expectations of licensees over the Christmas period and what is expected now that the official pilot period has ended.

## **Costs**

Overall, stakeholders identified little in the way of costs incurred from participation in the intervention. Licensees identified no costs as a result of their participation and appear to have regarded the time costs as insignificant.

Agency representatives identified significant time costs, especially in the engagement phase of the intervention. They commented that these had exceeded expectations. They also identified the need for a project manager to coordinate and support the intervention. It is understood that the cost of a part-time project manager was met by Christchurch City Council via funding from the Ministry of Justice.

Other costs that were identified but not specified included:

- Office overheads and any specific costs of implementing the co-location model
- Meeting venues and catering – initially met by the Council then shared by all stakeholders
- Publicity and promotions – appear to have been met by the agencies and mainly the Council
- Policing – human resource costs of a significant increase in frontline policing.

The other costs identified were to those premises that had lost business.

Note: the project documentation did not support a detailed analysis of the monetary costs associated with the intervention. In part this is because the predominantly human resource costs were absorbed by the agencies and other stakeholders involved.

## **Policing activity**

Additional Police frontline resources were employed during the six-month one-way door pilot as follows.<sup>45</sup> The intention to deploy additional resources was communicated by the Area Commander, Christchurch Central to the Accord Management Team on 20 September 2006.

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<sup>45</sup> Correspondence Gary Knowles, 8 May 2007.

## 1. Operation Crusader

Operation Crusader is run four times per year, approximately every three months on a Saturday night.

The operation involves 30 extra staff comprising Beat Section, General Duties, Combined Criminal Investigation and other day shift staff (such as the Area Commander, Christchurch Central) who would not traditionally work on the weekends.

Operation Crusader focuses on saturating the CBD with high-visibility staff on foot patrol. Offenders are processed quickly by the use of 19A summonses through a mobile processing van and any breach of liquor ban offences result in an arrest as there are no warnings.

Each operation generates approximately 40 arrests. It is a zero-tolerance approach that sends a clear message to potential offenders and has an impact on reducing violence.

Operations during the pilot were run on:

- 14 October 2006
- 9 December 2006
- 24 February 2007.

## 2. Operation Reduce Violence

Operation Reduce Violence was implemented in March 2007 and focused on street violence and disorder in the target area of the Accord.

The objective of the Operation was to minimise violence in March, which is traditionally a high-risk month for violence. This operation was implemented for the four weeks of March on Thursday, Friday and Saturday nights. It employed both late shift and night shift staff undertaking high-visibility foot patrols and the placement of staff at static points. On an average night, 10-15 staff were deployed.

Critical components of the Operation were:

- An increased awareness of violence creating a focus for all staff
- The identification of three key locations that contribute to violence
- Directed Patrolling Reports requiring staff to stay at key locations during key times
- Police patrol vehicles placed in key strategic locations as a deterrent.

### 3. Beat Section

At the commencement of the one-way door pilot, Beat Section staff hours on a Saturday and Sunday morning were extended to 5am. The reason for this was to provide greater coverage of foot patrols after 4am.

This initiative meant that each Beat Section (Sergeant and five Constables) worked extended hours to provide high-visibility policing.

### 4. Swing shifts

At the commencement of the one-way door pilot, swing shift staff on Thursday, Friday and Saturday nights between 10pm and 3am were deployed on foot patrol in the CBD instead of in vehicles.

As a result, an average 10-15 extra staff were deployed within the inner city.

### 5. Special events/rugby

Christchurch Central Police staff attended and policed the following events during the period of the one-way door pilot:

- Sunday 5 November: Christmas in the Park (20 staff)
- Thursday to Monday 7-11 December: Cricket (36 staff)
- Sunday 31 December: New Year's Eve (30 staff)
- Tuesday 2 January: Cricket (36 staff)
- Monday 5 February: Classical Sparks (20 staff)
- Friday 9 February: Rugby (15 staff)
- Saturday 3 March: Starry Nights (15 staff)
- Saturday 17 March: Rugby (15 staff)
- Saturday 24 March: Rugby (15 staff).

On each occasion at the conclusion of these events (10pm), staff were deployed to walk the beat within the inner city. These extra staff were teamed up with the swing shift staff and Beat Section to provide greater coverage for the city.

This meant that on each of these occasions there were, on average, 20 event staff, 10 swing shift staff and five Beat Section staff patrolling the inner city.

## 6. Tactical Response Group

On 28 November 2006, shortly after the commencement of the one-way door pilot, a second Tactical Response Group (TRG) was implemented. Prior to this date, one TRG existed covering two out of three weekends. With the implementation of the second group also covering two out of three weekends, the TRG covered every weekend with two groups working a weekend together every three weeks.

This meant that on an average weekend, a Sergeant and five Constables formed part of the TRG and every third weekend this doubled to two Sergeants and 10 Constables.

## 7. Road Policing Group

The Road Policing Group ran a major drink-drive campaign in the Christchurch CBD in the two weeks leading up to Christmas. There were 60 staff working on the campaign between 6pm and 4am on Thursday, Friday and Saturday nights, which created a highly visible presence of Police staff in the city.

## 8. Crime cameras

At the implementation of the one-way door pilot, a decision was made to increase the number of volunteers who currently operated the closed circuit television system for the city. These staff were given extra training and allowed to use a Police radio. This provided foot patrol staff with additional information in regard to breaches of the liquor ban, disorderly behaviour and minor violence.

## 9. Party bus accord

The party bus code of conduct came into effect on 1 November 2006 with the objective of curbing antisocial behaviour en route and making journeys for patrons safer.

Party bus members signed the following agreed code of practice:

- No alcohol to be taken off the bus
- Intoxicated people to be banned
- Only four venues to be visited
- Partygoers must be dropped off in the city by 11.30pm
- Party buses must book with pubs as part of the trip
- Party buses must obtain a special liquor licence that allows alcohol on the bus, but passengers are not allowed to remove it from the bus
- Party buses will drop partygoers off at designated points in the city.

## RESULTS: OUTCOMES OF INTERVENTION

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The outcome results presented as follows are based on feedback from:

- Licensee feedback sheets
- Crime data (a full report from the crime data analysis is presented in Appendix 8)
- A telephone survey of licensees
- Licensee and agency interviews
- The community panel survey (a full report of the panel survey results is presented in Appendix 9).

### PERCEPTIONS OF SAFETY AND INCIDENTS

Perceptions of safety and incidents were measured using the panel survey and licensee feedback sheets. Additionally, some information emerged from the telephone survey of licensees and licensee and agency interviews.

#### Safety

Comments from licensees on perceptions of safety (collected via the telephone survey and telephone interviews conducted at the end of the pilot period) indicated mixed views regarding whether the Alcohol Accord had had a positive impact on safety in the CBD. Thirteen of 33 respondents commented on safety, with seven of these indicating that the streets appeared to be safer, four indicating that there had been no change and two reporting first-hand witnessing or knowledge of serious assaults.

Two of five licensees interviewed indicated that there had been some improvement in safety on the streets.

Agency representatives commented more on crime reduction than on perceived safety, however there was an inference from all parties that the streets were perceived to be safer. One respondent commented that the intervention was “killing the perception that the CBD is unsafe”.

Feedback from the panel survey showed a consistent shift towards an improved perception of safety in the CBD at night between October 2006 and January 2007.

Regarding general safety, all (8/8) respondents deemed the CBD unsafe in 2005/6, whereas in 2006/7, 2/7 (29%) deemed the CBD safe, 4/7 (57%) deemed it unsafe, and one indicated an opinion partway between safe and unsafe.

Perceptions of safety on different occasions shifted from more to less safe as follows and stayed in approximately the same order from 2005/6 through to 2006/7:

- In the CBD or working in the CBD
- In public areas in the CBD
- Working in the CBD at night
- In the CBD at night
- Walking alone in the CBD at night.

It was notable that the perception of safety in the CBD at night had improved in responses to three of four situations (in public areas, working in and being in the CBD), but reduced in relation to a sense of safety when walking alone in the CBD at night.


Critically, 4/6 (67%) of respondents noted that their perceptions of safety over the previous six months were better.

The improvement in safety was less marked with regards to personal safety **when working** compared with three months previously. In 2005/6, 6/8 considered this to be about the same and two regarded it to be more at risk. In 2006/7, all considered their personal safety to be about the same (7/8) or less at risk (1/8).

A clear improvement in perceptions of safety over three months of daily feedback from licensees (weekends of 5 October to 7 December) can be seen in figure 2. This is supported by monthly licensee feedback sheets from December 2006 to February 2007 where safety was reported as average (3/7) or above average (4/7).

Safety was more often cited as average (54% of reports [48/89]) or above average (32/89 [36%]) than below average (9/89 [10%]) in daily feedback sheets.

Figure 2: Perceptions of safety in vicinity of licensed premises (outside) as reported on daily licensee feedback sheets (weekends of 5 October to 7 December only when daily feedback was provided)



## Incidents

Specific feedback on incidents was available from the community panel survey and the licensee feedback sheets.

In terms of personal experiences of violence/assault in the CBD, there was a consistent trend toward fewer panel survey respondents having had negative experiences and those experiences having occurred on fewer occasions eg, in 2005/6, 7/7 witnessed fights/assaults in the CBD after dark on an average of 11 (range 2-25) times whereas in 2006/7, 5/6 witnessed an average of five (range 2-10) fights/assaults. The only exception was that no respondent was a victim of assault after dark in the CBD in 2005/6, whereas one respondent was a victim of assault after dark in the CBD in 2006/7.

Panel survey members answered a series of questions regarding their perceptions of various incidents relating to intoxication and violence in and around licensed premises. Considering each question to each respondent as a "response", incident frequency decreased in 16/55 (29%) responses, increased in 6/55 (11%) responses and remained the same in 33/55 (60%) responses.

The need for involvement in three problem situations in 2005/6 versus 2006/7 had lessened in two of three situations (intervening in a fight and calling Police to an incident or reporting a crime) and stayed the same in one situation (need to administer first aid).

The order of a selection of 13 locations listed from more to less safe stayed approximately the same from 2005/6 through to 2006/7, with licensed premises remaining at the top of the list (ie, the


safest environment). Notably, the most marked change was the improvement in perceptions of safety in streets and on footpaths: more respondents cited this location as unsafe than safe in 2005/6 (5:3) yet in 2006/7, two perceived this location as unsafe compared with four who perceived it as safe. One respondent indicated a response between safe and unsafe.

On consideration of 13 problems such as litter, vandalism and theft over the previous three months, the situation was regarded to be better in 17% of responses in 2006/7 versus 5% of responses in 2005/6 (where each question to each respondent is treated as a “response”). The situation was regarded to be worse in 30% of responses in 2006/7 versus 46% of responses in 2005/6.

On consideration of six soiling issues (vomit, spitting, urine, faeces, syringes and condoms) over the previous three months, respondents in all cases deemed that the situation with each issue had been worse (36% of responses) or the same (64% of responses) in 2005/6 (where each question to each respondent is treated as a “response”). In 2006/7, problems were regarded to be better in 6/25 (24%) responses, to have remained the same in 18/25 (72%) responses, and to have worsened in one (4%) response only.


Trends in door-based incidents with patrons as reported in three months of daily licensee feedback sheets (weekends of 5 October to 7 December) are as shown in figure 3. It is difficult to identify a pattern over the period, but incidents were more often cited as average (52% of reports [47/90]) or below average (32/90 [36%]) than above average (11/90 [12%]). A downward trend in door-based incidents with patrons was indicated in feedback in the last three months of the pilot; incidents were only reported as average (5/7) or below average (2/7) between December 2006 and February 2007.

Figure 3: Door-based incidents with patrons as reported on daily licensee feedback sheets (weekends of 5 October to 7 December only when daily feedback was provided)



Trends in cleaning required and damage in the vicinity of premises over three months of daily feedback (weekends of 5 October to 7 December) are as shown in figure 4. A clear pattern over time does not emerge, although there is something of a trend toward more reports of above-average problems. This is supported by monthly licensee feedback sheets from December 2006 to February 2007, where problems were reported as below average (1/7), average (4/7) or above average (2/7).

Figure 4: Cleaning required and damage in the vicinity of premises (outside) as reported on daily licensee feedback sheets (weekends of 5 October to 7 December only when daily feedback was provided)



## PERCEPTIONS REGARDING PROBLEMS WITH YOUNG PEOPLE

Perceptions regarding problems with young people were measured using the panel survey. Additionally, some information emerged from the telephone survey of licensees.

In both 2005/6 and 2006/7, most respondents agreed that “Christchurch CBD has a problem with youth drinking” (2005/6: 8/8 agreed, four strongly; 2006/7: 7/8 respondents agreed, four strongly).

With regards to whether youth drinking had changed in the previous three months, all respondents in 2006/7 thought drinking was “about the same” (7/8) or “a little better” (1/8), an improvement from 2005/6 when 2/7 thought it was worse.

However, responses were the same in both years as to whether “matters related to youth drinking are better than they were last year”; three agreed, four disagreed and one did not know.

Supermarkets, bottle stores and home were most often cited as places where “young people in the CBD **mainly** get their alcohol” along with “other” including friends and older people. Licensed premises were cited only once in 2005/6 and not in 2006/7.

This was strongly endorsed by some licensees via the telephone survey. Examples of comments include:

*Kids come out so late. Home drinking is the problem – there is no real business in the late night market. There are big problems around the eating places like McDonald's.*

*Problems are happening between 12 and 3am with young intoxicated people. Fully support the Police – they do an outstanding job.*

*Young people drink too much. Don't like to see them wandering the street.*

Interestingly, while respondents highlighted the problem with young people and drinking when prompted in questions, responses regarding the “main dangers facing people in my role” only included references to young people 2/9 and 2/7 times in 2005/6 and 2006/7 respectively.

## **PERCEPTIONS OF POLICE ACTIVITY AND PERFORMANCE**

Perceptions regarding Police activity and performance were evaluated using the panel survey, licensed premises' feedback sheets, telephone surveys of licensees and key stakeholder interviews.

The panel survey presented a fairly favourable perception of Police performance in both 2005/6 and 2006/7, with somewhat improved perceptions in 2006/7.

The level of agreement with six positive statements about Police activity ranged from 50% to 88% in 2005/6 and 57% to 86% in 2006/7. The biggest increases in levels of agreement (from 50% in 2005/6 to 71% in 2006/7) occurred for two statements: “Police do a good job of controlling crime in the Christchurch CBD” and “The Police often apprehend people who are drunk in the Christchurch CBD”.

Across the board, statements were agreed with 74% of the time in 2006/7 versus 64% of the time in 2005/6. In the case of five of the six statements, the percentage of respondents agreeing in 2006/7 was higher than in 2005/6. In the case of the sixth statement, the percentage agreeing dropped slightly from 88% to 86%.


Additionally, in relation to perceptions about drinking and young people, there was a small shift in the level of disagreement with the statement “The Police turn a blind eye to underage drinking in pubs in the Christchurch CBD”; in 2005/6, one agreed and four disagreed, whereas in 2006/7 all respondents disagreed.

Based on licensee feedback sheets, the Police presence was most often perceived to have been average or above average in the first three months of the pilot. Over the nine out of 10 weekends of 5 October through to 7 December for which there was licensee feedback, the Police presence was described as average (6/9 weekends) or above average (2/9 weekends) or equally distributed between average and above average (1/9). The Police presence was described as below average on 9/89 daily feedback sheets (10%), average on 48/89 (54%) and above average on 32/89 (32%).

Perceptions of the Police presence were also mixed in monthly feedback from December 2006 to February 2007. On five monthly feedback sheets, the Police presence was described as below average (2/7), average (2/7) or above average (3/7).

Licensees responding to the telephone survey were asked to rate the level of Police presence compared to levels of Police presence prior to the Alcohol Accord being implemented. Survey results from November indicated that over 50% of respondents rated the Police presence as above average compared with pre-Accord levels. Survey results from March 2007 showed a slight decrease, with 42% of respondents indicating that the Police presence was above average compared with pre-Accord levels. These results are shown in figure 5.

Figure 5: Licensee ratings of Police presence



Comments indicate that licensees perceived that the Police presence increased on the implementation of the Alcohol Accord and dropped off slightly between November 2006 and March 2007. For example:

*Has dropped off but still seems to be less action on the streets.*

*Police were invisible prior to the Accord. At 4am now they seem to be policing the Accord – if the Police arrived earlier there would be less crime.*

The perceived impact of the Police presence is noted in stakeholder interview results (from both licensee representatives and agency representatives). One licensee noted that the increased Police presence is a big plus and one noted that it is in fact the Police presence that has had an impact rather than the one-way door. All but one of the agency representatives also highlighted the significance of an increased Police presence, with one agency representative stating that the project would have struggled without this level of input from Police. For example:

*Level of commitment and involvement of Police Commander was unexpected as was the fact that the project would have struggled without this level of input.*

Many comments from the telephone surveys and the stakeholder interviews indicated a high regard for Police performance. Examples of these comments include:

*Fully support the Police – do an outstanding job.*

*Police are awesome – [both] numbers [of them on the streets] and what they are doing.*

*Locking up for breach of liquor ban has been keystone of success, no tolerance by Police and rigorous liquor ban enforcement.*

## **ANALYSIS OF OFFENCE DATA**

### **Whole-weekend data 2005/6 versus 2006/7**

Occurrences of 11 offences identified as those most typically involving alcohol in the Christchurch metropolitan setting increased by 75% in 2006/7 compared with 2005/6 (710 and 405 respectively). Of that increase, 73% was from liquor ban breaches and 20% was from disorder occurrences.

Disorder and liquor ban breaches are the two offences evaluated that are most typically “self-generated” by Police (identified through frontline officers actively policing these offences rather than a member of the public informing Police of a crime occurring). The intention is that by excluding these self-generated data, the analysis focuses more closely on crimes that are unaffected by an increase in Police presence.

With the exclusion of liquor ban breaches data, the increase from 2005/6 to 2006/7 is only 23%. With the exclusion of both liquor ban breaches and disorder, the increase is 8%.

Most of the total increase of 75% (67%) occurred on Saturday-Sunday nights.

A further consideration when accounting for the effect of increased Police activity on offence numbers is the breakdown of minor offences. Assault Police offences usually occur in conjunction with other offences (such as disorder and wilful damage) and it is useful to consider the

contribution of assault Police offences to minor offences overall. However, as assault Police offences represented a similar percentage of minor assaults in 2005/6 and 2006/7 (18% and 16% respectively), it does not appear that there was a marked rise in assault Police offences that accompanied the increased number of disorder and wilful damage offences.

### **Saturday-Sunday night data 2005/6 versus 2006/7**

Occurrences of 11 offences identified as those most typically involving alcohol in the Christchurch metropolitan setting on a **Saturday-Sunday night** increased by 101% in 2006/7 compared with 2005/6 (405 and 201 respectively). Of that increase 87% was from liquor ban breaches and a further 16% was from disorder occurrences.

With the exclusion of liquor ban breaches data from the analysis, the increase in occurrences on Saturday-Sunday night between 2005/6 and 2006/7 is 15% (177 versus 204). With the exclusion of both liquor ban breaches and disorder data, occurrences on a Saturday-Sunday night **decreased by 4%** (from 129 to 124) in 2006/7 compared with 2005/6.

### **Violence offences**

Violence offences overall (robbery and grievous, serious and minor assaults) increased by 14% from 140 in 2005/6 to 160 in 2006/7. However, the number of robbery and grievous assault offences decreased by 21% and 18% respectively, while the number of serious and minor assaults increased by 24% and 31% respectively.

It is interesting to consider violence offences in the absence of minor assault data, given that the increased Police activity related to the Accord resulted in a focus on controlling low-level offences.

With the exclusion of minor assault data, the increase in violence offences is 1% between 2005/6 and 2006/7.

Violence offences overall on a Saturday-Sunday night (robbery and grievous, serious and minor assaults) decreased by 4% from 83 in 2005/6 to 80 in 2006/7. The number of robbery and grievous assault offences decreased by 55% and 46% respectively, while the number of serious and minor assaults increased by 4% and 25% respectively.

With the exclusion of minor assault data, violence offences on a Saturday-Sunday night reduced by 22% between 2005/6 and 2006/7.

### **Sexual offences**

It is difficult to comment on trends in sexual offences given the very low offence numbers in the periods evaluated. The number of sexual offences was approximately the same in 2005/6 versus 2006/7 (10 versus nine offences) as was the number of rapes (four and five respectively).

However, there was a shift in the number of sexual affronts (increasing from two to four) and the number of sexual assaults (decreasing from four to zero).

It is notable that sexual offences overall on a Saturday-Sunday night reduced in number from three (one each rape, sexual attack, sexual affront) to one (one sexual affront) between 2005/6 and 2006/7.

### Times of offences

The pattern of occurrences through the night looks similar for both 2005/6 and 2006/7, a bell curve peaking at midnight to 12.59am (refer figure 6). However, the fall after 1am in 2006/7 flattens out between 3am and 3.59am, possibly reflecting the disorder and breach of liquor ban offences that increased over the period of the one-way door pilot.

This suggestion is supported by data on the pattern of disorder occurrences through the night, which show a notable second peak occurring at 4am (refer figure 7).

Figure 6: Occurrences by time






Figure 7: Disorder occurrences by time



An analysis of breach of liquor ban offences also supports this suggestion, although less markedly (refer figure 8). The peak remains at 1am in both years, but a number of offences after 1am decline more slowly in 2006/7. Additionally, a secondary peak at 4am occurs in 2005/6.

Figure 8: Breach of liquor ban occurrences by time



An analysis of offences by time with the exclusion of breach of liquor ban and disorder offences is shown in figure 9. In both years the number of offences peaks around 1am, although in 2006/7 the peak is spread between midnight and 2am.


The exclusion of breach of liquor ban and disorder offences results in a picture that looks very similar in both 2005/6 and 2006/7, with the increase of 8% in 2006/7 over 2005/6 showing as offences mainly occurring between 2am and 6am.

Figure 9: Occurrences by time excluding breach of liquor ban and disorder offences



It is also useful to consider data on the pattern of minor assaults through the night, as they represent the biggest offence group after liquor ban breaches and disorder occurrences. Data on minor assaults through the night show a later peak at 2am than is seen with all occurrences and a notable flattening of the curve between 3am and 4am (refer figure 10).

Figure 10: Minor assaults by time



### Comparison with Alcolink data

A comparison with Alcolink data was undertaken to determine the viability of the approach of using selected offences in NIA data to evaluate offences that most often are associated with alcohol. Similar trends and patterns of offending supported the validity of the selected NIA data as a proxy for statistics on alcohol-related crime.

Alcolink offences increased by 51% in 2006/7 compared with 2005/6. In comparison, offences evaluated using NIA data as reported above increased by 75%.


57% of the increase in Alcolink offences was from liquor ban breaches and 12% was from disorder offences. Comparative figures in the NIA data reported above were 73% and 20%.

Of the total increase in Alcolink offences, 69% occurred on Saturday-Sunday night compared with 67% on Saturday-Sunday night using NIA data.

There were similar patterns in time of offending for both Alcolink offences and occurrences identified with NIA data (refer figure 11):

- Alcolink and NIA both peak at midnight to 1.59am in 2005/6 and 2006/7
- Similar pattern with primary peak and secondary peak at 4am to 4.59am
- Both fall away in number by 5am.

Figure 11: Alcolink offences by time



## PERCEPTIONS OF CRIME LEVELS

Qualitative feedback on crime levels was provided in stakeholder interviews, telephone interviews with licensees and a summary from the Area Commander, Christchurch Central, prepared for inclusion in the March Accord newsletter.<sup>46</sup>

According to the Area Commander, there was a reduction in violent crime in December and a similar trend in January. It was estimated that there were 77 fewer victims of violent crime in the inner city. There were still a number of minor incidents and some low-level occurrences of violence, but there were no major violent attacks over the period.<sup>47</sup>

It was also noted by the Area Commander that violence in the two weeks leading up to Christmas 2006 was well below the five-year average for the city and was the lowest since 2003.<sup>48</sup>

Interview feedback (from the Area Commander) highlighted that Police are picking up a lot more low-level offences (drunk and disorderly, breach of liquor ban) and fewer high-level issues. The common view (Police, liquor licensing) is that the arrests for low-level offences are stopping an escalation of crime, as these arrestees would have been offenders or victims of higher-level

<sup>46</sup> Note: copy for the March newsletter was prepared but the newsletter was not produced.

<sup>47</sup> Summary on Police view of crime levels prepared by the Area Commander, Christchurch Central for inclusion in the March Accord newsletter, 15 February 2007.

<sup>48</sup> Summary on Police view of crime levels prepared by the Area Commander, Christchurch Central for inclusion in the March Accord newsletter, 15 February 2007.

offences. In particular it was noted that the dramatic increase in liquor ban breaches and disorder offences was self-generating Police work, which results from Police on the street detecting and responding to crime.

Also noted in interviews (Area Commander, Christchurch Central) is the increased communication with Police; Police are getting more information from members of the public and the licensing trade and the latter have more access to Police because of an increased street presence. As a result Police pick up trends and crime issues earlier. One example cited was advice to Police of a gang incident earlier in the weekend that allowed Police to defuse a potential situation.

Other agency stakeholders and licensees expressed some doubt that a 10% reduction in crime had been achieved but were also of the view that crime had decreased. The following comments illustrate the evident themes:

*Crime stats may be unclear and not sure if there has been any marked reduction in alcohol-related crime. But there are lots of positives and anecdotal feedback has been good eg, comments that "no violent crimes in city over past two weeks".*

*There is anecdotal evidence of a decrease in violent offending.*

*Think it may have reached a 10% target.*

Telephone survey respondents were more cautious in their responses, with 22 of 33 respondents stating that they did not know if there had been any reduction in crime as a result of the Alcohol Accord implementation. Two respondents indicated that in their view there had been no impact and four respondents indicated that there had been some impact. The remainder declined to comment.

## **PERCEPTIONS OF PUBLIC AWARENESS OF THE ONE-WAY DOOR**

The level of public awareness of the one-way door was measured in the panel survey and licensee feedback sheets. Some comments were also collated from the agency interviews and the telephone survey of licensees.

Licensee feedback sheets showed an improvement over the duration of the pilot with respect to perceptions of patrons' levels of understanding of the one-way-door. Respondents reported poor understanding by patrons 5-25% of the time during three of the first four weekends of the pilot (weekends of 5, 12 and 26 October 2006), but reports for all subsequent weekends in 2006 and the weekend of 19 October consistently indicated adequate or very good understanding. Monthly feedback for the months of December through to February 2007 consistently indicated adequate or very good understanding.

A specific comment was made in feedback sheets in early January – “people still go out with knowledge that things close up at 4am rather than understanding one-way door?”.

Of panel survey respondents, 5/8 (62.5%) and 6/8 (75%) had heard the slogan “Get in B4 4” and expressed reasonable understanding of what this meant in 2005/6 and 2006/7 respectively.

Four of eight (50%) had seen advertising in relation to the campaign in both 2005/6 and 2006/7.

Comments from the licensee surveys in November and March indicated that the public had increasingly come to understand the one-way door. Licensees emphasised the importance of this in dealing with patrons at the operational level. One interview participant stated that the public was so attuned to the intervention now that it will be difficult to go back to a 24-hour open-door policy. Examples of comments are:

*Works well, most punters aware. Easter was bad – 1am is too early. Lots of problems. Apart from that has worked really well.*

*Quite good now, still some patrons that don't understand. On the whole most people are OK with it.*

*No going back now – public are brainwashed.*

Two licensees suggested that there was still some confusion and that a better communication strategy was required for the target group, but also raised questions about how this could be funded. For example:

*Postcards are not a good way to communicate with the target audience.*

One agency representative noted the unexpectedly high level of community interest in the one-way door and suggested that there was an expectation that the one-way door would be a “silver bullet”. It was noted that the community needed to better understand the intervention and that a better communication plan was needed over the long term.

## **IMPACT ON LICENSED PREMISES' TURNOVER**

Licensed premises' turnover was measured in the licensed premises' weekly and monthly feedback sheets and the telephone surveys of licensed premises.

Based on licensee feedback sheets, turnover was most often perceived to be average or below average in the first three months of the pilot. Turnover was described as below average on 29/91 daily feedback sheets (33%), average on 42/91 (46%) and above average on 20/91 (22%).

Feedback in three months of daily feedback (weekends of 5 October to 7 December) indicated that turnover appeared to trend up in the first two-thirds of this period, then showed a shift down again.<sup>49</sup> The upward trend was again apparent in the last three months of the pilot: monthly feedback sheets for December 2006 to February 2007 reported turnover as average (3/7) or above average (4/7).


However, results from telephone surveys of licensed premises' representatives (n=33) indicated a stable pattern. Turnover was most often described as average in both November 2006 and March 2007 (refer figure 12). In both periods, approximately 70% or more respondents reported that licensed premises' turnover had not been adversely affected by the Alcohol Accord throughout the pilot timeframe. However, just under 10% reported a decrease in business. Comments from the survey and from the stakeholder interviews suggested that for some licensed premises, trade had decreased between 3am and 5am.

This is supported to some extent by licensee daily feedback sheet data; patron numbers between 4am and 6am were more often reported as below average (55%) than average (32%) or above average (14%) in the weekends 5 October through to 7 December 2006. It should be noted, however, that these data were based on the very small number of bars operating after 4am that provided feedback. Monthly data from December through to March were too sparse to be helpful – one bar each reported below average and average turnover.

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<sup>49</sup> Turnover was most often reported as average in the weekends of 5, 12 and 19 October, and was then most often cited as above average in all but one weekend from then on until 16 November (equal numbers citing average and above average in the weekend of 9 November). Turnover was again most often reported as average in the two weekends of 30 November and 7 December.

Figure 12: Reported turnover rates compared with rates in 2005/06 and 2006/07



### INTEREST IN CONTINUATION

Interest in the continuation of the Alcohol Accord was measured in the telephone survey of licensees. Results showed that 61% of those surveyed in November 2006 supported continuing the Alcohol Accord beyond the agreed pilot timeframe. This figure reduced to 54% in March 2007. The number of respondents indicating that they did not support the continuation of the Alcohol Accord remained constant throughout the evaluation (15%), with those taking a neutral position increasing slightly from November 2006 (18%) to March 2007 (25%). Results are shown in figure 13.

Figure 13: Licensee support for continuation of the Alcohol Accord post-pilot





Figure 14 shows licensee support for the continuation of the Alcohol Accord post-pilot for those bars that are operating after 4am. This shows that circa 18% of this group do not support the continuation of the Accord.

Figure 14: Licensee support for continuation of the Alcohol Accord post-pilot – bars operating post-4am only



Those who did not support the continuation of the Alcohol Accord commented on the following issues:

- It has been bad for business
- It is not addressing the causes of crime and violence in the city
- More Police are required on the streets, rather than expecting licensed premises to solve the problems
- Objections to “stand-over tactics” used by the agencies in getting the Alcohol Accord implemented.

Examples of comments include:

*We need more Police on the street – all evening. We are dealing with fights. I am unimpressed with the whole Accord process from the word go. The regulatory bodies used stand-over tactics and unethical threats. There is also a lot of distrust among bar owners.*

*The Accord is addressing the symptom not the cause. Drinking in cars and streets is the problem. The litter is still there. It hasn't achieved anything just killed our business.*

*I like the Accord overall and would support that continuing – I just don't like the one-way door.*

Those who were neutral in relation to the continuation of the Alcohol Accord indicated that the intervention was not relevant to them, did not address the issues or was best decided by those who were directly affected by it. Examples of comments are:

*We don't want to be regulated by something that does not apply to us. I don't think 4am lock-in is the solution. They should focus on the rogue operators and the off-licence outlets. Problems are happening between 12 and 3am with young intoxicated people. I fully support the Police – they do an outstanding job.*

*Stop supermarket drinking. Better to police the bars that are having problems. Leave the rest to their own devices. Don't see that it is making a difference.*

*Doesn't affect us – up to others.*

Those supporting the continuation of the Alcohol Accord highlighted the following:

- It has worked well for their establishment and for the city in general
- An earlier one-way door would be supported and would be more effective
- It has fostered positive relationships between licensees and agencies.

Examples of comments are:

*Good to work with the agencies – Police, council etc. Good to create a safe environment.*

*Support it if there is a level playing field. It has worked well for us. It would be better for society and needs to be across the board. I think that everyone should close at the same time. Maybe a 3am closing would be better.*

*It doesn't do any harm. I would like to see it moved back to earlier – 2am. Most places close at 3am, there are a lot of intoxicated people hanging around. It's positive that someone is trying to manage the situation.*

## RESULTS: LITERATURE FINDINGS

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The following success factors for a one-way door intervention implemented within the framework of an Alcohol Accord are based on findings from the literature summary (refer Appendix 10).

### Engagement and set-up

- Collaboration.
- All stakeholders involved from start.
- Licensees empowered and motivated as primary decision-makers.
- Accords that reflect local issues.
- Joint effort towards safe night-time economy.
- Role clarity for all players.
- Clear outline of benefits for licensees and assurance of no threat to business viability.
- “Community” projects seem to require at least some external resources or initiative to get them going.
- The employment of a project officer.

### Framework for the Accord

- Cooperative partnership between all players.
- Approach based on assisted self-regulation.

### Accord implementation

- Community-based monitoring committee that does not include representatives of the formal agencies of control, backed by a cohesive steering committee.
- Approaches that focus on social control rather than arrests and prosecutions as the main tools. The Police role is primarily in crime (situational) prevention, with traditional law enforcement taking a secondary position.
- Use of the media to positively drive change.
- Accord supported by a selection of supplementary items eg, work on other issues such as lack of late-night taxis, server responsibility training.
- Allowance for the time it takes for licensees to develop understanding and commitment.
- A shift across the course of the project from dependence on personnel to dependence on process.

### Accord sustainability

- Strong agreement from all parties involved regarding the outcomes to be achieved and sustained commitment to work together to achieve those aims.<sup>50</sup>
- Ongoing credible deterrent to irresponsible management.
- Active and consistent Accord reinforcement via monitoring committee.
- Adherence that is financially worthwhile for licensees.

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<sup>50</sup> Crime Prevention Victoria 2005.

- A framework for ongoing related support eg, Surfers Venues Association contributes to improving safety such as security for taxi ranks.
- Transition from dependence on personnel to dependence on process – joint versus single drivers.

#### Complementing the Accord

- Consideration of a systems approach that places the Accord alongside initiatives that address other modifiable situational variables.

## DISCUSSION

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### WHAT WAS PLANNED COMPARED WITH WHAT TOOK PLACE

The evaluation has found that the Christchurch CBD Alcohol Accord intervention was, in the main, implemented as planned. The essential components of the planned intervention were:

- An Alcohol Accord aimed at reducing alcohol-related harm in the Christchurch CBD
- A 3am one-way door on Thursday, Friday and Saturday nights as a key method within the Accord
- The aim of reducing crime and violence in the inner city by 10%
- An Alcohol Accord based on a willing compliance model and a partnership approach between the agencies, licensees and other stakeholders.

These components were achieved with the exception of the 3am one-way door, which was, in the final instance, pushed back to 4am and diluted somewhat with the agreement to allow the option of a cover charge as an alternative. These changes represented a significant compromise from the perspective of the agency representatives, and many participants in the evaluation (both agency representatives and licensees) expressed concern that these changes could compromise the intervention in terms of achieving the target 10% reduction in crime.

### WERE THE OBJECTIVES OF THE ALCOHOL ACCORD MET?

#### *10% reduction in alcohol-related crime and violence*

Despite qualitative feedback indicating increased perceptions of safety, the quantitative offence data in this evaluation did not demonstrate the achievement of the overall goal of the Alcohol Accord to reduce alcohol-related crime and violence by 10%.

However, offence data need to be considered alongside the increased Police presence in the CBD that was provided in association with the one-way door intervention. This increase was documented by the Area Commander, Christchurch Central and supported by stakeholder perceptions that generally indicated a view of an increased Police presence.

The increased Police presence in the CBD effectively created a confounder with regard to the analysis of offence data. Certainly, consideration of the offence data with the exclusion of self-generated offences in order to offset this effect indicated that the increase in crime between 2005/6 and 2006/7 had been contained to some degree (8%).

Similarly, data on violence offences, with the exclusion of minor assault data,<sup>51</sup> showed a contained increase of 1% between 2005/6 and 2006/7.

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<sup>51</sup> As set out earlier, exclusion considered on the basis that given that the increased Police activity related to the Accord resulted in a focus on controlling low-level offences.

The most compelling evidence from the quantitative offence data comes from the analysis of offence numbers on Saturday-Sunday night. This analysis is significant given that more offences occur on Saturday-Sunday night than any other night of the weekend. It is also significant as the increases in Police numbers as described earlier in this report affect numbers on Saturday-Sunday night more than other nights of the weekend. Both Operation Crusader and the extended Beat Section staff hours applied on Saturday-Sunday night only.

With the exclusion of both liquor ban breaches and disorder, occurrences on Saturday-Sunday night **decreased by 4%** in 2006/7 compared with 2005/6.

With the exclusion of minor assault data, violence offences on Saturday-Sunday night **decreased by 22%** between 2005/6 and 2006/7.

Low numbers of sexual offences precluded robust trend analysis. However, it is notable that sexual offences on Saturday-Sunday night reduced in number from three to one between 2005/6 and 2006/7 (by comparison, numbers remained stable across the whole weekend at 10 versus nine offences).

Hence it can be argued that while the overall goal of a 10% reduction in alcohol-related crime and violence has not been met, there has certainly been some impact on crime levels and, in some subsets of crime, there has been a decrease of above 10%.

#### *Other Accord objectives*

The evaluation data were selected at the outset of the intervention to measure the impact of the intervention on alcohol-related crime and violence prior to the development of the Alcohol Accord. However, it is possible to use these data to some extent to consider whether each of the objectives that were later agreed for the Alcohol Accord has been met.

#### *To create a safe and prosperous night-time economy within the Christchurch CBD*

Feedback from the panel survey showed a consistent shift towards an improved perception of safety in the CBD at night between October 2006 and January 2007. Data from the feedback sheets, telephone survey and interview participants were mixed, but on balance showed that more than one-half of those who commented perceived an increase in safety.

An analysis of violence offences did not directly support the perception of improved safety except in relation to offences on Saturday-Sunday night.

In terms of prosperity, the only measure of this in the evaluation was licensed premises' turnover. Feedback sheets indicated that turnover appeared to trend up in October and early November then showed a shift down again. The upward trend was again apparent in the last three months of the pilot. In contrast, results from telephone surveys of licensed premises' representatives indicated a stable pattern. Turnover was most often described as average in both November 2006 and March 2007, however it is notable that just under 10% of telephone survey respondents reported a decrease in business.

On balance it would appear that there has been some achievement in enhancing perceptions of safety. Crime data are inconclusive regarding whether the environment is safer. In terms of prosperity, there has been no obvious gain for licensees and a minority report that they have been adversely affected.

*To reduce alcohol-related harm and crime-related costs*

It is to be expected that contributions to reducing alcohol-related harm and crime-related costs would flow on from a reduction in alcohol-related offences. As above, there is no concrete evidence from overall offence data at this stage of the project that would indicate that this objective has been met. However, positive results in some subsets of crime may be interpreted as indicating that this objective is possibly being met at some level. This assumption is further supported by perceptions of increased safety and reduced serious crime resulting from increased Police activity relating to minor offences.

*Contribute to the reduction in liquor abuse*

There are no specific data from the evaluation to support any assumptions regarding a reduction in liquor abuse.

*Reduce intoxication, underage drinking and antisocial behaviour*

Panel survey results were inconclusive as to whether problems with young people have reduced.

Supermarkets, bottle stores and home were most often cited as places where “young people in the CBD mainly get their alcohol” along with “other” including friends and older people. Licensed premises were cited only once in 2005/6 and not in 2006/7.

This view was strongly endorsed by a number of licensees via the telephone survey.

*Build better relationships between stakeholders and the public*

Relationships between stakeholders have undoubtedly been enhanced by the Alcohol Accord process. This is supported almost unanimously and is a standout achievement of the intervention.

Whether this has been achieved with the public in general cannot be determined by this evaluation.

It is important to note that the findings of this evaluation were limited by a number of factors as follows:

- The small numbers represented on the panel survey and in the licensee feedback sheets mean that these data need to be interpreted cautiously and with consideration of other information gathered. Note: the licensee telephone surveys that reached circa 80% of licensees were conducted as a response to offset the impact of the low number returning licensee feedback sheets

- There is a marked contrast between the offence data analysed and some of the reductions in violent crime reported by the Area Commander, Christchurch Central during the pilot. This contrast raises the question of whether the data supplied adequately reflected the crime situation
- The evaluation team was unable to obtain data from taxi companies and ambulances. The absence of these perception data, and potentially quantitative data, on incident numbers impacted on the degree to which incident numbers could be evaluated
- Limitations of available literature as described earlier in this report.

## **THE “ACTIVE INGREDIENTS” OF THE INTERVENTION**

To determine how an intervention achieves its outcomes, it is necessary to understand the processes that make up the intervention and the resources that are required to deliver the intervention. These are the “active ingredients” of the intervention.

In the Christchurch CBD Alcohol Accord intervention, the following active ingredients are evident:

- The collaborative relationships and level of expertise within the agency triad of Christchurch City Council, Police and Canterbury DHB Community and Public Health
- The use of an evidence-based approach
- The infrastructure provided by Christchurch City Council, in particular the dedicated project management resource
- The involvement of a communications expert to advise on and assist with implementing a planned approach to communications
- The significant hands-on involvement of frontline Police
- The input and leadership provided by a small group of licensees and HANZ
- The involvement of further stakeholders representing eg, taxi companies, security organisations, bus companies, city design department
- The allowance of adequate time for the various phases of the intervention to take place.

All of the above were identified by stakeholders as critical success factors. It is useful to consider these in relation to the literature on success factors in Alcohol Accords.

The agencies brought to the intervention a history of collaboration and effective working relationships with each other and with the other stakeholders. The plan within the CVRP to apply a co-location model demonstrated a high level of collaboration. Additionally this group had considerable expertise in relation to identifying the issues and understanding the CBD weekend night-time environment.

The literature is strongly supportive of the need for a high level of collaboration between partner agencies.

The combination of collaboration and expertise appears to have enabled the agencies to develop a shared vision and create a perception of risk for licensees that was described by stakeholders as a critical motivating factor in gaining licensee participation in the Alcohol Accord. This approach is supported in the literature, which identifies the threat of sanction as necessary for an effective Alcohol Accord. Interestingly, this threat is one factor that continues to be viewed very negatively by some licensees.

The issues on which the project focused were identified via Police crime data and the Christchurch Community Safety Survey. Alcohol Accords are well established as being effective in achieving reductions in crime. The intervention was evidence based to this point. However, the literature suggests that the most successful Accords involve all stakeholders from the start, and actively involve these stakeholders, in particular licensees, in generating solutions. In Christchurch, the preferred solution had been substantially decided before the licensees became involved in the project. Some licensees expressed a view that the intervention has been going to happen whatever transpired and that the involvement of the licensees was a token gesture.

It appears that one result of this was that licensees were not fully persuaded about the one-way door as a method and many had concerns about the one-way door having an adverse effect on their business. This contributed to their pressing for and successfully negotiating a move from a 3am to a 4am one-way door and the addition of a cover charge option. This move undermined, from the outset, the likelihood of achieving the target 10% reduction in crime. The literature further suggests that licensees must see the Accord as a “win-win” situation and must be clear about the benefits of the Accord. While this was achieved to some extent, the failure to reach the 10% target may make it difficult to convince licensees that continuing the effort is worthwhile.

It was noted in feedback that bringing in the licensees earlier would have benefited the intervention.

The CVRP to some extent provided a “home” for the Alcohol Accord intervention and has linked the project to broader activity aimed at reducing violence and crime within the city. This may have assisted with gaining mayoral involvement and gaining a higher profile for the intervention. It was suggested in feedback that City Council management could have been more involved at an earlier point in the project. Being part of the broader project appears to have facilitated access to project management funds, allowing project management resources to be dedicated to the project and other Council resources such as communications expertise, street cleaning and signage to be made available. The employment of a dedicated project manager (or officer) is identified in the literature as an essential ingredient of an Alcohol Accord. This requirement was recognised by agency stakeholders in the evaluation.

The involvement of a communications expert in this case was linked to the Christchurch City Council infrastructure. This expertise and support was a vital ingredient in the intervention. The literature has little to offer regarding communication in general but does highlight the importance of media attention to educate and engage the public and the importance of having an official launch. Both of these were features of the Christchurch intervention.

There were suggestions from evaluation participants that more communication with the public could have been helpful. Lack of funding for this aspect of the intervention was noted in feedback.

There was a very high level of involvement of frontline Police in both the later engagement and implementation phases of the project. The input to planning and implementation from the Area Commander, Christchurch Central was a key ingredient in this intervention and was identified as such by all stakeholder groups. However, it was noted in feedback that the intervention would have benefited from an earlier involvement of frontline Police, from the conceptual phase onward. The early involvement of frontline Police is supported by the literature.

With regard to frontline Police involvement, the Christchurch intervention departs from the approaches advocated in the literature, which argue that arrests and prosecution should not be the main tool in an Alcohol Accord initiative and that Police should take a predominantly preventive role. While the Christchurch Police took a preventive role, there was arguably more focus on law enforcement. Some stakeholders have argued that this was the critical ingredient of the intervention.

The involvement and active leadership provided by a group of licensees and HANZ were critical as the intervention progressed and were significantly strengthened with the formation of the Accord Management Team. It is possible that without this the Alcohol Accord would not have been achieved. This process was facilitated in part by the intentional development of a partnership and the transfer of ownership of the intervention from the agencies to the wider stakeholder group. This approach is well supported in the literature and is a significant achievement of the Christchurch project, especially given that licensees were brought into the project at a later time than is recommended.

Notably the literature states that groups such as the Accord Management Team are often less effective to begin with but become more functional with time. Evaluation results support this, with agencies identifying issues with the management in the engagement phase and praising the group's functioning at the end of the pilot. The literature also suggests that licensees should be supported to form sub-committees to attend to the various aspects of overseeing an Accord. This could be considered to strengthen the Christchurch Accord.

A key challenge now will be maintaining the level of licensee ownership of the intervention. One suggestion in feedback was that there was a need to increase the number of committed licensees involved in the Accord Management Team. The literature favours a licensee-only monitoring group (in addition to a steering group) to maintain compliance with the Accord. This is a step that could be considered in Christchurch. A further suggestion was that more active communication was required with the whole licensee group, especially those who were not part of the Accord Management Team. This requirement is supported in the literature.

The active involvement of wider stakeholder groups (beyond agencies and licensees) became more evident as the intervention progressed and appears to have been significant in supporting the achievements of the Alcohol Accord.

This approach is well supported in the literature and has been a very positive feature of the Christchurch intervention according to feedback from all stakeholders. It has been suggested by evaluation participants that there is a need to further broaden the scope of the Alcohol Accord ie, to include rugby clubs, suburban pubs, off-licence premises, etc.

Finally, time was an active ingredient in the intervention. The level of collaboration and expertise evident in the conceptual phase of the intervention was developed over time. Additionally there were many issues that required negotiation and resolution and these also required considerable time. The literature supports a view that Alcohol Accords take time and seems to support a considerably longer timeframe than six months. This requires consideration by the Accord Management Team.

In summary, the Christchurch CBD Alcohol Accord intervention reflects a number of the key success factors identified in the literature. The intervention was built on a collaborative approach with a threat of sanction; a dedicated project management resource was secured; data were used to identify and refine a description of the problems; a voluntary Accord was developed involving a partnership approach with all key stakeholders; and the Accord Management Team was developed as a key structure to sustain the intervention through the pilot.

However, there are some key areas where the project is not in keeping with approaches promoted in the literature. The most critical relates to not involving licensees in generating the solution from the outset. It is possible that this will make it more difficult to keep the intervention going once the pilot has officially ended. A further issue is the reliance on Police enforcement as a key strategy within the Accord, which is not endorsed in the literature and may not be sustainable.

## **MOVING ON**

The literature suggests that part of “moving the project on” is developing political advocacy, for example the management team lobbying politically for a formalisation of the processes of the project into government legislation or policy (for example, through amendments to the Sale of Liquor Act or into the routine procedures of government agencies. In this case the Accord Management Team could take up the issues highlighted in the project regarding the requirements of the Commerce Commission and the restrictions these placed on the Alcohol Accord.

All stakeholders expressed disappointment regarding the loss of the drink promotions clause from the Accord. This aspect of the Accord was of keen interest to many licensees and was strongly supported by the agencies. All parties expressed the loss of this clause as a weakening of the Accord. It is therefore an excellent opportunity for the stakeholders to work together on an area of shared interest.

Other wider issues could also be considered, such as the suggestion in feedback to broaden the issue focus to include, for example, supermarket sales of cheap alcohol.

This would be directly in keeping with the literature with regards to complementing the Accord with further initiatives that address other modifiable situational variables.

The literature also highlights the need to develop and maintain a sense of the benefits of the Alcohol Accord for the licensees. The Christchurch CBD Alcohol Accord is vulnerable in this area, particularly as the incentive for collaboration on drink specials is undermined and the crime data are inconclusive.

As noted, the literature stresses involvement and ownership by all stakeholders. It has been suggested in feedback that there is a need to develop better ways to keep licensees who are not part of the Accord Management Team informed and engaged in the intervention.

## **LESSONS FROM THE CHRISTCHURCH CBD ALCOHOL ACCORD AND ONE-WAY DOOR**

The following recommendations for successfully implementing the type of intervention to reduce alcohol-related harm that was piloted in the Christchurch CBD are based on lessons from that project and findings from the literature.

### **1. Establish or build on effective agency relationships**

Effective working relationships between relevant agencies need to be developed or in place for an intervention to be successful.

The effective working relationship between the agencies was in existence before the Accord and one-way door intervention in Christchurch. This provided a critical foundation that needs to be established, if not already in place, when implementing such a project.

Additionally, this relationship underscored the strong vision for the project that was essential to its effectiveness.

### **2. Facilitate licensee ownership of problems and solution**

Licensees need to be actively recruited and involved from the earliest stages to ensure that they contribute to formulating a description of the problems and designing an effective solution(s). For example, a one-way door intervention might be recognised as valid where migration between drinking venues is seen as a critical issue.

Licensee involvement needs to extend to the establishment of a licensee-only monitoring group (refer below).

### **3. Address multiple issues as required**

Typically, it will be necessary for the planned intervention(s) to address **multiple** related issues as identified by stakeholders eg, in Christchurch, activities involved the control of licensed premises' opening hours using a one-way door as well as the management of taxi transport, party buses, street cleaning, etc.

### **4. Establish project leadership**

Interventions of this type require a cohesive and committed project steering group that represents **all** relevant stakeholders, from the earliest stages, and a dedicated full-time project management resource.

This group guides and manages the project process and supports a licensee-only monitoring group if this is in place. Sub-groups or "task forces" from the steering group can be used to work on various individual issues that the project is aiming to address eg, the management of transport out of the city. Other relevant individuals may be seconded to these sub-groups as required.

A critical responsibility of the steering group is planned and regular communication with **all** relevant licensees involved in the intervention.

### **5. Establish a licensee-only monitoring committee**

A licensee-only monitoring committee is the favoured mechanism for ensuring that the intervention is implemented as planned by licensees.

The use of such a self-regulation structure is strongly recommended in the literature, in particular where some irresponsible practices are not illegal.

It is critical that the forum where non-compliance is to be addressed does **not** include representatives of the formal agencies of control. This may mean that the monitoring committee lacks **all** expertise required at the outset, but these skills can be developed with input from strong project management and a steering group taking a leadership role.

### **6. Plan communications**

Planned communications should be used to both advise the public on the planned intervention(s) and educate the public in relation to minimising alcohol-related harm.

## **7. Ensure suitable infrastructure to “house” the project**

A suitable infrastructure is required to ensure that interventions of this type are adequately managed and resourced.

In the case of the Christchurch intervention, the Christchurch City Council CVRP provided the infrastructure for the intervention, which then ensured that the required project management, communications and other resources were available.

## **8. Allow adequate timeframes**

Adequate time is required to both set up and run an intervention of this type and to achieve project targets. One year has been cited in the literature as the minimum period for trialling such an intervention.

## **9. Move the project forward**

The end of the first year of a project is a key transition point. The steering group needs to move the project from dependence on personnel, such as the project manager, to dependence on a process. The project can sustain an inevitable loss of momentum at this point provided the key decisions have been made to move the project to the next stage.

The steering group needs to lobby for a formalisation of the processes of the project into the routine procedures of the relevant government agencies. While the initial role of the steering group is as support to the project manager, it must eventually become the vehicle for “normalising” the processes of community change.

# APPENDIX 1: ALCOHOL ACCORD ONE WAY DOOR: LICENSED PREMISES DAILY FEEDBACK SHEET

Please complete **one sheet** for each of Thursday, Friday and Saturday nights (three sheets per weekend) and **fax** to: 09 916 0339 or **e-mail**: louisek@jhug.co.nz

Premises name:

Day and date:

Sheet completed by:

Please circle or underline to indicate your view on patrons' level of understanding of one-way-door	Poor	Adequate	Very good	Comments:
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**Please circle or underline the appropriate option for each question:**

				Please provide comments below as needed:
1a. Numbers of patrons 12am - 2am	Below average	Average	Above average	
1b. Numbers of patrons 2am – 4am	Below average	Average	Above average	
1c. Numbers of patrons 4am – 6am	Below average	Average	Above average	
1d. Numbers of patrons after 6 am	Below average	Average	Above average	
2. Turnover	Below average	Average	Above average	
3. Door-based incidents with patrons	Below average	Average	Above average	
4. Cleaning required/damage in vicinity of premises (outside)	Below average	Average	Above average	
5. Your view of safety in vicinity of premises (outside)	Below average	Average	Above average	
6. Your observation of police presence in the city centre	Below average	Average	Above average	
7. Have you had a visit from any Sale of Liquor Act Agency staff?	Yes	No		
<b>Any further comments:</b>				

## APPENDIX 2: KEY STAKEHOLDER INTERVIEW PROMPT SHEET EXAMPLE

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Christchurch City One Way Door Intervention Evaluation 2006 -2007  
**Initial interview questions for licensee representatives September 2006**

<b>Name:</b>	<b>Telephone:</b>
<b>Role/organisation:</b>	<b>E-mail:</b>
<b>Address:</b>	<b>Best way to contact:</b>
<b>Consent form signed: yes / no</b>	

### **Role in project**

How did you become involved in the One Way Door project?

What factors influenced/encouraged you to become involved?

What has been your experience of the project to date (prompt for views re changes)?

What, if any, costs have you incurred so far in participating in the One Way Door project (record initial view; prompt re time, money )?

**Overview of project**

What is your understanding of how the Christchurch One Way Door project will work? Eg what are the goals, what are the key strategies?

**Anticipated benefits and costs of project**

What do you see as the key incentives to licensees being involved in the project?

What do you see as the key barriers to licensees being involved in the project?

In what ways do you expect the One Way Door project to be good for business (prompt for own and reported views)?

What, if any, costs or risks might arise from the One Way Door project (prompt for own and reported views)?

What will indicate to you that this project is achieving its aims (prompt for key indicators/measures and how used in practice)?

What is your view regarding the ability of the project to deliver a 10% reduction in alcohol-related harm? (Prompt for indicators that the project is achieving this)

**Project processes to date**

Thinking about the processes used to get the project off the ground (ie invitation to participate, meetings, formation of management group etc):

From your perspective what has worked well?

What could be done to enhance the processes that have been used?

What alternative processes would be more effective? more efficient?

Who would you say are the key drivers of the project? Has this changed as the project has been evolving?

To what extent has the project highlighted the issues in Christchurch in relation to alcohol-related harm?

To what extent has the project enhanced or detracted from the development of positive working relationships between stakeholders (licensees, police, City Council, public health)?

**Project implementation**

What will implementation of the One way Door mean for you ie, what changes would you anticipate making in your establishment(s) to make it happen?

## APPENDIX 3: TEMPLATES FOR TELEPHONE SURVEYS OF LICENSEES / REPRESENTATIVES

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Christchurch City One Way Door Intervention Evaluation 2006 -2007  
**Communication with licensee representatives October 4 2006**

<b>Bar:</b>	<b>Contact person:</b>
<b>Phone:</b>	<b>Fax:</b>
<b>E-mail:</b>	
<b>Know about Accord?</b>	<b>Is your bar/s signed up to Accord?</b>
<b>Does 4 AM OWD apply?</b>	
<b>Know about the evaluation/feedback sheets?</b>	<b>Will your bar be completing feedback sheets?</b>
<b>Best way to send them?</b>	<b>Person to liaise with?</b>
<b>Any questions?</b>	
<b>Info sheet sent</b>  <b>Feedback sheets sent Oct 5/6/7</b>	
<b>Interested in 15 minute interview?</b>	

**One Way Door: Licensed Premises – Mid point Survey November 2006**

Premises:  <b>Consent to interview</b>	Contact person & details:
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**1. Currently operating (tick as applies)**

Close before 4 am	One way door from 4am alone	Mix of one way door and cover charge \$\$	Cover charge only \$\$	Other (specify)
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Why is this approach preferred? (Prompt for changes over time, reasons why)

**2. In your view to what extent is the Alcohol Accord being implemented in the city?**

Not being implemented	Some aspects being implemented	Most aspects of Accord being implemented	All aspects of Accord being implemented	Don't know
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Comments:

**3. To what extent has the Alcohol Accord made an impact on reducing crime in the city?**

No impact on reducing crime	Some impact	Significant impact	Don't know
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Comments:

**4. What is your observation of Police presence since the Accord was implemented?**

Below average	Average	Above average	Don't know
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Comments:

**5. How do you rate your average turnover since the Accord was implemented? (cf same time previous year)**

Below average	Average	Above average	Don't know
---------------	---------	---------------	------------

Comments:

**6. Would you like to see the Alcohol Accord remain in place after March 2007?**

No	Neutral	Yes	Don't know
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Comments:

**7. Have you kept an incident register since the initiation of the Accord?**

**8. Any other comments for the evaluation of the one-way door/Accord project?**

**One Way Door: Licensed Premises – Survey April 2007**

Premises:  <b>Consent to interview</b>	Contact person & details:
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**1. Currently operating (tick as applies)**

Close before 4 am	One way door from 4am alone	Mix of one way door and cover charge \$	Cover charge only \$	Other (specify)
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Why is this approach preferred? (Prompt for changes over time, reasons why)

**2. In your view to what extent is the Alcohol Accord being implemented in the city?**

Not being implemented	Some aspects being implemented	Most aspects of Accord being implemented	All aspects of Accord being implemented	Don't know
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Comments:

**3. To what extent has the Alcohol Accord made an impact on reducing crime in the city?**

No impact on reducing crime	Some impact	Significant impact	Don't know
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Comments:

**4. What is your observation of Police presence since the Accord was implemented?**

Below average	Average	Above average	Don't know
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Comments:

**5. How do you rate your average turnover since the Accord was implemented?(cf same time previous year)**

Below average	Average	Above average	Don't know
---------------	---------	---------------	------------

Comments:

**6. Would you like to see the Alcohol Accord remain in place?**

No	Neutral	Yes	Don't know
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Comments:

**7. Any other comments for the evaluation of the one-way door/Accord project?**

APPENDIX 4: LIST OF PREMISES SIGNED UP TO THE ACCORD  
(SUPPLIED BY CHRISTCHURCH CITY COUNCIL)

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Inner city bars trading later than 4.00am

		Signed	Picked up box	Additional resources required?
1	<b>Barcelona</b>	<input type="checkbox"/>		
2	<b>Barfly</b>			
3	<b>Base</b>	✓		
4	<b>Base Backpackers</b>	✓		
5	<b>Belgium Beer Care Torenhof</b>	✓		
6	<b>Boogie Nights</b>	✓		
7	<b>Calendar Girls</b>			
8	<b>Capitol</b>	✓		
9	<b>Civic/Zinc</b>	✓		
10	<b>Concrete Club</b>	✓		
11	<b>Coyotes</b>	✓		
12	<b>Di Lusso Bar &amp; Lounge</b>	✓		
13	<b>Dynasty</b>	✓		
14	<b>Excelsior Hotel</b>	✓		
15	<b>Ferment</b>	✓		
16	<b>Foam Bar</b>	✓		
17	<b>Grumpy Mole Saloon</b>	✓		
18	<b>Harrys on Gloucester</b>	✓		
19	<b>Holy Grail Sports Bar</b>	✓		
20	<b>Iconic</b>	✓		
21	<b>Legends</b>	✓		
22	<b>Liquidity &amp; XO</b>	✓		
23	<b>Loaded Hog</b>	✓		
24	<b>Mad Cow</b>	✓		
25	<b>Micky Finns</b>	✓		
26	<b>Ministry</b>	✓		
27	<b>Minx Dining Room &amp; Bar</b>	✓		
28	<b>Oxford Tavern</b>	✓		
29	<b>Pegasus Arms Tavern</b>	✓		
30	<b>Sammy's Jazz Review</b>	✓		
31	<b>Scruffy Murphys</b>	✓		
32	<b>Shooters</b>	✓		
33	<b>Southern Blues Bar</b>	✓		

34	Southlander Hotel	✓		
35	Sticky Fingers	✓		
36	Sullivans Saloon	✓		
37	The Bard on Avon	✓		
38	The Bog	✓		
39	The Boulevard	✓		
40	The Dolls House Nightclub			
41	The Rockpool	✓		
42	The Tap Room	☐		
43	The Vic and Whale	✓		
44	Treehouse	✓		
45	Viaduct Restaurant & Bar	✓		
46	Warners Hotel	✓		
47	Work	✓		

# APPENDIX 5: ALCOHOL ACCORD DOCUMENT

## ALCOHOL ACCORD

### Christchurch Central Business District (CBD) Alcohol Accord

#### TARGET

Alcohol-affected groups or individuals congregating or migrating in the Christchurch CBD resulting in disproportionately high rates of offending such as common or sexual assaults, wilful damage, property offences and other criminal or antisocial activity.

#### KEY STAKEHOLDERS

ACC, ALAC, Canterbury District Health Board (Community and Public Health), Christchurch City Council, Hospitality Association of New Zealand (HANZ), Licensees (and Duty Managers), Liquor companies, New Zealand Police, Security Companies, Taxi Federation and After Midnight Express.

#### OBJECTIVES

- To create a safe and prosperous night-time economy within the Christchurch CBD
- To reduce alcohol-related harm and crime-related costs.
- Contribute to the reduction of liquor abuse.
- Reduce intoxication, underage drinking and antisocial behaviour
- Build better relationships between stakeholders and the public

#### METHOD

A "One-Way Door" policy will commence at 4am Thursday-Saturday (Friday-Sunday mornings). No new patrons will be admitted to the premises or re-admitted once they have left. Exclusion of patrons from 4am will remain in place for two hours and extends to no earlier than 6am.

#### ACCORD PRINCIPLES

Goal: Through consultation and collaboration between key stakeholders, to contribute to the reduction of liquor abuse and associated disorder and harm caused on or from licensed premises in central Christchurch.

It is acknowledged that this accord is a partnership between the enforcement and regulatory agencies and the hospitality venue operators and managers.

It is agreed that this trial is for a period of 6 months with a measured reduction of crime and violence in the CBD of 10% as the goal. At the conclusion of which, after independent assessment, it will be subject to review by the elected Accord Management team committee in conjunction with SOLA regulatory agencies.

#### The venue operators give a commitment to:

1. Adhering to the method as above and not admit new or returning patrons (other than stated exceptions below) onto the premises from 4.00am to 6.00am.
2. Ensure staff are aware of and assist in educating patrons of the 4.00am One-Way Door policy.
3. Work together with regulatory agencies to promote the Accord to the public.
4. Have in place host responsibility and intervention practices to ensure patrons do not become intoxicated.
5. Ensure the provisions of the SOLA that relate to liquor promotions are adhered to.
6. Provide a sufficient level and quality of security staff to ensure the Accord is adhered to.
7. In the event considering or wanting to withdraw from the Accord or its provisions (for any reason) to first consult with the Accord Management team and regulatory agencies.
8. Operate fairly and within the spirit of the Accord in accordance with its objectives.

#### The regulatory agencies give a commitment to:

1. Monitor and encourage premise commitment to the principles of the Accord.
2. Provide and increase a visible Police presence.
3. Actively enforce the liquor ban and ensure signage in relation to the liquor ban is improved.
4. Help promote and advertise the Accord and One-Way Door policy to the public.
5. Ensure all licensed premises operating within the Accord are dealt with fairly and consistently to ensure a level playing field.
6. Maintain flexibility in the Accord to allow for special or unforeseen events (by agreement).
7. Acknowledge that bona fide hospitality workers may require special consideration to allow access to licensed premises immediately after their shift (valid identification will be required).
8. Allowing smokers to re-enter a premise where a specific smoking area has not been provided.
9. To advocate for improved 'late-night' public transport and taxi facilities for those leaving the area.
10. To advocate for improved design elements (CPTED) of the inner city to improve public safety.
11. Address (where possible) other issues which may have a bearing on the effectiveness of the Accord (i.e. off-licence supply of liquor, intoxicated persons arriving in the CBD, liquor promotions, etc).


#### LICENSED PREMISES PARTICIPATING IN THIS ACCORD

WE the signatories agree to abide by the Alcohol Accord, the principles behind the Accord and to actively contribute to achieving the objectives of the Accord.

Signed this                      Day of September 2006

Supported and Endorsed by:

Canterbury DHB  
District Health Board  
100 HURONUI AVENUE



# **Christchurch Central Business District Alcohol Accord**

## **Communications & Promotions Plan August 2006**

### **INTRODUCTION**

In 2005, Christchurch City Council produced the city's first community safety strategy – The Safest City in New Zealand: Safer Christchurch Strategy. It is designed to make Christchurch a safer place to live, work, play and learn.

The Strategy aligns injury prevention, road safety and crime prevention under the overarching aim of Christchurch becoming the safest city in New Zealand – all the initiatives under the strategy working towards Christchurch seeking World Health Organisation accreditation as a Safe Community.

One of the Strategy's four goals is: to enhance safety from crime through preventative and supportive action. Another is to reduce the incidence of injury in our community.

Alcohol has been identified as a significant cause of crime and injury, particularly in Christchurch Central Business District (CBD), resulting in disproportionately high rates of offending such as common assaults, sexual assaults, willful damage, property offences, and other criminal and antisocial behaviour.

Groups of young people and individuals tend to congregate or migrate to the CBD Thursday to Sunday. These people are often in some state of intoxication and become either the perpetrators or victims of crime. Forty-five per cent of all offending in the central city happens between midnight and 8am.

A City Council survey in 2004 showed that 79 per cent of respondents felt unsafe by themselves in the central city at night.

### **BACKGROUND**

Christchurch is unique in the way it has such a large number of bars (64 licensed premises) in a relatively confined area – the two distinct areas being Oxford Terrace, more commonly referred to

as The Strip, and the Manchester Street-Cashel Street corner. This enables patrons to easily wander from bar-to-bar or migrate between the two areas.

The problem is intensified by current drinking patterns. There is an older age group present in the bars up to about 1am, with younger patrons tending to arrive around midnight, having consumed alcohol before coming into town. The more people on the street late at night, and possibly effected by alcohol, the more potential there is for disorder and violence.

In an attempt to reduce the number of people on the street during the night, Christchurch is looking to introduce an Alcohol Accord, working in partnership with licensed premises.

A similar accord on Australia's Gold Coast has seen a substantial reduction in crime: alcohol-related offences have dropped by 17 per cent and sexual offences by 12 per cent. In Geelong (Victoria), an alcohol accord has also resulted in a marked reduction in alcohol-related crime and violence.

It is considered a similar such accord for the Christchurch central business district will help the city achieve its aim of being the Safest City in New Zealand.

## **THE STRATEGY**

The umbrella Strategy is to work towards making Christchurch the safest city in New Zealand. A key component of this is to form a partnership with licensees to work together to reduce alcohol-related crime and violence in Christchurch's CBD area by stopping the migration of patrons from bar-to-bar. The formation of an Alcohol Accord is the first initiative in this process.

## **COMMUNICATION OBJECTIVES**

The key communications objective is to promote the introduction of the Alcohol Accord through a strong promotions and publicity campaign. This is an important first step to ensure patrons understand the details of the Accord, the responsibility of which rests with the Council, licensees, Police and Accord partners.

Throughout the first six months of the Accord there needs to be a sustained campaign of strategic promotions and publicly to promote a positive environment – promoting the benefits of the Accord in helping to create a night-time inner-city environment that is safe and enjoyable.

The strength of any communications plan is promoting the partnership and commitment that exists between Council, Police, licensees and other key stakeholders to reduce inner city crime and violence, thereby creating a buoyant night-time economy.

## **STAKEHOLDERS**

- Christchurch City Council
- New Zealand Police
- Canterbury District Health Board (Community and Public Health)
- ACC
- ALAC
- Hospitality Association of New Zealand (HANZ)
- Licensees (and bar duty managers)
- Canterbury Taxi Federation
- Individual taxi companies and drivers
- Public Transport – bus companies and drivers
- Bar patrons
- Major Breweries
- Wine & Spirit Companies
- Ministry of Justice – Crime Prevention Unit
- 24-hour off-license premises
- Security companies
- Tourists/backpackers

## **KEY MESSAGES**

- The Christchurch City Council is working towards making Christchurch the Safest City in New Zealand
- The Council, Police, Canterbury District Health Board and licensees have formed a partnership to work together to reduce alcohol-related crime and violence in Christchurch's CBD area.
- An Alcohol Accord is the first initiative to help create a night-time environment in the inner-city that is safe and enjoyable.
- Licensees, the Police, Council and CDHB are committed to finding solutions that reduce inner city crime and violence, thereby creating a safe and prosperous night-time economy.

## TACTICS & ACTION PLAN

WHAT	WHEN	AUDIENCE	WHO
<p>The Accord to be launched at a bar in the CBD area – to mark the start of the accord and acknowledge the partnership by the licensees and key stakeholders to work together.</p> <p>This will be billed as a key media event – we need to get the media to help spread the word – television, print and radio.</p> <p>This event needs to be strategically timed to maximise publicity to ensure we get media coverage the day before or the day of the Accord coming into operation.</p> <p>The event to be attended by the Mayor, District Police Commander, signatories of the Accord and key stakeholders.</p> <p>Work with The Press to produce a feature on the Saturday – before or after launch. Possibly on the aspirations of Christchurch to be New Zealand’s Safest City – that incorporates the latest initiative of the Alcohol Accord.</p> <p>Or explore the opportunity with them to do a series of features on safety –using the four key</p>	<p>Time and venue yet to be identified at the end of September-beginning of October.</p>	<p>All stakeholders Media General public</p>	

<p>goals in the Safer Christchurch Strategy. (This would coincide with the Strategy beginning a year-old).</p>			
<p>The launch needs to be supported with an advertising campaign – newspaper and radio – posters for bars and pasted on billboards and bollards throughout the city, and promotional items to be produced which can be given to patrons to reinforce the key events of the Accord, such as the 4am one-way door policy or \$5 cover charge. It is important all elements of the Accord are promoted.</p> <p>The extent of this campaign will depend on available funding from all partners.</p> <p>Patrons must be communicated to so they understand the details of the Accord. This responsibility rests with licensees, the Council, Police and Accord partners. It can be done in a number of ways.</p>	<p>At the time of the launch and sustained over a period of weeks.</p>	<p>Bar patrons</p>	
<p>Monitor the success of the Accord during the first weekend – and send out a press release. This will quote the Mayor, Police Commander and key licensees.</p>	<p>A week after launch.</p>	<p>Media The Public</p>	

<p>There will be a lot of media interest in the Accord and we will need to keep up the publicity and ensure it is operating effectively.</p> <p>At this stage it will be important for everyone to meet to raise and address any concerns, ensuring everyone remains 100 per cent positive as we work through the first six months of the Accord and our goal of a 10 per cent reduction in crime and violence.</p>			
<p>Story in City Scene in October to promote the Accord and the work being done to make Christchurch a safer city.</p> <p>This ensures continued promotion and is a good way to connect with all residents.</p>	<p>October</p>	<p>Media The Public</p>	
<p>Again, after the first month, we send out a press release reporting on the success of the first month – including quotes from the Mayor, Police Commander, and licensees.</p>	<p>End of October/beginning of November</p>	<p>Media The Public</p>	
<p>After three months of the Accord being in place, we should again canvas the media and seek publicity.</p>			

<p>This will be half-way through the six-month period – it would be good to have some results to report on crime rates.</p> <p>The sooner we can communicate some positive results the better.</p> <p>This information should be presented to licensees and stakeholders before being putting out as a media release.</p>			
<p>After six months, we will again need to court the media, after the results have been collated and stakeholders informed.</p> <p>This will be one of the most important phases to keep up the momentum of what the Accord has achieved and work towards other initiatives.</p> <p>This phase needs to be inclusive.</p>			

## APPENDIX 7: SUMMARY OF MID POINT EVALUATION OF THE CHRISTCHURCH CITY ONE-WAY DOOR INTERVENTION

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Prepared by Paula Parsonage and Louise Kirkwood

6 December 2006

Background:

- Evaluation aim is to assess the efficacy of the one-way door policy to reduce alcohol-related crimes and associated harms within Christchurch CBD
- Mid point evaluation reviews first six weekends of the intervention: 5 October – 14 November 2006

### Conceptual phase March 05 – March 06

- Key critical success factor: multi-agency approach, collaboration and team work
- Possible improvements: earlier involvement of frontline police and licence holders

*“[The project] evolved over a year with good interagency collaboration (DLA, CPH, Police Liquor Licensing). Willing compliance is key and can only be achieved with agencies working together – you cannot achieve compliance if agencies work in silos.”*

### Engagement phase March 06 – October 06

Barriers and enablers:

- Key barrier of financial risk
- Barrier of different perspectives on problems and solutions, eg, problem with home/street/car drinking vs bars
- Barriers offset by shared perspectives, eg, drinks promotions are problematic, want people to come into town earlier, want CBD to be perceived as safe
- Key motivator for licensees to stay on the right side of the DLA and Police

Outcome:

- High level of engagement achieved
- Police commitment to additional frontline resource
- Unanimous view that relationships among all stakeholders enhanced

Critical success factors:

- Licensee perspective: Bringing licensees together and accounting for different interests; united approach; Accord Management Team with licensee representation
- Agency perspective: agency collaboration; strong vision; provision of structure for the intervention

Costs and benefits:

- Agencies cite time input required while licensees identify no significant costs to involvement
- Benefits identified: constructive stakeholder relationships; common interests highlighted; increased co-operation; innovative solutions to problems; wider issues addressed, eg, transport issues, liquor ban signage, bollards, street cleaning

*“Has pulled previously adversarial parties into a more collaborative role, now willing to compromise and want to work together for “greater good.”*

**Implementation phase October 06 – April 07**  
**Report on 5 October to 14 November**

Survey of licensees:

- 30% operate one way door, 12% operate cover charge, 6% operate a mix of the two (survey of 33/42 bars; balance of 52% close by 4am)
- Reported perceptions suggest that turnover is average
- Police presence perceived as above average (52%) or average (12%); balance reported as “don’t know”
- At this early stage, strong majority believe that Accord/OWD should continue post pilot

*“This is a fantastic thing. Police are awesome, both the numbers of them out there and what they are doing. Communication is fantastic, open dialogue is great.”*

*“We are in a critical area. It is not hurting our business so anything that can help reduce crime is a good thing for us.”*

Crime:

- Occurrences of 12 key offences (selected on basis of association with alcohol) increased 44.6% (168 to 243) in 2006 compared with 2005 BUT:
  - 89% of increase from liquor offences and 7% from drunk in custody/detox/drunk home
  - Omit liquor offences data – increase 2005 to 2006 is 5%
  - Omit liquor offences and drunk in custody data – increase is 2%

Christchurch City Council / DHB panel survey:

- Eight respondents working in the CBD provide snapshot of previous 3 or 6 months – effectively pre-Accord baseline survey for future panel surveys
- All respondents regard CBD to be unsafe
- On-licensed premises and places of entertainment never regarded to be unsafe
- Unanimous agreement that youth drinking in CBD is a problem: main sources of alcohol identified as friends/family, supermarkets, home and bottle stores
- Universally positive expectation of impact of a reduction in inner city violence and disorder.

#### Summary of mid-point evaluation findings:

- 42 licensed premises signed and 48% implementing OWD/cover charge (balance closed by 4am)
- Patron awareness improving
- Mixed expectation of outcome in terms of alcohol-related crime
- General interest in Accord continuation
- Recognition of value of collaboration and role for all stakeholders
- Crime stats at similar levels to 2005 with exception of marked rise in liquor offences/drunks in custody
- Perception of increased policing (borne out in crime stats)
- Perception that there has been no obvious negative effect on business at this stage
- No reported change on perceptions of safety, incidents, litter, etc

*“[We are] now discussing things other than problems, ie, how to solve issues.”*

**APPENDIX 8: CRIME DATA ANALYSIS: FULL REPORT**

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**METHODOLOGY .....111**

**RESULTS .....113**

    OFFENCE NUMBERS .....113

    OFFENCE TYPES.....114

    CONTRIBUTION OF MINOR OFFENCES TO OFFENCE NUMBERS .....116

    TIME OF OFFENCES.....117

    DAYS ON WHICH OFFENCES OCCURRED .....1206

    VIOLENCE OFFENCES.....121

    OFFENCES OF A SEXUAL NATURE.....121

    COMPARABILITY OF NIA AND ALCOLINK DATA .....122

**APPENDIX: SELECTION OF NIA VERSUS CARD DATA.....124**


## METHODOLOGY

Data were sourced through the Police Mapping System (MAPS) using National Intelligence Application (NIA) data. The selection of NIA versus CARD<sup>52</sup> data was based on the rationale set out in Appendix 1. This was at the request of the Area Commander for Christchurch Central so that this analysis of the one-way door trial period is more closely aligned to other recent, similar analyses that have used NIA data.

The predominant function of MAPS is to assist in analysing spatial patterns of offending as opposed to providing quantitative data. However, MAPS is the only way quantitative data can be obtained regarding a specific area (eg, one street or block), which is why it was used.

The physical boundary for the data is the four avenues bounding the central city: Bealey, Deans, Moorhouse and Fitzgerald (refer figure 1).

Figure 1: Physical boundary for offence data



<sup>52</sup> Calls for service from the Police Communications Centre.

Violence in this analysis refers to Commissioner's Risk Indicator (CRI) violence, which includes violence (category code 1000) and **excludes** intimidations/threats (class code 1700).

CRI violence also excludes the following family violence-related type and offence codes:

- Crimes Act 1961 Section 194(b) assault on child under 14 years and assault by male on female (type codes 1530 and 1540) and common assault domestic firearm, common assault domestic other weapon, common assault domestic manually and common assault domestic stabbing/cutting weapon (offence codes 1581-1583, 1587)
- Summary Offences Act 1981 Section 9 common assault domestic firearm, common assault domestic other weapon, common assault domestic manually and common assault domestic stabbing/cutting weapon (offence codes 1641-1643 and 1647).

These family violence-related codes are excluded from violence on the basis that they form their own subset of crime type, which requires separate monitoring from CRI violence.

As there is no method to restrict offence data to crimes enacted under the influence of alcohol, the analysis was restricted to data for the following 11 offences identified as those offences most typically involving alcohol in the Christchurch metropolitan setting:<sup>53</sup>

- Robbery
- Sexual affronts
- Grievous assaults
- Sexual attacks
- Serious assaults
- Rape
- Minor assaults
- Disorder
- Intimidation/threats
- Liquor offences
- Wilful damage.

Note: offence data for “drunk custody” was omitted from the above list although it was recognised as being in the offences most typically involving alcohol in the Christchurch metropolitan setting. This was because there were serious concerns regarding the validity of data on “drunk custody” occurrences in NIA because of operator workloads. Entries for charges/arrests that need to be ready before Court each morning take priority and often the “drunk custody” records are not included in the system at all.<sup>54</sup>

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<sup>53</sup> Offences identified as those most typically involving alcohol in the Christchurch metropolitan area by the Alcohol Intelligence Analyst, Policing Development Group, Canterbury District Headquarters.

Offences within the above criteria within the following times were plotted over a six-month period from 1 October to 31 March for both 2005/6 and 2006/7. Only those offences that resulted in a K6 (an offence report has been submitted) or a K9 (an arrest) were considered.

- Thursday 10pm – Friday 7am
- Friday 10pm – Saturday 7am
- Saturday 10pm – Sunday 7am.

A further set of data was obtained through the data-querying application Business Objects using Alcolink<sup>55</sup> data. These data sets comprised occurrences within the same physical boundary and dates and times as used for NIA data.

## RESULTS

### Offence numbers

Occurrences increased by 75% in 2006/7 compared with 2005/6 (710 and 405 respectively). However, 73% of the increase was from liquor ban breaches.

Liquor ban breaches were 39% of all occurrences in 2006/7 versus 13% of all occurrences in 2005/6.

It is notable that a further 20% of the increase was from disorder occurrences; disorder and liquor ban breaches are two offences that are most typically “self-generated” by Police (identified by frontline officers actively policing these offences rather than a member of the public informing Police of a crime occurring). Self-generated occurrences are expected to increase in a situation where increased Police resources are applied, as occurred over the period of the one-way door pilot. The increased number of breach of liquor ban offences also reflects the nil tolerance policy of Police during the one-way door trial period towards offenders drinking in public.

Disorder occurrences were 37% of all occurrences excluding liquor ban breaches in 2006/7 versus 29% of all occurrences excluding liquor ban breaches in 2005/6.

With the exclusion of liquor ban breaches data, the increase in offences from 2005/6 to 2006/7 is 23%. With the exclusion of both liquor ban breaches and disorder data, the increase is 8%.

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<sup>54</sup> A low number of drunk custody offences in the 2006/7 period of the one-way door support this rationale; there were 18 drunk custody offences out of 423 offences overall (including drunk custody with the other identified 11 offences representing most typically involving alcohol) ie, only 4% of offences under consideration.

<sup>55</sup> Alcohol information pertaining to offender levels of intoxication and last place of drinks collected from Custody Charge Sheets and Traffic Offence Notices.

## Offence types

All weekend data

Occurrences are shown by types in figure 2 and table 1.

Figure 2: Occurrences by type for the period 1 October to 31 March for both 2005/6 and 2006/7




Table 1: Occurrences by type for the period 1 October to 31 March for both 2005/6 and 2006/7

	2005/6	2006/7	% change
Robbery	19	15	-21%
Grievous assaults	22	18	-18%
Serious assaults	37	46	24%
Minor assaults	62	81	31%
Intimidation/threats	28	30	7%
Sexual affronts	2	4	100%
Sexual attacks	4	0	-100%
Rape	4	5	25%
Disorder	101	162	60%
Breach of liquor ban	54	277	413%
Wilful damage	72	72	0%
<b>Total</b>	<b>405</b>	<b>710</b>	<b>75%</b>

The key changes from 2005/6 to 2006/7 are, as mentioned above, the increases in liquor ban breaches (413% from 54 to 277) and disorder occurrences (60% from 101 to 162). Other notable changes were in sexual attacks: nil in 2006/7 compared with 2005/6 (n=4) and in sexual affronts: four in 2006/7 compared with two in 2005/6.

### *Saturday-Sunday night data*

Because a large proportion of offences during the Thursday night to Sunday morning weekend occur on Saturday-Sunday night (50% and 57% in 2005/6 and 2006/7 respectively), a separate analysis of Saturday-Sunday night data was completed.

An analysis of offence types occurring on Saturday-Sunday night revealed a similar pattern to that seen across the Thursday night to Sunday morning weekend, although an even higher percentage of the increase could be attributed to liquor ban breaches.

Occurrences on Saturday-Sunday night increased by 101% from 201 to 405 from 2005/6 to 2006/7. 87% of the increase was from liquor ban breaches. A further 16% of the increase was from disorder occurrences.

In 2006/7, liquor ban breaches represented 50% of all Saturday-Sunday night occurrences versus 39% of occurrences over the whole weekend.

Liquor ban breaches on Saturday-Sunday night increased more than seven-fold between 2005/6 and 2006/7, from 24 to 201, and represented 50% of all Saturday-Sunday night occurrences in 2006/7 versus 12% in 2005/6.

With the exclusion of liquor ban breaches data, the increase in occurrences on Saturday-Sunday night between 2005/6 and 2006/7 is 15% (177 versus 204). With the exclusion of both liquor ban breaches and disorder, occurrences on Saturday-Sunday night decreased by 4% (from 129 to 124) in 2006/7 compared with 2005/6.

In contrast to the whole weekend, there was a reduction in violence offences on Saturday-Sunday night (refer detail below).

Other notable changes in occurrences on Saturday-Sunday night between 2005/6 and 2006/7 were:

- Increase in disorder by 67% (16% of increase in 2005/6 on Saturday-Sunday night)
- Drop in grievous assaults by 46% (13 versus seven)
- Drop in robberies by 55% (11 versus five)
- Nil sexual attacks or rapes in 2006/7 compared with one each in 2005/6.

## CONTRIBUTION OF MINOR OFFENCES TO OFFENCE NUMBERS

A further consideration when trying to account for the effect of increased Police activity on offence numbers is the breakdown of minor offences.

Minor assaults can be broken into categories as shown in table 2.

Table 2: Minor assaults by type

	2005/6	2006/7	% of 2005/6 minor assaults	% of 2006/7 minor assaults
Assault Police	11	13	18%	16%
Common assault (taxi driver)	1		2%	0%
Other common assault		1	0%	1%
Common assault (other weapon)	1		2%	0%
Common assault (manually)	48	67	77%	83%
Common assault (stabbing/cutting weapon)	1		2%	0%
<b>Total</b>	<b>62</b>	<b>81</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>

Assault Police offences usually occur in conjunction with other offences (such as disorder and wilful damage) and as it is useful to consider the contribution of [assault](#) Police offences to minor offences overall.

However, as [assault](#) Police offences represented a similar percentage of minor assaults in 2005/6 and 2006/7 (18% and 16% respectively), it does not appear that there was a marked rise in [assault](#) Police offences that accompanied the increased number of disorder and wilful damage offences.

## TIMES OF OFFENCES

The pattern of occurrences through the night looks similar for both 2005/6 and 2006/7, a bell curve peaking at midnight to 12.59am (refer figure 3). However, the fall after 1am in 2006/7 flattens out between 3am and 3.59am, possibly reflecting the disorder and breach of liquor ban offences that increased over the period of the one-way door pilot.

This suggestion is supported by data on the pattern of disorder occurrences through the night, which show a notable second peak occurring at 4am (refer figure 4).

Figure 3: Occurrences by time






Figure 4: Disorder occurrences by time



An analysis of breach of liquor ban offences also supports this suggestion, although less markedly (refer figure 5). The peak remains at 1am in both years, but the number of offences after 1am declines more slowly in 2006/7. Additionally, a secondary peak at 4am occurs in 2005/6.


Figure 5: Breach of liquor ban occurrences by time



An analysis of offences by time with the exclusion of breach of liquor ban and disorder offences is shown in figure 6. In both years the number of offences peaks around 1am, although in 2006/7 the peak is spread between midnight and 2am.


The exclusion of breach of liquor ban and disorder offences results in a picture that looks very similar in both 2005/6 and 2006/7, with the increase of 8% in 2006/7 over 2005/6 showing as offences mainly occurring between 2am and 6am.

Figure 6: Occurrences by time excluding breach of liquor ban and disorder offences




It is also useful to consider data on the pattern of minor assaults through the night, as they represent the biggest offence group after liquor ban breaches and disorder occurrences. Data on minor assaults through the night show a later peak at 2am than is seen with all occurrences and a notable flattening of the curve between 3am and 4am (refer figure 7).

Figure 7: Minor assaults by time



These patterns of later and sometimes second peaks and slower declines are noticeable when comparing patterns over time for all occurrences, liquor ban breaches, disorder occurrences and minor assaults in 2005/6 versus 2006/7 (refer figure 8).

Figure 8: Patterns in offence times 2005/6 versus 2006/7



## **DAYS ON WHICH OFFENCES OCCURRED**

In both 2005/6 and 2006/7, a large proportion of offences during the Thursday night to Sunday morning weekend occurred on Saturday-Sunday night (50% and 57% respectively).

The higher percentage in 2006/7 versus 2005/6 on Saturday-Sunday night was reflected in a lower percentage of offences occurring on Thursday-Friday night (15% versus 22% respectively).

The percentage of offences occurring Friday-Saturday night was similar in both periods (29% and 28% respectively).

67% of the total increase in occurrences across the Thursday night to Sunday morning weekend in 2006/7 (from 410 to 705 occurrences; 75%) occurred on Saturday-Sunday night (201 versus 405 occurrences; 101%).

## **VIOLENCE OFFENCES**

Violence offences overall (robbery and grievous, serious and minor assaults) increased by 14% from 140 in 2005/6 to 160 in 2006/7. However, the number of robbery and grievous assault offences decreased by 21% and 18% respectively, while the number of serious and minor assaults increased by 24% and 31% respectively.

It is interesting to consider violence offences in the absence of minor assault data, given that the increased Police activity related to the Accord resulted in a focus on controlling low-level offences.

With the exclusion of minor assault data, the increase in violence offences is 1% between 2005/6 and 2006/7.

Violence offences overall on a Saturday-Sunday night (robbery and grievous, serious and minor assaults) decreased by 4% from 83 in 2005/6 to 80 in 2006/7. The number of robbery and grievous assault offences decreased by 55% and 46% respectively, while the number of serious and minor assaults increased by 4% and 25% respectively.

With the exclusion of minor assault data, violence offences on a Saturday-Sunday night were reduced by 22% between 2005/6 and 2006/7.

## **OFFENCES OF A SEXUAL NATURE**

It is difficult to comment on trends in sexual offences given the very low offence numbers in the periods evaluated.

The number of sexual offences was approximately the same in 2005/6 versus 2006/7 (10 versus nine offences) as was the number of rapes (four and five respectively). However, there was a shift in the number of sexual affronts (increasing from two to four) and the number of sexual assaults (decreasing from four to zero).

It is notable that sexual offences overall on a Saturday-Sunday night reduced in number from three (one each rape, sexual attack, sexual affront) to one (one sexual affront) between 2005/6 and 2006/7.

## **COMPARABILITY OF NIA AND ALCOLINK DATA**

### *Alcolink data*<sup>56</sup>

Based on Alcolink data, the total number of occurrences was 831 in 2005/6 and 1255 in 2006/7. Of these, 548 and 967 occurrences respectively involved an offender who had consumed alcohol.

Data were also sourced to include information about offenders, including whether alcohol was consumed or not, and offender age and gender.

Occurrences obtained using Alcolink data cover a wider range of offences than those considered using NIA data.

Because Alcolink includes both offence and offender information, it is important to note that the data for both does not marry exactly, because one offender may be responsible for multiple offences, and likewise, one offence may have multiple offenders.

### *Alcolink and NIA comparison*

A comparison with Alcolink data was undertaken to determine the viability of the approach of using selected offences in NIA data to evaluate offences that most often are associated with alcohol. Similar trends and patterns of offending supported the validity of the selected NIA data as a proxy for statistics on alcohol-related crime.

Alcolink offences where the offender had consumed alcohol increased by 76% (548 in 2005/6 and 967 in 2006/7). In comparison, offences evaluated using NIA data as reported above increased by 75%.

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<sup>56</sup> It is noted that there have been data reliability issues in both the collection and entry of Alcolink data. Steps have been taken to resolve these issues but the validity of the 2005 Alcolink data is unable to be verified.


57% of the increase in Alcolink offences where the offender had consumed alcohol was from liquor ban breaches and 12% was from disorder offences. Comparative figures in the NIA data reported above were 73% and 20%.

Of the total increase in Alcolink offences, 69% occurred on Saturday-Sunday night compared with 67% on Saturday-Sunday night using NIA data.

There were similar patterns in time of offending for both Alcolink offences and occurrences identified with NIA data (refer figure 9).

- Alcolink and NIA both peak at midnight to 1.59am in 2005/6 and 2006/7
- Similar pattern with primary peak and secondary peak 4am to 4.59am
- Both fall away in number by 5am.

Figure 9: Alcolink offences by time



Note: Alcolink data were not suitable to use alone for the crime data analysis in this evaluation because the Alcolink database only records data for crimes where the offender is known and an arrest has taken place (K9). Thus Alcolink omits any offence where there is no arrest (eg, a K6 where an offence report has been submitted or the offender has not been identified). As such, Alcolink records do not reflect the full extent of offence activity that is relevant for this evaluation.

## APPENDIX: SELECTION OF NIA VERSUS CARD DATA

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CARD data extracted from MAPS provide a reflection of the number of calls for service reported through the Police Communications Centre. Staff at Police Communications code the incoming calls as they interpret the information provided to them by callers.

For example, a member of the public may call in to report what they perceive to be a violent attack, which may in reality be a fight in a public place or a disorderly behaviour offence. Based on the description of the incident the caller provides to the call taker, it may end up being coded as a violent attack.

CARD data extracted from MAPS quantitatively overstates actual numbers (see the table below).

Comparison of Data Extracted from 1 October 2006 to 31 March 2007 in Christchurch central area

	<i>Offence type code 1510</i>	<i>Offence type code 1640</i>
MAPS (CARD)	54	591
MAPS (NIA)	3	21
Business Objects INCOFF Offence Provisional Stats	3	16

In contrast, NIA data, extracted out of MAPS, reflect the portion of CARD data that results in a correctly coded report with the addition of any additional incident reports received over the watchhouse counter or by Police as they happen upon incidents.

As the above table highlights, NIA data extracted from MAPS are a more accurate picture of numbers reflected in official statistics, and the result of correct coding of offences and incidents.

# APPENDIX 9: COMMUNITY PANEL SURVEY ANALYSIS: FULL REPORT

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- METHODOLOGY .....126**
- RESULTS .....126**
  - SURVEY COMPLETION ..... 126
  - SURVEY RESPONDENTS EXPERIENCE OF THE CBD:.....127
  - PERCEPTIONS OF SAFETY IN THE CBD.....128
  - PERCEPTIONS OF YOUNG PEOPLE (UNDER 18) AND ALCOHOL ..... 132
  - PERCEPTIONS OF LICENSED PREMISES/INTOXICATION AND VIOLENCE ..... 134
  - PERCEPTIONS OF SAFETY IN THE CBD.....142
  - PERCEPTIONS OF CHRISTCHURCH CBD ..... 146
  - PERCEPTIONS OF POLICING.....148
  - PERCEPTIONS OF ONE WAY DOOR AND THE ACCORD ..... 149

## **INTRODUCTION**

This appendix presents a detailed analysis of the findings from the community panel survey developed and conducted by the Christchurch Community Violence Project (CCVP) Project Manager.

## **METHODOLOGY**

The approach used was a panel survey developed by the CCVP Project Manager. The base survey contained 60 questions. Some survey questions were slightly amended or omitted<sup>57</sup> for different recipients, but the majority of questions remained the same across all surveys.

Panel members were selected to ensure that all key stakeholders in the community were represented. Hard copy surveys were provided to panel members for completion and reply-paid return to the Project Manager. Completed surveys were supplied to the evaluation team.

## **RESULTS**

### **Survey completion**

The following eight respondents working in the Central Business District (CBD) completed forms on two occasions during the one-way door pilot:

- Security
- Store security
- Oxford Terrace (resident)
- Street cleaners
- Youth worker
- Midnight Express driver
- KFC worker
- Taxi driver.

The first surveys were completed between 11 October and 1 November 2006 and refer to perceptions of the previous three to six months<sup>58</sup> – effectively a pre-Accord survey.

The second surveys were completed between 17 January and 12 February 2007 and refer to the previous three to six months – effectively a mid-intervention survey.

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<sup>57</sup> Four surveys with 60 questions, two with 57 questions, one each with 52 and 54 questions.

<sup>58</sup> Questions typically referred to survey members' perceptions in the previous three months. However, occasionally questions referred to the previous six months or to perceptions of the current situation.

On most occasions the recipients completed all parts of the survey. For questions where recipients omitted to provide a response, the results presented reflect the feedback that was provided (in each case this is indicated by the total number of responses referred to).

**Survey respondents' experience of the CBD:**<sup>59</sup>

- All have worked in the CBD for more than one year (eight for  $\geq$  one year, seven for  $\geq$  three years, six for  $\geq$  six years, two for  $\geq$  10 years)
- Seven of eight work in the CBD in the evening at least once per week, with 5/8 working in the CBD for two or more nights a week and 3/8 working in the CBD five or more days per week. One respondent works in the CBD once per two weeks
- Seven are in the CBD at least one weekend day per week and six on both weekend days
- Night work extends past 1am for 6/8 and past 3am for 5/8 (two earlier than 11pm).

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<sup>59</sup> Data from second survey results.

## Perceptions of safety in the CBD<sup>60</sup>

1. Eight out of eight deemed the CBD unsafe in 2005/6. Four out of seven (57%) deemed the CBD to be unsafe in 2006/7, 2/7 (29%) deemed it safe and one indicated an opinion partway between safe and unsafe.
2. Specific CBD locations listed from more to less safe:

	2005/6		2006/7	
	<i>Ratio of those responding safe to those responding unsafe</i>	<i>Rough groupings</i>	<i>Ratio of those responding safe to those responding unsafe</i>	<i>Rough groupings</i>
Cashel St/Mall	0:8	Never cited as safe	1:6	More citing unsafe than safe
The Strip (Oxford Tce)	1:6	More citing unsafe than safe	3:4	
Colombo St	2:5		3:3	Equal numbers citing safe and unsafe
Manchester St	1:5		3:3	
Hereford St	3:3	Equal numbers citing safe and unsafe	3:3	

3. Personal experiences of violence, assaults etc in the CBD in the previous three months are shown in the following table and graphs:


<sup>60</sup> Initial questions on perceptions of safety (first seven of 12 questions) were omitted from the 2006/7 survey supplied by one respondent. Hence responses are calculated out of seven.

	2005/6	2006/7
Respondents who have witnessed fights/assaults in the CBD <b>after dark</b>	7/7: witnessed an average 11 (range 2-25) times	5/6 witnessed an average 5 (range 2-10) times
Respondents who have witnessed fights/assaults in the CBD <b>in the day</b>	3/6: witnessed an average 2 (range 1-3) times	0/5 witnessed a daytime assault
Respondents verbally assaulted in the Christchurch CBD	6/7: an average 18 (range 2-40) times	5/6: an average 9 (range 1-25) times
Respondents who have feared violence because of the actions of a person or persons nearby	7/8: 1 each reported once, >5, >10 or >20 times and 3 on 2-5 occasions	5/7: 2 once, 1 on 2-5 occasions and 1 each on >10 and >20 occasions
Respondents fearing violence "because of a threat made directly to me"	5/8: 2 on 2-5 occasions and 1 each >5, >10 or >20 times	3/7: 1 once and 2 on 2-5 occasions
Respondents who have experienced threatening or intimidating behaviour	7/8: 2 each on 1, 2-5 or >20 occasions and 1 on >10 occasions	5/8: 3 once and 1 each on >10 and >20 occasions
Respondents who have "seen street robberies (muggings)"	2/8: 1 once and 1 on 2-5 occasions	1/8: 1 once


No respondent was a victim of assault after dark in the CBD in 2005/6, whereas one respondent was a victim of assault after dark in the CBD in 2006/7.

In 2005/6, 6/8 considered their own personal safety when working compared with three months previously to be about the same and two regarded it to be more at risk. In 2006/7, 7/8 considered their own personal safety when working compared with three months previously to be about the same and once regarded it to be less at risk.


% Respondents fearing violence because of action of person(s) nearby in last 3 months - 2006 vs 2007




% Respondents experiencing threatening or intimidating behaviour in last 3 months - 2006 vs 2007



% Respondents fearing violence because of a threat made directly - 2006 vs 2007



% Respondents who have seen street robberies in last three months - 2006 vs 2007



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4. Cited “main dangers facing people in my role”:

	2005/6	2006/7
Youth worker	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Dealing with intoxicated people/young people</li> <li>2. Aggressive behaviour</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Groups of young people drinking then trying to intimidate and threaten other young people and general public</li> </ol>
Midnight bus/express? driver	<i>no comment</i>	<i>no comment</i>
Taxi driver	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>3. Walking over street as don't look and there is broken glass including bottles left by boy racers</li> <li>4. People in groups, especially “hoodies”</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>2. Bottles left on road – broken glass</li> <li>3. Drunk pedestrians walking in front of traffic and walking on road</li> </ol>
Security	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>5. Aggressive males and some females</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>4. Intoxicated persons</li> <li>5. Aggressive persons</li> </ol>
Worker at fast food outlets	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>6. Getting to and from work</li> <li>7. Verbal harassment</li> <li>8. Damage to confidence from continued unsafe environment</li> <li>9. Potential physical danger from escalating fighting (have had people jump counter when involved in in-store fighting)</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>6. Getting to and from work – relies on public transport</li> <li>7. Verbal abuse from heavily intoxicated people</li> </ol>
Street cleaners	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>10. Intoxicated people in early hours congregating around fast food outlets</li> <li>11. Boy racers' weekend activities</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>8. People under the influence of drugs or alcohol</li> </ol>
Store security	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>12. People carrying</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>9. Gang-related offences</li> </ol>

	weapons 13. Youth offenders 14. Gang-related offenders 15. People who take drugs/alcohol who are unstable and/or intoxicated	10. Drunken/drugged persons 11. Armed persons 12. Mentally unstable persons
Resident	16. Vandalism	13. Property abuse and damage

### Perceptions of young people (under 18) and alcohol

- In 2005/6, all respondents agreed that “Christchurch CBD has a problem with youth drinking” (four strongly agreed and four agreed). In 2006/7, 7/8 respondents agreed (four strongly agreed, three agreed and one disagreed).
- Statements in order from more strongly to less strongly agreed with:

	2005/6		2006/7	
	<i>Ratio of those agreeing to those disagreeing</i>	<i>Rough groupings</i>	<i>Ratio of those agreeing to those disagreeing</i>	<i>Rough groupings</i>
<i>It's easy for young people in the Christchurch CBD to get alcohol</i>	8:0	No respondent disagrees	7:0	

<i>The issues for the Christchurch CBD are the same as other places in New Zealand with regard to young people's drinking</i>	6:0		6:0	
<i>Christchurch CBD has a problem with youth drinking</i>	8:0		7:1	<i>More respondents agree than disagree</i>
<i>It's easy to get served in pubs in the Christchurch CBD if you are under 18</i>	3:3	<i>Equal numbers agree and disagree</i>	3:3	
<i>There are lots of underage people drinking in pubs in the Christchurch CBD</i>	2:3	<i>More respondents disagree than agree</i>	1:4	
<i>In general, matters related to youth drinking are better than they were last year</i>	3:4		3:4	
<i>The Police turn a blind eye to underage drinking in pubs in the Christchurch CBD</i>	1:4		0:6	<i>All respondents disagree</i>

3. In 2005/6, respondents had mixed responses to changes in youth drinking over the previous three months, with most regarding it to be worse (two, including one significantly worse) or the same (four) and only one regarding it to be “a little better” (one no response). In 2006/7, 7/8 respondents felt that youth drinking had remained the same and one felt it was “a little better”.
  
4. Respondents had mixed responses to the following statement: “There are many programmes and good systems by organisations such as the Police, Local Council and Health in the Christchurch CBD for dealing with youth and alcohol issues”:
  - 2005/6: three agreed, two disagreed and three did not know or did not comment
  - 2006/7: four agreed, two disagreed and two did not know.
  
5. Responses regarding whether “matters related to youth drinking are better than they were last year” were the same in both 2005/6 and 2006/7: 2005/6: three agreed, four disagreed and one did not know.
  
6. Respondents cited the following as places where “young people in the CBD **mainly** get their alcohol”:

	<i>2005/6</i>	<i>2006/7</i>
Supermarkets	5/7	3/8
Licensed premises	1/7	0/8
Bottle stores	4/7	3/8
Home	4/7	4/8
Other off-licences (eg, Night & Day)	1/7	2/8
Other	5/7 – 2 citing older friends, 1 citing friends/whanau, 1 citing theft	3/8 – 1 each citing “stolen”, “over-age people”, “friends and parents”

### **Perceptions of licensed premises/intoxication and violence**

Seven respondents were asked varying questions about perceptions of licensed premises and about intoxication and violence. Responses from store security were disregarded as the respondent stated they worked only until 8.30pm and were never in the CBD after 11pm.

Drawing parallels between the six remaining responses is not useful as they reflect the very different tasks in which respondents are involved (taxi driver, bus driver, security, youth worker, KFC worker, resident).

The responses are presented in the table below. They paint a picture of the situation in the CBD in 2005/6 and 2006/7 from the perspective of each respondent and can be used to help to identify any trend that may exist in responses between these dates. Changes in responses are identified in a further table (following the table described above): incidents that have increased in frequency are shown in red and those that have decreased are shown in green.

Considering each response to each question by each respondent as a “response”, incident frequency decreased in 16/55 (29%) responses, increased in 6/55 (11%) responses and remained the same in 33/55 (60%) responses.

2005/6	2006/7
<b>Security:</b>	
Has more times than can be remembered: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Seen someone refused service at a bar or club or refused admittance to a bar, club or other premises (for example a fast food outlet or retail premises) because they were <u>intoxicated</u></li> </ul>	
Has regularly (16-25 times): <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Had to eject/escort someone from the premises for being drunk or intoxicated</li> <li>• Seen someone refused service at a bar or club or refused admittance to a bar, club or other premises because they were <u>violent</u></li> <li>• Asked a customer to leave the premises because they were <u>intoxicated</u></li> </ul>	Has regularly (16-25 times): <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Had to eject/escort someone from the premises for being drunk or intoxicated ⇔</li> <li>• Asked a customer to leave the premises because they were <u>intoxicated</u> ⇔</li> </ul>
Has often (5-15 times): <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Had to eject/escort someone from the premises for being loud or obnoxious due to the influence of alcohol</li> <li>• Had to ask a customer to leave the premises because they were <u>violent</u></li> <li>• Seen someone assaulted or seen a fight in the Christchurch CBD in the <u>evening</u></li> </ul>	Has often (5-15 times): <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Had to eject/escort someone from the premises for being loud or obnoxious due to the influence of alcohol ⇔</li> <li>• Seen someone refused service at a bar or club or refused admittance to a bar, club or other premises (for example a fast food outlet or retail premises) because they were <u>intoxicated</u> ↓↓</li> </ul>

2005/6	2006/7
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Seen someone refused service at a bar or club or refused admittance to a bar, club or other premises because they were <u>violent</u> ↓</li> </ul>
<p>Has occasionally (1-4 times):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Had to trespass a customer verbally or in writing because they were <u>intoxicated</u></li> <li>• Had to trespass a customer verbally or in writing because they were <u>violent</u></li> </ul>	<p>Has occasionally (1-4 times):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Had to trespass a customer verbally or in writing because they were <u>intoxicated</u> ↔</li> <li>• Had to trespass a customer verbally or in writing because they were <u>violent</u> ↔</li> <li>• Had to ask a customer to leave the premises because they were <u>violent</u> ↓</li> <li>• Had to eject/escort someone from the premises for displaying inappropriate behaviour ↓</li> <li>• Seen someone assaulted or seen a fight in the Christchurch CBD in the <u>evening</u> ↓</li> </ul>
<p>Has <b>not</b>:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Seen someone assaulted or seen a fight in the Christchurch CBD in the <u>day</u></li> </ul>	<p>Has <b>not</b>:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Seen someone assaulted or seen a fight in the Christchurch CBD in the <u>day</u></li> </ul>
<p>Rates the standard of bar security in the Christchurch CBD as good</p>	<p>Rates the standard of bar security in the Christchurch CBD as good ↔</p>
<p><b>Youth worker:</b></p>	
<p>Has occasionally (1-4 times):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Seen someone ejected /escorted from licensed premises for being loud or obnoxious due to the influence of alcohol</li> <li>• Seen someone refused service at a bar or club or refused admittance to a bar, club or other premises (for example a fast food outlet or retail premises) because they were <u>intoxicated</u></li> <li>• Seen someone assaulted or seen a fight in the Christchurch CBD in the evening</li> </ul>	<p>Has occasionally (1-4 times):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Seen someone ejected from licensed premises for being drunk or intoxicated ↑</li> <li>• Seen someone refused service at a bar or club or refused admittance to a bar, club or other premises (for example a fast food outlet or retail premises) because they were <u>intoxicated</u> ↔</li> <li>• Seen someone assaulted or seen a fight in the Christchurch CBD in the <u>evening</u> ↔</li> </ul>
<p>Has not:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Seen someone ejected from licensed</li> </ul>	<p>Has not:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Seen someone ejected /escorted from</li> </ul>

2005/6	2006/7
<p>premises for being drunk or intoxicated</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Seen someone ejected from licensed premises for displaying inappropriate behaviour</li> <li>• Seen someone refused service at a bar or club or refused admittance to a bar, club or other premises because they were <u>violent</u></li> <li>• Seen someone assaulted or seen a fight in the Christchurch CBD in the <u>day</u></li> </ul>	<p>licensed premises for being loud or obnoxious due to the influence of alcohol ↓</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Seen someone ejected from licensed premises for displaying inappropriate behaviour ↔</li> <li>• Seen someone refused service at a bar or club or refused admittance to a bar, club or other premises because they were <u>violent</u> ↔</li> <li>• Seen someone assaulted or seen a fight in the Christchurch CBD in the <u>day</u> ↔</li> </ul>
<p>Rates the standard of bar security in the Christchurch CBD as good</p>	<p>Rates the standard of bar security in the Christchurch CBD as good ↔</p>
<p><b>KFC worker:</b></p>	
<p>Has regularly (16-25 times):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Had to ask a customer to leave the premises because they were intoxicated</li> </ul>	<p>Has regularly (16-25 times):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Had to eject/escort someone from the premises for being drunk or intoxicated ↑</li> <li>• Had to eject/escort someone from the premises for being loud or obnoxious due to the influence of alcohol ↑</li> <li>• Had to eject/escort someone from the premises for displaying inappropriate behaviour ↑</li> </ul>
<p>Has occasionally (<u>1-4 times</u>):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Seen someone refused service or refused admittance to the premises because they were <u>violent</u></li> <li>• Had to trespass a customer verbally or in writing because they were <u>violent</u></li> <li>• Had to trespass a customer verbally or in writing because they were <u>intoxicated</u></li> </ul>	<p>Has occasionally (<u>1-4 times</u>):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Had to trespass a customer verbally or in writing because they were <u>violent</u> ↔</li> </ul>
<p>Has not:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Seen someone refused service or refused admittance to the premises because they were <u>intoxicated</u></li> <li>• Seen someone assaulted or seen a</li> </ul>	<p>Has not:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Seen someone refused service or refused admittance to the premises because they were <u>intoxicated</u> ↔</li> <li>• Seen someone assaulted or seen a</li> </ul>

2005/6	2006/7
<p>fight in the Christchurch CBD in the <u>evening</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Seen someone assaulted or seen a fight in the Christchurch CBD in the <u>day</u></li> </ul>	<p>fight in the Christchurch CBD in the <u>evening</u> ⇔</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Seen someone assaulted or seen a fight in the Christchurch CBD in the <u>day</u> ⇔</li> <li>• Seen someone refused service or refused admittance to the premises because they were <u>violent</u> ↓</li> <li>• Had to trespass a customer verbally or in writing because they were <u>intoxicated</u> ↓</li> </ul>
<p>Rates the standard of bar security in the Christchurch CBD as good</p>	<p>Rates the standard of bar security in the Christchurch CBD as good</p>
<p><b>Midnight Express driver:</b></p>	
<p>Has occasionally (<u>1-4 times</u>):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Asked a customer to leave the bus/ejected a customer for being loud or obnoxious due to the influence of alcohol</li> <li>• Seen someone assaulted or seen a fight in the Christchurch CBD in the <u>evening</u></li> </ul>	<p>Has occasionally (<u>1-4 times</u>):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Seen someone assaulted or seen a fight in the Christchurch CBD in the <u>evening</u> ⇔</li> </ul>
<p>Has not:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Asked a customer to leave the bus/ejected a customer for being <u>drunk</u> or <u>intoxicated</u></li> <li>• Asked a customer to leave the bus/ejected a customer for being <u>violent</u></li> <li>• Seen someone refused service at a bar or club or refused admittance to a bar, club or other premises (for example a fast food outlet or retail premises) because they were <u>intoxicated</u></li> <li>• Seen someone refused service at a bar or club or refused admittance to a bar, club or other premises because they were <u>violent</u></li> <li>• Had to blacklist a customer because they were <u>intoxicated</u></li> </ul>	<p>Has not:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Asked a customer to leave the bus/ejected a customer for being <u>drunk</u> or <u>intoxicated</u> ⇔</li> <li>• Asked a customer to leave the bus/ejected a customer for being <u>violent</u> ⇔</li> <li>• Asked a customer to leave the bus/ejected a customer for being loud or obnoxious due to the influence of alcohol ↓</li> <li>• Seen someone refused service at a bar or club or refused admittance to a bar, club or other premises (for example a fast food outlet or retail premises) because they were <u>intoxicated</u> ⇔</li> <li>• Seen someone refused service at a bar or club or refused admittance to a bar,</li> </ul>

2005/6	2006/7
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Had to blacklist a customer because they were <u>violent</u></li> <li>• Seen someone assaulted or seen a fight in the Christchurch CBD in the <u>day</u></li> </ul>	<p>club or other premises because they were <u>violent</u> ⇔</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Had to blacklist a customer because they were <u>intoxicated</u> ⇔</li> <li>• Had to blacklist a customer because they were <u>violent</u> ⇔</li> <li>• Seen someone assaulted or seen a fight in the Christchurch CBD in the <u>day</u> ⇔</li> <li>• Asked a customer to leave the bus/ejected a customer for being loud or obnoxious due to the influence of alcohol (no response to this question in 2005/6)</li> </ul>
Has experienced non-payment on 1 occasion	Has not experienced non-payment ↓↓
Rates the standard of bar security in the Christchurch CBD as good	Rates the standard of bar security in the Christchurch CBD as good
<b>Taxi driver</b>	
<p>Has more times than can be remembered:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Seen someone refused service at a bar or club or refused admittance to a bar, club or other premises (for example a fast food outlet or retail premises) because they were <u>intoxicated</u></li> </ul>	
	<p>Has regularly (16-25 times):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Seen someone refused service at a bar or club or refused admittance to a bar, club or other premises (for example a fast food outlet or retail premises) because they were <u>intoxicated</u></li> </ul>
<p>Has often (5-15 times):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Seen someone assaulted or seen a fight in the Christchurch CBD in the <u>evening</u></li> <li>• Seen someone assaulted or seen a fight in the Christchurch CBD in the <u>day</u></li> </ul>	<p>Has often (5-15 times):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Seen someone assaulted or seen a fight in the Christchurch CBD in the <u>evening</u> ⇔</li> </ul>
<p>Has occasionally (<u>1-4 times</u>):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Asked a customer to leave the</li> </ul>	<p>Has occasionally (<u>1-4 times</u>):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Asked a customer to leave the</li> </ul>

2005/6	2006/7
<p>taxi/ejected a customer for displaying inappropriate behaviour</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Seen someone refused service at a bar or club or refused admittance to a bar, club or other premises because they were <u>violent</u></li> </ul>	<p>taxi/ejected a customer for being drunk or intoxicated ↑</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Asked a customer to leave the taxi/ejected a customer for being loud or obnoxious due to the influence of alcohol ↑</li> <li>• Asked a customer to leave the taxi/ejected a customer for displaying inappropriate behaviour ↔</li> <li>• Seen someone refused service at a bar or club or refused admittance to a bar, club or other premises because they were <u>violent</u> ↔</li> </ul>
<p>Has not:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Asked a customer to leave the taxi/ejected a customer for being drunk or intoxicated</li> <li>• Asked a customer to leave the taxi/ejected a customer for being loud or obnoxious due to the influence of alcohol</li> <li>• Asked a customer to leave the taxi/ejected a customer for being <u>violent</u></li> <li>• Had to blacklist a customer because they were <u>intoxicated</u></li> <li>• Had to blacklist a customer because they were <u>violent</u></li> </ul>	<p>Has not:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Asked a customer to leave the taxi/ejected a customer for being <u>violent</u> ↔</li> <li>• Had to blacklist a customer because they were <u>intoxicated</u> ↔</li> <li>• Had to blacklist a customer because they were <u>violent</u> ↔</li> <li>• Seen someone assaulted or seen a fight in the Christchurch CBD in the <u>day</u> ↓</li> </ul>
<p>Has experienced non-payment on more than 10 occasions</p>	<p>Has experienced non-payment on 2-5 occasions ↓</p>
<p>Rates the standard of bar security in the Christchurch CBD as very good</p>	<p>Rates the standard of bar security in the Christchurch CBD as very good</p>
<p><b>Resident:</b></p>	
<p>More times than can be remembered has:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Witnessed someone being loud or obnoxious due to the influence of alcohol in the CBD</li> <li>• Witnessed someone displaying inappropriate behaviour outside</li> </ul>	

2005/6	2006/7
licensed premises	
	<p>Has often (5-15 times):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Witnessed someone being loud or obnoxious due to the influence of alcohol in the CBD ↓</li> <li>• Witnessed someone displaying inappropriate behaviour outside licensed premises ↓</li> </ul>
<p>Has occasionally (1-4 times):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Witnessed someone displaying violent behaviour outside licensed premises</li> <li>• Seen someone assaulted or seen a fight in the Christchurch CBD in the <u>evening</u></li> </ul>	<p>Has occasionally (1-4 times):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Witnessed someone displaying violent behaviour outside licensed premises ↔</li> </ul>
<p>Has <b>not</b>:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Seen someone assaulted or seen a fight in the Christchurch CBD in the <u>day</u></li> </ul>	<p>Has <b>not</b>:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Seen someone assaulted or seen a fight in the Christchurch CBD in the <u>evening</u> ↓</li> <li>• Seen someone assaulted or seen a fight in the Christchurch CBD in the <u>day</u> ↔</li> </ul>

**Perceptions of safety in the CBD**

1. Perceptions of safety on different occasions shifted from more to less safe in approximately the order shown in the following table. Positive and negative changes are indicated with green and red arrows respectively.

<i>2005/6</i>	<i>2006/7</i>	<i>Change</i>
Respondents all feel safe or very safe <b>in the CBD</b> or <b>working in the CBD</b> during the <b>day</b> except 1 who feels unsafe working in the CBD during the day (store security)	Respondents all feel safe or very safe <b>in the CBD</b> or <b>working in the CBD</b> during the <b>day</b> except 1 who feels unsafe in the CBD or working in the CBD during the day (store security)	↓
3 respondents feel safe in <b>public areas in the CBD</b> at night and 5 feel unsafe	4 respondents feel safe in <b>public areas in the CBD</b> at night, 3 feel unsafe and 1 feels very unsafe	↑
3 respondents feel safe <b>working in the CBD at night</b> and 5 feel unsafe	3 respondents feel safe <b>working in the CBD at night</b> and 4 feel unsafe; 1 indicated a response between safe and unsafe	↑
3 respondents feel safe <b>in the CBD at night</b> , 3 feel unsafe and 2 feel very unsafe	1 respondent feels very safe <b>in the CBD at night</b> , 2 respondents feel safe, 3 feel unsafe, 1 feels very unsafe and 1 indicated a response between safe and unsafe	↑↑
2 respondents feel safe <b>walking alone in the CBD at night</b> , 2 feel unsafe and 3 feel very unsafe	1 respondent feels safe <b>walking alone in the CBD at night</b> , 4 feel unsafe and 2 feel very unsafe	↓

Perceptions of safety on different occasions shifted from more to less safe as follows and stayed in approximately the same order from 2005/6 through to 2006/7: in the CBD or working in the CBD; in public areas in the CBD; working in the CBD at night; in the CBD at night; and walking alone in the CBD at night.

It was notable that the perception of safety in the CBD at night was improved in responses to three of four situations (in public areas in, working in and being in the CBD), but reduced in relation to a sense of safety when walking alone in the CBD at night.

2. Specific locations listed from more to less safe:

<i>2005/6</i>	<i>Ratio of those responding safe to those responding unsafe</i>	<i>Rough groupings</i>	<i>2006/7</i>	<i>Ratio of those responding safe to those responding unsafe</i>
On licensed premises	7:0	No respondent citing as unsafe or very unsafe	In shops	6:1
Places of entertainment	8:0		Offices	6:1
Offices	6:0		On licensed premises	6:1
In shops	7:0		Places of entertainment	6:1
Outside shops/offices	6:1	More citing safe than unsafe	Outside shops/offices	4:3
Open spaces	6:2		Open spaces	5:1
On public transport	4:3	Near equal numbers citing safe and unsafe	<b>Street/footpath</b>	4:2 plus one indicating a response between safe and unsafe
Carparking facilities	3:4		On public transport	4:2
In public transport facilities	2:5	More citing unsafe than safe	Carparking facilities	3:3
In/around public toilets	2:5		In public transport facilities	3:2
<b>Street/footpath</b>	3:5		In/around public toilets	1:5
Anywhere after dark	3:5		Anywhere after dark	1:5
Alleyways/lanes	1:6		Alleyways/lanes	1:6

The order of locations listed from more to less safe stayed approximately the same from 2005/6 through to 2006/7. The categories for three locations changed between 2005/6 and 2006/7; perceptions of safety in public transport facilities and on public transport were slightly improved in

2006/7 versus 2005/6. Most notable was the improvement in the perception of safety in streets and on footpaths: more respondents cited this location as unsafe than as safe in 2005/6 (3/5) yet in 2006/7 four perceived this location as safe compared with two who perceived it as unsafe. One respondent indicated a response between safe and unsafe.

3. Involvement in problems:

The requirement for involvement in problems in 2005/6 versus 2006/7 is shown in the table below. The need for involvement in problems had lessened in two of three situations considered (intervening in a fight and calling Police to an incident or reporting a crime) and stayed the same in one situation (need to administer first aid).

Critically, 4/6 (67%) of respondents noted that their perceptions of safety over the previous six months were better.

Responses to a series of additional questions asked of street cleaners further indicated an improvement in perceptions of safety between 2005/6 and 2006/7 as shown in the following table. Again, positive and negative changes are indicated with green and red arrows respectively.

	2005/6	2006/7	
Respondents who had had to intervene in a fight in the previous 3 months	5/7: once (2), 5-15 times (2), more than 10 times (1)	5/6: once (2) or 2-5 times (3)	↑↑
Respondents who had had to call the Police to an incident or report a crime in the previous 3 months	5/8: once (1), 5-15 times (3), more than 10 times (1)	5/7: once (1), 2-5 times (3) or 5-10 times (1)	↑↑
Respondents who had had to administer/had operators administer first aid while working on the street in the previous 3 months	2/2 both between 1 and 4 times	2/2 both between 1 and 4 times	↔
Respondents' perceptions of safety in the CBD in the previous 6 months	Responses mixed: 3 better 3 worse 1 significantly worse	Responses mixed: 4 better 2 worse	↑

<i>Street cleaner only questions:</i>			
Street cleaner operators who had seen someone assaulted in the Christchurch CBD in the <b>evening</b> in the previous 3 months	Between 16 and 25 times	Between 5 and 15 times	↑
Street cleaners who had seen fights in the Christchurch CBD in the <b>day</b> in the previous 3 months	Between 1 and 4 times	On no occasions	↑

#### 4. Factors influencing feelings of safety in the CBD:

	<i>2005/6</i>	<i>2006/7</i>
Youth worker	Working in a team with a Police officer	Lighting – streets, lanes, etc Being in a team with Police officer
Taxi driver	Alcohol, groups, night time, gangs, boy racers, “hoodies”	Alcohol, drugs, prostitute minders and their dogs, “hoodies”
KFC worker	Level of Police or organised security people; number of people (intoxicated); darkness	Work-related incidents and interaction with Police and their activities Dealings with youth street gangs (they are trying to create an unsafe environment) Safety of staff
Midnight Express driver	More Police presence	<i>No comment</i>
Security	Problems between passing groups resulting in Police and ambulance action; steadily increasing numbers of violent females	More Police presence on a regular basis
Street cleaners	More Police on foot or mobile	Seeing Police on the ground and greater Police presence give a sense of safety
Resident	Drunk people on streets	Uncomfortable outside office on Thursday evening
Store security	Lack of Police presence; alcohol/intoxication; youths; gang-related people; assaults on others; thefts; other crime such as tagging	Lack of Police presence; awareness of recidivist offenders “at large”; knowing persons who are HIV, hepatitis C positive, etc; knowing persons who are mentally unstable are in the CBD

## Perceptions of Christchurch CBD

### 1. Problems in Christchurch CBD

Respondents considered 13 problems such as litter, vandalism and theft over the previous three months. Considering each response to each question by each respondent as a “response”, the situation was better in 17% (11/66) of responses in 2006/7 versus 5% (5/94) of responses in 2005/6. Respondents regarded the situation to be worse in 30% (19.5/66) of cases in 2006/7 versus 46% (43/94) of cases in 2005/6. Details are provided in the two following tables.

<i>2005/6<sup>5</sup></i>	<i>2006/7<sup>6</sup></i>
On 5/94 (5%) occasions, problems were seen to be better (4) or significantly better (1)	On 11/66 (17%) occasions, problems were seen to be better
On 46/94 (49%) occasions, problems were seen to have remained the same	On 35.5/66 (54%) occasions, problems were seen to have remained the same
On 43/94 (46%) occasions, problems were seen to have become worse (33/94 – 35%) or significantly worse (10/94 – 11%)	On 19.5/66 (30%) occasions, problems were seen to have become worse (16.5/66 – 25%) or significantly worse (3/66 – 5%)

	<i>2005/6</i>	<i>2006/7</i>
Problems that were more often better or the same than worse:	Litter Broken windows Car damage Theft Theft of/or from cars Drunk people on licensed premises	Litter Broken windows Car damage Theft Theft of/or from cars Drunk people on licensed premises Drunk people interfering with traffic, cyclists or pedestrians People you feel unsafe around because of their behaviour, attitude or

<sup>5</sup> Total 94 responses (eight panel survey members responding to status of 13 problems – less 10 items indicated “don’t know”).

<sup>6</sup> Total 66 responses (six panel survey members responding to status of 13 problems and one panel survey member responding to status of four problems – less 16 items indicated “don’t know”).

	2005/6	2006/7
		appearance Broken glass Bottles being thrown Dangerous driving and speeding
Equal numbers responding worse and better or the same	Drunk people interfering with traffic, cyclists or pedestrians People you feel unsafe around because of their behaviour, attitude or appearance	Graffiti and tagging
Problems that were more often worse than better or the same (problems that have worsened most shown in bold face type)	<b>Broken glass</b> <b>Vandalism</b> <b>Bottles being thrown</b> Dangerous driving and speeding Graffiti and tagging	Vandalism

2. On consideration of six problems such as vomit, spitting and urine over the previous three months (considering each response to each question by each respondent as a “response”):
  - In 2005/6:<sup>62</sup> problems were seen to have remained the same according to 27/42 (64%) responses and to have worsened according to 15/42 (36%) responses including three responses where they were deemed significantly worse
  - In 2006/7:<sup>63</sup> problems were seen to have remained the same according to 18/25 (72%) responses, to be better according to 6/25 (24%) responses, and to have worsened according to one (4%) response only.
  
3. In 2005/6, seven of eight (87%) respondents agreed with the statement that drunk people are a problem in the Christchurch CBD, with four of these agreeing strongly. One respondent disagreed. In 2006/7, five of six (83%) respondents agreed with the statement that drunk people are a problem in the Christchurch CBD, with two of these agreeing strongly. One respondent disagreed.

<sup>62</sup> Of a total 42 responses (eight panel survey members responding to status of six problems – less six items indicated “don’t know”).

<sup>63</sup> Of total 25 responses (six panel survey members responding to status of six problems – less 11 items indicated “don’t know”).

## PERCEPTIONS OF POLICING

The level of agreement with six positive statements about Police activity ranged from 50% to 88% in 2005/6 and 57% to 86% in 2006/7.

Across the board, statements were agreed with 74% of the time in 2006/7 versus 64% of the time in 2005/6.

In the case of five of the six statements, the percentage of respondents agreeing in 2006/7 was higher than in 2005/6. In the case of the sixth statement, the percentage agreeing dropped slightly from 88% to 86%.

The biggest increases in levels of agreement (from 50% in 2005/6 to 71% in 2006/7) occurred for two statements: "Police do a good job of controlling crime in the Christchurch CBD" and "The Police often apprehend people who are drunk in the Christchurch CBD".

2005/6 <sup>10</sup>	2006/7 <sup>11</sup>
On 28/44 (64%) occasions, respondents agreed with statements	On 29/39 (74%) occasions, statements were agreed with (including 7 occasions where they strongly agreed)
On 16/44 (36%) occasions, respondents disagreed with statements (including 2 occasions where they strongly disagreed)	On 10/39 (26%) occasions, respondents disagreed with statements

	2005/6	2006/7
Statements more often agreed with than disagreed with:	Police often walk through pubs in the Christchurch CBD I have confidence in the abilities of the local Police Police often walk through the streets of the CBD The Police often apprehend people who are drunk in the Christchurch CBD – difference less marked 4 to 3	Police often walk through pubs in the Christchurch CBD I have confidence in the abilities of the local Police Police often walk through the streets of the CBD The Police often apprehend people who are drunk in the Christchurch CBD – difference less marked 4 to 3 Police do a good job of

<sup>10</sup> Total 44 responses (eight panel survey members responding to six statements – less four items indicated "don't know").

<sup>11</sup> Total 39 responses (seven panel survey members responding to six statements – less three items indicated "don't know").

	2005/6	2006/7
		controlling crime in the Christchurch CBD Police have a visible presence in the Christchurch CBD – difference less marked 4 to 3
Statements equally often disagreed with and agreed with:	Police do a good job of controlling crime in the Christchurch CBD Police have a visible presence in the Christchurch CBD	<i>nil</i>
Statements more often disagreed with than agreed with	<i>nil</i>	<i>nil</i>

## PERCEPTIONS OF ONE-WAY DOOR AND THE ACCORD

- 2005/6: 5/8 (62.5%) panel survey respondents had heard the slogan “Get in B4 4” and expressed a reasonable understanding of what this meant.  
2006/7: 6/8 (75%) panel survey respondents had heard the slogan “Get in B4 4” and expressed a reasonable understanding of what this meant.
- 2005/6: 4/8 (50%) had seen advertising in relation to the campaign; three cited newspapers, two each cited posters and radio and one was approached by Christchurch City Council.  
2006/7: 4/8 (50%) had seen advertising in relation to the campaign; three cited newspapers, two each cited posters and radio and two were approached by Christchurch City Council.
- Comments regarding the “effect the 4am one-way door policy has had on you”:

	2005/6	2006/7
Resident	Unknown	Not aware of any effect
Midnight Express driver	No effect	No comment
Taxi driver	Creates too much of a rush; people linger outside	Busier earlier on Sunday morning – 3am
Street cleaners	No effect	Operators have seen massive improvement: less people on street, pleased to see Police on Strip and in malls between 4am and 5am, much fewer problems now after 5am

Store security	No effect ( <i>not in CBD after 11pm</i> )	No effect
KFC worker	Changed peak – made a rush 3.45-4.15am, dead at 6-7am; may close earlier	Poor on revenue – trade down 50% 5-7am “but these were the worst customers over night”
Youth worker	No effect although noted it was a “great idea” and “hopes it is a key to starting to reduce violence in the CBD”	Very little effect but think it is a “great idea” and should have an earlier time to be in by
Security	Earlier finishes on some doors; easier to refuse patrons using one-way door than telling them they are intoxicated	Much better; easier to turn away intoxicated people by saying 4am lock-out than saying they are intoxicated

4. Comments regarding “what effect a reduction in inner-city violence and disorder would have on your job” presented a very positive expectation from all panel members:

	2005/6	2006/7
Resident	Less vandalism, litter, etc; more pride in central city as tourist area; better feeling of safety; less noise	Would make place of work cleaner and tidier with less risk of property damage
Midnight Express driver	Feeling safer	No comment
Taxi driver	Feel more at ease, more trusting of customers, less damage to taxi including flat tyres	Reduced stress and anxiety Less damage to taxi (reluctant to park on Strip taxi stand)
Street cleaners	Allow staff to relax more at night without constant threats of violence	A huge effect on our company. The sooner the streets empty, the easier it is to get the city clean for the morning
Store security	Potential for less criminal activity in CBD; repeat	“It would make my job less dangerous”

	<i>2005/6</i>	<i>2006/7</i>
	offenders could be trespassed (sic) from the inner city; possible result in less inappropriate behaviour and shoplifting in store	
KFC worker	Reduce repair costs, lift team morale, give management more confidence	Lose many staff Have to "watch my own back" when going to my car because "I've tried to tackle the youth gangs during the day/evening"
Youth worker	Fantastic, fewer victims of crime and reduction of youth offenders in the court system	Make things easier and safer
Security	"Would certainly make it easier." "Would get rid of drunks and idiots earlier", the street would be clearer earlier and people may come to town earlier. "Great"	Make it easier "for sure". A zero tolerance policy with drunk and violent people would "work wonders"

## APPENDIX 10: SUMMARY OF LITERATURE

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<b>INTRODUCTION</b> .....	<b>153</b>
<b>METHODOLOGY</b> .....	<b>153</b>
<b>RESULTS</b> .....	<b>154</b>
SCOPE OF THE REVIEW .....	154
WHAT IS AN ALCOHOL ACCORD .....	155
COMPONENTS OF ACCORDS.....	156
INTERNATIONAL EXAMPLES OF LIQUOR INDUSTRY ACCORDS .....	157
LEGAL AND POLICY CONTEXT FOR ONE-WAY DOOR IN NEW ZEALAND .....	158
“Responsive regulation”.....	160
EVIDENTIAL BASE FOR SUCCESS FACTORS IN IMPLEMENTATION OF A ONE-WAY DOOR INTERVENTION.....	163
CONTRIBUTORS TO VOLUNTARY ACCORD PROJECT SUCCESS .....	166
<i>Engagement and set-up</i> .....	166
<i>Framework for the Accord</i> .....	168
<i>Implementation</i> .....	168
<i>Accord sustainability</i> .....	171
<i>Complementing the Accord</i> .....	173
COMPARING SUCCESS FACTORS WITH AN EXISTING NEW ZEALAND SUMMARY .....	175

## INTRODUCTION

This appendix presents a brief summary of literature relevant to the implementation of the Christchurch one-way door intervention from which the success factors in the body of this report were drawn.

## METHODOLOGY

A time-limited (10-day) overview of selected literature was undertaken to establish current knowledge regarding best practice for the implementation of a one-way door intervention. The review was predominantly based on papers selected and provided by ALAC.

English language literature published up to August 2006 was searched.

A literature search was completed using the following:

1. In-depth search on ALAC bibliographic databases
2. Ebsco search, which contains newspaper items on "Lockouts".

Search terms used were combinations of:

- Lockout\*, lock out\*, lockdown\*, lock down\* or one-way door policy
- Or Accord\*
- With alcohol or liquor.

Other search terms used were:

- Licens\*
- Premise\*
- Violence\*
- Bar, bars, clubs, club, pub, pubs
- Entry, entering or movement\* or hopping.

Because of limited findings from the above, an extended search was completed to cover the following:

- Harm reduction and licensed premises, generally
- Interventions making up Liquor or Alcohol Accords, particularly in Australia and New Zealand, and cover charge as a specific such intervention
- Migratory drinking patterns and efforts to reduce these.

Search terms used were:

- Licensed/bars/bar/pub/pubs/club/clubs
- With combinations of:
  - Police/policing
  - Violen\*
  - Crime
  - Driving
- Local authorities and Accord

Articles were selected on the basis of date and relevance.

The above material was supplemented by the report authors using further general Internet searches using the keyword “Accord” and specific searches by site or researcher to supplement identified material.

## RESULTS

### Scope of the review

There is limited international literature on one-way door or “lock-out” interventions and the bulk of that available is based on examples of these interventions in Australia. Although lock-outs in Australia are implemented with the support of local councils, Police and licensees, they are enforced by law (implemented under the Liquor Amendment Act 2005). For example, lock-out provisions apply in the following areas throughout Queensland: Brisbane, Ipswich, Gold Coast, Sunshine Coast, Cairns, Townsville, Rockhampton and Mackay.<sup>64</sup>

Searches failed to identify evidence specific to the implementation of **non-regulated** one-way door interventions such as that piloted in Christchurch.

Because of this and because data on the implementation of a regulated one-way door are of little practical application in relation to a non-regulated intervention, the literature review was expanded to include coverage of the use of voluntary Accords with licensed premises in general, which provide the framework for various interventions.

The review begins with an overview of Alcohol Accords by way of introduction.

It then briefly sets the scene for the one-way door pilot undertaken in Christchurch by providing a short overview of the policy context for such an intervention in New Zealand.

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<sup>64</sup> Queensland Government. Liquor Licensing Division website.  
[www.liquor.qld.gov.au/Licensees/Lock-out+information](http://www.liquor.qld.gov.au/Licensees/Lock-out+information).

The balance of the review presents the evidential base for best practice principles in voluntary Accords with licensed premises.

### **What is an Alcohol Accord?**

Numerous sources define Alcohol Accords. For example:

*Alcohol Accords are voluntary, industry-based partnerships in local communities used to introduce practical solutions to alcohol-related problems. Most Accords include members from the local business community, local councils, Police, government departments and other community organisations. Stakeholders are able to discuss and reach agreement on ways to improve the operation of entertainment venues and ensure precincts remain safe and enjoyable.*<sup>65</sup>

*Liquor Accords can be voluntary codes of practice, memorandums of understanding or other arrangements. They may address the supply of liquor, trading hours and business operations.*<sup>66</sup>

The International Center for Alcohol Policies (ICAP) refers to Accords as one approach to reduce violence in public drinking places:<sup>67</sup>

*Accords are comprehensive, community-based partnerships that work with those most affected by on-license violence, the citizens who live close to the drinking venue itself. Accords call for the application of situational crime theory, which maintains that crime is more the result of dangerous situations than dangerous individuals.*

*[Accords] typically combine two elements: education and the environment. The former focuses on changing behaviour through increasing awareness, the latter through changing social and economic systems.*

Some elements of the literature focus on the emphasis of Accords on community safety, and the need to balance efforts to achieve this with the need to maintain a viable business environment for licensees.<sup>68</sup>

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<sup>65</sup> Queensland Government 2006.

<sup>66</sup> Queensland Government 2006.

<sup>67</sup> International Center for Alcohol Policies 2002.

<sup>68</sup> Vaughan 2001.

*[Accords] are intended to provide a viable environment for licensees to operate profitably whilst protecting the community against harm, which might result from excessive consumption of alcohol in licensed premises.*

*A local liquor Accord involves three main stakeholders – law enforcers, the liquor industry and local government authorities (including statutory bodies such as fire brigades and environmental protection authorities). Other local businesses could be involved through Chambers of Commerce and local public place management or community safety committees. Other stakeholders, of course, are the people who attend licensed premises and the wider community, including local residents.*

Based on the above, the key characteristics of an Alcohol Accord can be described as:

- Voluntary
- Inclusive of multiple community members incorporating the **main** stakeholders – law enforcers, the liquor industry and local government authorities
- Industry inclusive
- Based on situational crime theory: crime results more from dangerous situations than dangerous individuals
- Balanced between forming a viable night-time economy and protecting the community from alcohol-related harm.

## **Components of Accords**

ICAP notes that Accords typically combine education (changing behaviour through increasing awareness) and the environment (changing social and economic systems) and thus successful Accord implementation requires the following steps.<sup>69</sup>

- Develop rules and codes of practice
- Encourage managers of licensed premises to regard themselves as responsible business people (stimulate conscience)
- Control the availability of alcohol through server intervention
- Facilitate compliance with agreed codes of practice by creating a regulatory environment in which adherence is financially worthwhile for licensees.

Police and local authorities typically coordinate Accords by enlisting the cooperation of operators of licensed premises then establishing the common aims and principles of the Accords.

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<sup>69</sup> Hauritz et al 1998a, International Center for Alcohol Policies 2002.

## **International examples of liquor industry Accords**

According to ICAP, the Accord partnership approach has been utilised throughout the English-speaking world, and in Scandinavia and other parts of Western Europe.<sup>70</sup>

It is the Australian initiatives that are referred to most frequently in the literature and, as such, make up the primary focus in this review.

### *Australian initiatives*

Accords were the first locally based initiatives to emerge in Australia as a response to alcohol-related violence in and around licensed premises. The success of these early Accords has resulted in a proliferation of similar arrangements throughout Australia.

The more widely reviewed Australian Accords are:

- West End Forum Project – Melbourne Central Business District (CBD) 1990
- Geelong Local Industry Accord 1989/90
- Surfers Paradise Safety Action Project 1993
- Queensland replication projects: Cairns, Townsville, and Mackay – 1995 and early 1996
- Fremantle 1992 and 1993.

### *United States examples*

Various Accord-style partnerships have been implemented in small towns and college campuses in the United States. Examples follow.<sup>71</sup>

A contractual agreement established at the University of Washington bound fraternities and sororities to certain codes of conduct, such as taking responsibility for the off-campus conduct of members and, if necessary, reporting them to the University. The aim was to reduce problems in fraternities and sororities, such as violence and drink-driving.

The task force behind the arrangement included representatives from Police and the fire department, the Washington State Liquor Control Board, residential boards, the student body and the University.

The institutions were further required to provide representatives who would be available to Police 24 hours a day to conduct education programmes on substance abuse and acquaintance rape. Lastly, the fraternities and sororities were required to enter an annual written contract with the

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<sup>70</sup> International Center for Alcohol Policies 2002.

<sup>71</sup> International Center for Alcohol Policies 2002.

University and, in addition to obtaining a banquet permit from the state liquor control board, register any planned event with the office of student affairs (Shanahan 1995). Following the implementation of this approach, three fraternities lost University recognition and consequent privileges to host gatherings. Harm involving alcohol dropped significantly.

A second example is a partnership between Florida State University officials, public health groups, alcohol wholesalers and promoters that was used to set up a Hospitality Resource Panel with representatives from all sectors. The Panel has proven effective in regulating high-risk promotions, such as “all you can drink”, enforcing a safety checklist that covers server issues as well as security and safety issues (Alcohol Issues Insights 2002).

### *New Zealand initiatives*

There appear to be no published studies of New Zealand Accords.

However, a positive outlook on Accords in New Zealand, based on anecdotal reports from licensees, has been reported.<sup>72</sup>

ICAP refers to host responsibility activities in New Zealand as a wide-ranging partnership approach. The focus is on requiring establishments to offer food service, provide low-alcohol or alcohol-free beverages, and uphold strict policies on age identification. Additionally, participating establishments provide transport options for intoxicated patrons. Requirements are fulfilled under the supervision of an on-site host responsibility manager, and negligence can result in a revoked licence. A mass media campaign was also used to raise public awareness of these consequences. While it can be questioned whether this approach fits within the framework of an Accord as such, it is notable that the main motivation for licensed premises to adopt host responsibility practices was the threat of loss of licence and other penalties,<sup>73</sup> which directly supports findings from some of the Australian data in relation to Accords.

## **Legal and policy context for one-way door in New Zealand**

The legal and policy context in which initiatives like the one-way door are implemented in New Zealand is described as follows.

Decisions about the sale of alcohol in local communities in New Zealand are framed by two pieces of legislation: the Resource Management Act 1991 (RMA) and the Sale of Liquor Act 1989 (SoLA).

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<sup>72</sup> Matheson 2005.

<sup>73</sup> Wyllie 1997.

Essentially, the RMA controls where new premises may be established and the SoLA assesses the suitability of the applicant.

Before a liquor licence applicant applies under the SoLA, they must show that they are complying with the local district plan (by obtaining a certificate of compliance with the local district plan under the RMA).<sup>74 75</sup>

Processes established by the SoLA focus on the responsible management of all licensed premises. The main limitations that can be set under the SoLA are the hours of operation. Where there is evidence of poor management eg, serving minors, objections may be made at the time of licence renewal.<sup>76</sup>

Both Acts implement central government policy by delegating statutory roles and specified tasks to local government level. Routine decisions are made locally, but any contested issues are referred to the Environment Court or Liquor Licensing Authority, whose decisions can be reviewed by the High Court.<sup>77</sup>

Policies on alcohol sit alongside the above legislation. The Ministry of Health National Alcohol Strategy 2001, which complements the National Drug Policy, incorporates two priorities identified from the Policy,<sup>78</sup> and sets out desired outcomes and strategies.

Local councils are also able to adopt alcohol strategies for their areas.

Matheson (2005) positions main strategies including Accords within this legal and policy framework in his summary of harm-reduction strategies as shown in figure 1.<sup>79</sup>

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<sup>74</sup> Matheson 2005.

<sup>75</sup> Hill 2004.

<sup>76</sup> Matheson 2005.


<sup>77</sup> Hill 2004.

<sup>78</sup> National Drug Policy Priority One – to enable New Zealanders to increase control over and improve their health by limiting the harms and hazards of alcohol use.

National Drug Policy Priority Three – to reduce the hazardous and excessive consumption of alcohol, and the associated injury, violence and other harm, particularly on the roads, in the workplace, in and around drinking environments, and at home.

<sup>79</sup> Matheson 2005.

Figure 1: Summary of strategies<sup>80</sup>



## “Responsive regulation”

Ayres and Braithwaite (1992) advocate an approach to designing regulatory legislation and practices termed “responsive regulation”. They argue that regulation needs to respond to industry structure, as different structures will be conducive to different degrees and forms of regulation, and to the different motivations of regulated players.<sup>81</sup>

In their view, effective regulation provides a framework that facilitates a high proportion of willing compliance in response to persuasion, supported by expectations of appropriate but inevitable enforcement.

They contend that achieving regulatory objectives is more likely when relevant agencies have a hierarchy of sanctions and a hierarchy of strategies with differing levels of intervention. An “enforcement pyramid” that offers a range of sanctions of increasing severity from which to select a response appropriate to the degree of infringement is seen as critical.

<sup>80</sup> Matheson 2005.

<sup>81</sup> Ayres and Braithwaite 1992.

However, Ayres and Braithwaite (1992) argue that regulation is more effective if sanctions are kept in the background and the emphasis is on moral persuasion. It is noted that punishment is expensive whereas persuasion is cheap.

They argue that earlier assumptions that persuasion and punishment are incompatible fail to recognise the possibility of foregrounding cooperation and back grounding punishment: the “benign big guns”.

Regulatory agencies are best able to secure compliance if they are “benign big guns”, with a “big stick” and a range of options.

*Regulatory agencies will be able to speak more softly when they are perceived as carrying big sticks.*<sup>82</sup>

The model encourages a climate of willing compliance by assuming most players will cooperate as “socially responsible citizens” while demonstrating effective ways to deal with infringements. Regulatory practices that are offensive or inappropriate (too severe or not severe enough) are seen as likely to engender a culture of resistance.

The aim is for long-term “internalisation” of the desire to comply and it is argued that the more salient and powerful the control used to secure compliance, the more likely that such internalisation will result.

Ayres and Braithwaite (1992) recommend the empowerment of community and public interest groups and institutionalising their role in regulation.

They promote “tripartism” as the solution to the problem that features of regulatory encounters that foster an evolution of cooperation **also** encourage capture and corruption.

In tripartism, special interest groups are empowered to play a “watchdog” role in support of regulatory agency activities. Approaches for restricting capture and corruption include multiple industry versus single industry agency jurisdiction and rotating personnel.

Their model has been described as one in which no one element, whether it be self-regulation, formal enforcement or citizen involvement, can operate effectively without the others.<sup>83</sup>

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<sup>82</sup> Ayres and Braithwaite p6.

<sup>83</sup> Centre for Health Research and Practice 2004.

It has been highlighted that community and wider public health concerns are not easily addressed under the current alcohol legislation.<sup>84</sup>

It has been argued that licensing legislation in countries comparable to New Zealand frequently provides a range of options and greater discretionary powers than that provided by New Zealand's SoLA. Reports indicate that the experiences and practices of statutory officers working under the Act show that many of their most innovative and often effective strategies go beyond the enforceable provisions of Act.

*Looked at from a “responsive regulation” perspective it might be said that the Act [SoLA] as currently written is insufficiently flexible to back up the kind of negotiated approach which statutory officers are finding most successful in meeting the objects of the Act.<sup>85</sup>*

That said, it has been argued that aspects of Ayres and Braithwaite's analysis resonate with local strategies to encourage best practice on licensed premises in New Zealand.<sup>86</sup> Research suggests that a “climate of compliance” can be and has been created in some locations where statutory officers were liaising closely.<sup>87</sup>

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<sup>84</sup> Hill 2004.

<sup>85</sup> Alcohol & Public Health Research Unit 2002.

<sup>86</sup> Alcohol & Public Health Research Unit 2002.

<sup>87</sup> Alcohol & Public Health Research Unit 2002.

## EVIDENTIAL BASE FOR SUCCESS FACTORS IN IMPLEMENTATION OF A ONE-WAY DOOR INTERVENTION

- In the absence of evidence specific to the implementation of the **non-regulated** one-way door intervention in Christchurch, the establishment of a draft set of best practice principles for setting up and implementing a one-way door intervention must draw on available literature on voluntary Accords with licensed premises in general, which provide the framework for such interventions.
- Given the limited evidential base, the available literature, arguably, better supports the identification of key success factors for and main barriers to effectiveness rather than “best practices”.
- Despite the limited evidential base, there is a substantial body of work that indicates that initiatives delivered within the framework of a voluntary Accord can be effective in terms of reducing alcohol-related harm. The requirements for sustaining such outcomes beyond initial intensive intervention processes are the subject of broad debate and review.
- Reviews of the Australian initiatives provide general support for the effectiveness of voluntary Accord-based initiatives in reducing alcohol-related harm. Across the many reports of these initiatives, there is substantial consideration of critical elements that are essential to effectiveness and to sustainability.
- The 1990 West End Forum Project in the Melbourne CBD was one of the earliest Accords that was widely reported on. The Forum, comprising representatives from the liquor industry, Police, local council, health agencies and community groups, introduced a voluntary code of practice developed in consultation with licensees, the Liquor Licensing Commission, Police and local residents. Strategies also comprised a responsible serving of alcohol programme and Police patrols and Police liaison officers consulting with the public regarding issues affecting the area.<sup>88</sup>

The Project effectively provided the forerunner of the local Accords in Surfers Paradise and Geelong.

- The Geelong 1989/90 Accord – “Venues against Violence” strategy – was a cooperative effort involving Police, the Liquor Licensing Commission and hotel licensees, although, in practice, Police took on the main leadership role.

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<sup>88</sup> Felson et al 1997.

- Geelong appears to be, of those Accords most widely reviewed, the Accord that focused most on entry controls (an entry fee rather than a one-way door).<sup>89</sup>
- The Surfers Paradise Safety Action Project, Queensland was an Accord between local Police and venue licensees that saw the development of a community-based initiative: the Safety Action Intervention Model in 1992/3. The Project involved a partnership of a university research team, Police, health and other government agencies, and community and business groups. Key strategies included the use of a community forum and task groups to address safety in public spaces, the management of venues, and security and policing. A code of practice among licensees was used to regulate serving and security staff, advertising, alcohol use and entertainment, security and policing.<sup>90</sup>
- Replication projects in 1995/6 of the Surfers Paradise Safety Action Project in Queensland were conducted in socially and economically disparate communities that had both similarities to and differences from Surfers Paradise. Locations in Cairns, Townsville and Mackay were selected because of their willingness to provide resources to support the project but also, critically, as they comprised the diverse collection of communities most suitable for a replication project. In addition to an aim of improving the safety of licensed environments in the central city entertainment areas, the replication projects were used to determine how robust the Surfers model was in these diverse communities, to improve understanding of the change process, and to strengthen the scientific evidence for a causal impact of the intervention on crime and violence. A specific goal was to determine which elements of the model were essential to bring about reductions in violence, crime and disorder by comparing modes of implementation and outcomes in each community.<sup>91</sup>
- The 1992/3 Fremantle “Freo Respects You” responsible alcohol service project was a collaborative initiative involving the hospitality industry, Police and liquor licensing and health authorities. While it was essentially a training programme for bar staff and their managers on the responsible service of alcohol rather than a broader initiative, an evaluation of the project delivered critical lessons on the importance of local ownership by licensees and broad licensee participation. Additionally it was the prompt for the formulation of a systems approach to reducing risk factors for alcohol-related harm.

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<sup>89</sup> Felson et al 1997.

<sup>90</sup> Homel et al 1997.

<sup>91</sup> Hauritz et al 1998a.

- Such an approach suggests that the greatest benefits will be realised if a coordinated set of legal, economic, educational, regulatory and policing strategies is adopted in a consistent manner.<sup>92</sup>
- The Operation Link: Be Safe Late Program in Ballarat, Victoria involved Police, the council, CBD late night venue licensees and CBD retailer/traders. It was a Police-led, community-based partnership approach to responsible patron management at licensed late-night venues. Critically, for the purposes of this review, key strategies included a 3am “lock-out” of all late-night entertainment venues (along with increased lighting within the precincts of the venues and the commitment of additional Police resources).<sup>93</sup>
- The South Australian project Partnership for Personal Safety: preventing violent crime in and around licensed premises aimed to develop means to reduce violent and other crimes and improve the safety of hotels and clubs by identifying and piloting strategies for use by licensees and managers in their own premises. Approaches included changes to management practices (eg, crowd control, security, server responsibility) and to environmental features of premises and surrounds.<sup>94</sup>
- A number of review papers that consider some or all the above projects provide a further interpretation of the best practice principles of initiatives delivered within the framework of a voluntary Accord.<sup>95</sup>
- Despite mixed evidence, those involved with them generally view Accords favourably. A stakeholder review on Alcohol Accords in Western Australia found that 60% of respondents felt that the Accord had an ability to have a positive impact on the broader community. 80% reported better communication with Police and 73% had a clearer understanding of the reasons behind health and legal requirements.<sup>96</sup>

It has been reported that anecdotal reports from licensees in New Zealand suggest that this positive outlook is shared in New Zealand.

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<sup>92</sup> Stockwell 1997.

<sup>93</sup> Centre for Health Research and Practice 2004.

<sup>94</sup> Fisher 1993.

<sup>95</sup> For example: Lang and Rumbold 1997, Vaughan 2001, Rydon and Stockwell 1997, International Center for Alcohol Policies 2002.

<sup>96</sup> Haak et al 2003.

## CONTRIBUTORS TO VOLUNTARY ACCORD PROJECT SUCCESS

As highlighted under the scope of the review, the establishment of principles for the implementation of a one-way door policy within the framework of a voluntary Accord defers to principles that apply to voluntary Accords in general.

The following are identified as contributors to Accord success based on the literature reviewed.

### Engagement and set-up

- Involvement of key stakeholders including:<sup>97</sup>
  - The liquor industry, which must work with other stakeholders to maintain a safe environment in which to operate. It needs to view Accords as essential to ensure its viability in today's environment
  - Law enforcers, as they have day-to-day management of liquor laws
  - Liquor licensing authorities to support Police by acting on breaches of the Liquor Act by licensees
  - Local government, whose input to problems is critical to Accord success given the interrelationship of alcohol and violence. Roles include eg, planning approvals that consider the safety of patrons and local laws re liquor bans.
- Strong partnerships between key players (Police, Liquor Licensing Authority, industry body and key industry players) and key licensees provide initial credibility and an ongoing means of bringing licensees and managers along with the project.<sup>98</sup>
- An Accord must be tuned to reflect local issues It is critical to work from the overall concept of an Accord and work with **all** stakeholders to develop a specific aim for the area in consideration.<sup>99</sup>
- Licensees need to be clear about the benefits of the Accord. A lack of knowledge and trust by licensees who may initially see an Accord as a threat to their business is common and needs to be addressed at the outset. Licensees need to be shown that an Accord is a “win-win” proposition for them that presents no threat to their business viability.<sup>100</sup>
- Licensees need to be empowered and motivated as primary decision-makers in the process of change. Interested licensees, who understand that responsible hospitality

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<sup>97</sup> Vaughan 2001.

<sup>98</sup> Fisher 1993.

<sup>99</sup> Vaughan 2001.

<sup>100</sup> Vaughan 2001.

practices can be economically viable and are provided with a framework for change, can quickly demonstrate their knowledge of the problems and how they can be fixed. The code of practice in an Accord can effectively be a product of licensees' own knowledge and experience.

- Licensees can be innovative and keen to take control; it is important to take the time to wait and listen and work on their suggestions rather than on preconceived ideas. It has been noted that licensees are better positioned than anyone else for establishing the best measures to make a particular premises safer.<sup>101</sup> The finding that research in Canada, the US, supports this and New Zealand generally concludes that local communities are best able to assess local needs and problems associated with alcohol-related problems in and around licensed premises.<sup>102</sup>
- “Community” projects seem to require at least some external resources or initiative to get them going, even if the level of community involvement and empowerment eventually achieved is quite high. Such a “top-down” approach is not necessarily a barrier to the required cooperation achieved at a local level. The Melbourne West End Forum arose from the recommendation of a government-funded group, the Victorian Community Council Against Violence, yet a high level of community involvement was achieved through public meetings, safety audits and task groups.<sup>103</sup>
- Clarity on the role of the statutory licensing authority in relation to the project is required. In particular, it is critical that Police (general duties and licensing specialists) are clear as to their own role in relation to monitoring licensing laws and what role the authority plays and how this will support Police action. This is critical to the requirement for a fair and consistent application of licensing laws.<sup>104</sup>
- There is a need for active engagement of local government and local government awareness of the influence that it can have on problems arising from licensed premises.<sup>105</sup>
- Significant momentum can be garnered when it is the community that seeks a change. For example, in Surfers Paradise there was a high awareness that business

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<sup>101</sup> Fisher 1993.

<sup>102</sup> Lang and Rumbold 1997.

<sup>103</sup> Homel et al 1997.

<sup>104</sup> Vaughan 2001.

<sup>105</sup> Vaughan 2001.

was being lost because of the area's poor reputation. The shared economic incentive was effective in promoting cooperative action to create change.<sup>106</sup>

### **Framework for the Accord**

- A cooperative partnership between all players is essential. Accords need to be developed as partnerships as there are both responsibilities for and advantages to the stakeholders. Partnership is required for the ownership of an Accord agreement; without ownership, maintenance will fall to one or none of the parties and the likelihood of success will be reduced. A well developed and maintained Accord will tend to self-regulate. The stakeholders must be accountable for any lack of compliance within their responsibilities and strong group pressure works to ensure the best interests of the parties, and hence the community, are upheld.<sup>107</sup>
  
- An approach of assisted self-regulation, effectively a self-regulatory framework overseen by a threat of sanction, is promoted as effective. While policy in an Accord can be presented to licensees in a non-authoritarian manner, Police and the liquor licensing authorities maintain a “hidden stick”, the ability to investigate and ultimately close down businesses and/or to affect requests from licensees for changes they may seek. However, it has also been noted that, even with the threat of sanction for licensees who break an Accord, it is unlikely that such Accords would be embraced by the industry if they included changes to management practices that did not enhance profits.<sup>108</sup>

### **Implementation**

- The “essential ingredients” of an effective Accord are:<sup>109</sup>
  - The formation of a steering committee
  - The conduct of a community forum
  - The employment of a project officer
  - The formation of task groups (these may differ in function from city to city)
  - The conduct of a safety audit to assist in establishing and prioritising issues and solutions
  - The development of a code of practice.

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<sup>106</sup> Homel et al 1997.

<sup>107</sup> Vaughan 2001.

<sup>108</sup> Rydon and Stockwell 1997.

<sup>109</sup> Hauritz et al 1998a.

- There is a requirement for a mechanism that informally calls licensees to account for violations of the code of practice, backed by the realistic threat of formal enforcement. It has been proposed that an over-reliance on persuasion may be, in part, why long-term effects have been difficult to achieve in Australia (the formal regulatory structures in the liquor licensing area in Australia are regarded to be weak).<sup>110</sup>

The favoured approach is a community-based monitoring committee that underpins self-regulation by licensees (especially where some irresponsible practices are not illegal). The forum in which non-compliance with the code of practice can be addressed and dealt with should not include representatives of the formal agencies of control. The Monitoring Committee in Surfers lost its neutrality by inviting Police and licensing inspectors to become members. As a result, the licensees may have become reluctant to discuss inappropriate practices for fear of retribution. It was clearly too early in the project to expect two groups that had traditionally been in conflict to be comfortable working together in an informal regulatory environment.

The monitoring committee needs to be “community owned”. As such it may initially lack the expertise, cohesion or political muscle required, but these qualities can be developed with input from strong project management and a steering committee taking a leadership role in ensuring that conflicts between agencies are resolved and that appropriate structures are put in place.

- It is possible to generate a high level of inter-agency cooperation and community involvement to support the energetic implementation of initiatives.<sup>111</sup>
- The gender of the project officer may be a crucial factor in gaining licensees’ confidence and commitment. The assumption was made in the Surfers project that the female project officer was not perceived as posing a challenge or a threat to the male licensees and thus was better able to persuade them to adopt more responsible alcohol policies.<sup>112</sup>
- A Police role focused on crime prevention rather than traditional law enforcement, which becomes secondary, has been cited as critical for implementation.<sup>113</sup>
- Arrests and prosecution should **not** be the main tools in an initiative. Accord approaches should focus on social control measures eg, containment via entry fees

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<sup>110</sup> Hauritz et al 1998a.

<sup>111</sup> Homel et al 1997.

<sup>112</sup> Homel et al 1997.

<sup>113</sup> Felson et al 1997.

and restricted drink promotions, and efforts to change social attitudes to alcohol and violence. The intention is that laws against drinking on the streets are easier to enforce in combination with these other changes.<sup>114 115</sup>

- An official Accord launch with appropriate media attention that involves all stakeholders is critical. This launch should be used to highlight cooperation between the stakeholders and notify the public of planned changes to the local environment. Critically, this reminds the public of their responsibility to behave appropriately and not place a licensee in jeopardy.<sup>116</sup>
- Media can be used positively to drive change. In Surfers, the media were educated regarding the project and became a vehicle for community education about responsible drinking, thus enhancing public support for the initiative.<sup>117</sup>
- An Accord can be strengthened from a toolbox of supplementary items, including:
  - Police and other agencies' work on other issues such as a lack of late-night taxis
  - Server responsibility training
  - Server responsibility supported through public education re legal obligations of servers.
- The entire policy need not be presented to all stakeholders upfront. Stepped presentation and the use of other methods as needed may be used to gain support and facilitate implementation.<sup>118</sup>
- Licensees need to be engaged in the process of problem identification from their perspective at early stage. It is too hard to capture them later in the project. Additionally, there needs to be recognition of the time it may take for licensees to develop understanding and commitment; examples in the literature demonstrate a shift eg, from "get more Police, it's their problem" and "I'll do what I need to meet requirements of law" to "if we do something we will gain and we are part of the process which contributes to crime prevention and safety".<sup>119</sup>
- A cohesive, committed steering committee, regularly briefed on project developments, is essential for the long-term success of such community interventions in two crucial

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<sup>114</sup> Felson et al 1997.

<sup>115</sup> Lang and Rumbold 1997.

<sup>116</sup> Vaughan 2001.

<sup>117</sup> Homel et al 1997.

<sup>118</sup> Felson et al 1997.

<sup>119</sup> Fisher 1993.

respects: managing the transition between stages of the project, and providing political advocacy for the community change process.

- The end of the first year of a project is a key transition point. The steering committee needs to move the project from dependence on personnel, such as the project officer, to dependence on a process. The project can sustain an inevitable loss of momentum at this point provided the key decisions have been made to move the project to the next stage.

Part of “moving the project on” is political advocacy. The steering committee needs to lobby politically for formalisation of the processes of the project into government legislation or policy (for example, through amendments to the Liquor Act, or into the routine procedures of government agencies. While the initial role of the steering committee is to be a high-profile support to the project officer, it must eventually become the vehicle for “normalising” the processes of community change.<sup>120</sup>

### **Accord sustainability**

Many of the critical factors in engagement and implementation will also impact on sustainability. The following are additional points in relation to sustainability.

- The critical issue for any Accord is review and maintenance. Without active and constant reinforcement, any Accord will fail. If an Accord is maintained through regular meetings, stakeholders have an opportunity to express their concerns and offer solutions.<sup>121</sup>
- The most successful Accords have strong agreement from all parties involved regarding the outcomes to be achieved **and** a sustained commitment to working together to achieve those aims.<sup>122</sup> The multi-way partnerships in Accord projects require a significant degree of ongoing commitment to be successful.

The requirement for licensee buy-in as described in set-up is also critical to sustainability. There are frequent cases of failure to sustain a reduction in violence after intensive intervention ceases. A key reason cited for this is licensee disregard for the Accord in favour of commercial competition with one another.<sup>123</sup>

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<sup>120</sup> Homel et al 1997.

<sup>121</sup> Vaughan 2001.

<sup>122</sup> Crime Prevention Victoria 2005.

<sup>123</sup> Indermauer D. Situational prevention of violent crime: theory and practice in Australia. *Studies on Crime and Crime Prevention* 1999; 8(1): 71-87. Cited in Centre for Health Research and Practice 2004.

- It may be necessary to encourage licensee participation on an ongoing basis through meaningful incentives such as fees from cover charges, insurance subsidies and subsidised training opportunities.<sup>124</sup>
- An initiative that emerges from and is resourced and managed by the community has a greater chance of sustainability. “Ownership” of an Accord by licensees is essential to sustainable self-regulation. Note: this is more easily achieved if the local liquor industry is relatively stable in terms of ownership and staff turnover.<sup>125</sup>
- Clarity of roles and responsibilities of all parties and adequate resourcing are essential.<sup>126</sup>
- Sustaining an initiative is difficult in the absence of a credible deterrent for irresponsible management.<sup>127</sup>
- A framework for ongoing related support is essential eg, the Surfers Venues Association contributes to improving safety, for example by providing security for taxi ranks.<sup>128</sup>
- Advocacy is another component of sustainability. Advocacy relates to maintaining a high level of awareness of the relevant issues so that the Accord remains on the agenda of key players. In some regards, this should be a product of the long-term commitment that has been identified as a success factor.
- Isolation from external factors that adversely impact on Accord success requires consideration. For example, where an initiative affects licensed premises in a small geographic area, adjacent premises may continue with practices that the initiative is discouraging. In this situation, consensus from licensees is more difficult to obtain and, further, a displacement effect can occur. The Geelong project was an example where the project area was geographically isolated from other major entertainment areas and this was seen by both licensees and Police as a critical factor in Accord success and sustainability.<sup>129 130</sup>

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<sup>124</sup> Crime Prevention Victoria 2005.

<sup>125</sup> Lang and Rumbold 1997.

<sup>126</sup> Crime Prevention Victoria 2005.

<sup>127</sup> Rydon and Stockwell 1997.

<sup>128</sup> Homel et al 1997.

<sup>129</sup> Lang and Rumbold 1997.

<sup>130</sup> Homel et al 1997.

- Structures must be established to maintain momentum during the project and after the intended period of contact. Structures are more useful than staff; an emphasis on the latter can reinforce reliance on someone else to take responsibility for crime prevention.<sup>131</sup>

An Alcohol Accords stakeholder review in Western Australia highlighted that indicators of success that were common to most Accords were dependent on many of the **structural** factors of success, including:<sup>132</sup>

- The level of attendance/participation by members
- The extent to which the Accord meets its objectives
- The extent to which members follow through with Accord decisions.

The ability for an initiative to be disseminated from the initial organisation(s) into the community (sometimes referred to as transferral) is very dependent on the capacity within the community for maintaining the initiative, and capacity-building can enhance the prospect of sustainability.<sup>133</sup>

## Complementing the Accord

Linking Accords to other initiatives and strategies relevant to reducing alcohol-related antisocial behaviour and violence in and around licensed premises can contribute to a more effective coordination of local-level activity. Examples are local safety committees and drug action plans.<sup>134</sup>

The basis of this approach is that while there is good evidence that substantial benefits for public health, safety and order flow from strategies that limit the number of intoxicated people on, or leaving, licensed premises, there are also a number of other modifiable situational variables, such as the level of crowding, that may impact on levels of violence. A systems approach suggests that the greatest benefits will be realised if a coordinated set of legal, economic, educational, regulatory and policing strategies is adopted to reduce these risk factors in a consistent manner.<sup>135</sup>

Many such wider systemic effects on the drinking behaviour of communities have been identified in the research literature and one attempt to summarise these and show their relationship with the

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<sup>131</sup> Fisher 1993.

<sup>132</sup> Haak et al 2003.

<sup>133</sup> Centre for Health Research and Practice 2004.


<sup>134</sup> Crime Prevention Victoria 2005.

<sup>135</sup> Stockwell 1997.

more immediate situational factors of management and serving practices is shown in figure 2.<sup>136</sup> It is argued that contrary effects from any of the domains shown in the outer ring of figure 2 might negate, or at least reduce, the effectiveness of gains from the other elements.

An example of competing systemic effects would be the provision of training schemes without any legal requirement for staff to attend them and no perceived threat of relevant laws being enforced. Another example would be the provision both of training for bar staff and of consistent law enforcement, but with any benefits of these negated by a substantial increase in consumer demand for high-strength drinks stimulated by a reduction in alcohol taxes.

Figure 2: Systems model of the licensed drinking environment



RBS = responsible bar service

<sup>136</sup> Stockwell 1997.

## COMPARING SUCCESS FACTORS WITH AN EXISTING NEW ZEALAND SUMMARY

The findings in relation to success factors summarised above are in line with and are supported by the summary of advice provided by the Crime Prevention Unit in New Zealand<sup>137</sup> regarding good practice for working in a local partnership.

*As a local partnership, Alcohol Accords will work best when they:*

- Have a clear and shared purpose
- Focus on results and develop specific strategies for achieving these
- Are guided by strong leadership and vision
- Take a problem-solving approach and promote innovation – by seeking new solutions to old problems, and having the flexibility to adapt to new problems or circumstances
- Pool the knowledge, information, skills and resources of members, and allocate responsibilities appropriately
- Develop an environment of trust and respect
- Maintain enthusiasm and commitment by providing partner agencies and the wider community with regular updates on progress and successes.

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<sup>137</sup> Crime Prevention Unit 2000.

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